Documents / FOIA release
This is an October 1968 contribution by the Central Intelligence Agency's Office of Strategic Research to National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-68 on Soviet and East European general purpose forces. It covers Warsaw Pact war plans for Central Europe, the effects of the Czechoslovak crisis, and the doubling of Soviet forces on the Chinese border since 1965. It also assesses ground, tactical air, naval and coastal defense forces. The text does not mention UFOs or unidentified aerial phenomena.
In the Hungarian intervention in 1956 the Soviets probably began some preliminary mobili- zation steps on 19 October in response to the Polish crisis. Units from the USSR began arriving in Hungary on 25 October and the reinforcement was completed by 4 November, 16 days after the initial alert. the Soviet Carpathian Front was to Degin arriving in Czecho- ojvakia on the fourth day of hostilities (D+3) On balance, the evidence indicates that the Soviets believe they could complete the essential elements of reinforcement in Central Europe within about ten days if the need were sufficiently urgent. If given a choice, however, it appears that they would plan to take about three weeks to complete the rein- forcement. The most time-consuming and critical aspect of mobilization is the organization and filling out of the Front and army rear services. These units are the least combat ready in peace- time, and important elements of the rear services - 46 - T} BECR ET
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 115 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.