OSR Contribution to NIE 11-14-68, Soviet and East European General Purpose Forces, CIA/DI/OSR, October 1968.

'iQPiCRET
that vehicles and drivers are called up on practice
alerts during which they report to their designated
units. We have observed large numbers of what appear
__.t"o4aQ1=1n-vezi s---r~key-
divisional installations during the summer training
season.
Redundancy is built into the mobilization
system in an effort to make up for its inherent
shortcomings. In practice mobilizations, some low-.
strength Soviet and Eastern European divisions have
reportedly been overfilled by as much as 20 percent
of their wartime personnel strength.
The Warsaw Pact mobilization plan is
complex and vulnerable to interruptions if attempted
after the beginning of hostilities. More than 21,000
vehicles would be needed to complete the mobilization
of the low-strength divisions in the Belorussian and
Carpathian MD's and the three additional armies in
the Baltic and Kiev MD's, The army and-Front-level
organizations of these forces would probably require
from 15,000 to 20,000 additional vehicles.
The movement of mobilized Warsaw Pact
forces from their peacetime location into the theater
of operations, and thence into combat, is closely
related to the mobilization process itself. In
Warsaw Pact doctrine, mobilization and deployment
are viewed as integrated components of a single
process--reinforcement.
_ the
classified writings of tnePact countries invariably
portray mobilization and deployment as taking place
in reaction to some western initiative--either an
outright attack against East Germany or Czechoslovakia,
or some other action which causes a sudden hei htening
of tension-,
However, the selective mobilization
an eployment of Soviet and Polish forces in prep-
aration for the Czechoslovak intervention, although
smaller in scale, probably approximates the time
schedule they would plan for in a deliberate rein-
forcement.
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