Documents / FOIA release
This is an October 1968 contribution by the Central Intelligence Agency's Office of Strategic Research to National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-68 on Soviet and East European general purpose forces. It covers Warsaw Pact war plans for Central Europe, the effects of the Czechoslovak crisis, and the doubling of Soviet forces on the Chinese border since 1965. It also assesses ground, tactical air, naval and coastal defense forces. The text does not mention UFOs or unidentified aerial phenomena.
TOP'&E ET When fully mobilized the Czech Front would have consisted of about 200,000 men and 3,000 tanks. It would have been supported by 250 aircraft, about 40 nuclear-capable missile rocket launchers, _____- --- t4eypi eccz -- and I 5-m1-tipe-r:.-roket launchers. c. Polish Front The Polish armed forces are respon- sible for organizing and deploying a Front consisting of three Polish field armies and a tactical air army. Two of the field armies, one organized from the Pomeranian MD and one from the Silesian MD, constitute the first operational echelon of the Polish Front and are prepared for combat within a few hours after being alerted. The nine divisions in these two armies--five tank and four mechanized--are Category I and are prob- ably manned at between 70- and 100-percent personnel strength and have all their vehicles and equipment. The support units of these two armies are also prob- ably at sufficient strength for immediate deployment. The second echelon of the Polish Front would be formed by an army from the Warsaw MD. Its four mechanized divisions and its support units are Category II. They are probably manned at less than half strength in peacetime and are short much of their general-purpose transport equipment. The preparation of this army for combat, including the mobilization and integration of reservists and civilian vehicles and the organization of army- level command and control and logistic organizations, would probably require seven to ten days. In addition to the line divisions in armies, the Poles have an airborne division and an amphibious assault landing division. Although small, these divisions are probably available for immediate deployment. The airborne division would have to rely on Soviet aircraft for transport. The Front headquarters is formed by cadres from the Polish Ministry of National Defense, supplemented with reservists. The Front support units, particularly those concerned with supply, maintenance and transportation, would largely be - 37 - UOPS ECRET7
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 115 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.