Documents / FOIA release
This is an October 1968 contribution by the Central Intelligence Agency's Office of Strategic Research to National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-68 on Soviet and East European general purpose forces. It covers Warsaw Pact war plans for Central Europe, the effects of the Czechoslovak crisis, and the doubling of Soviet forces on the Chinese border since 1965. It also assesses ground, tactical air, naval and coastal defense forces. The text does not mention UFOs or unidentified aerial phenomena.
TOP'8FGRET The Czech forces include three field armies and a tactical air army. There are two field armies in the western part of Czechoslovakia, each _ ___ _.-.. .. ., ._~ -A '._~. z r x~=_ ld .ci rc._ _. - 0--- '$"° -...------The sions and their support units are probably manned at 70 percent strength or better and are sufficiently equipped for combat. In an emergency, these units were expected to deploy into.combat without rein- forcement. If time permitted, however, they were to be filled up with. reservists. The third Czech army, located in. eastern Czechoslovakia, is in cadre status. The cadres of four divisions, each at 15 to 30 percent of wartime strength, are consolidated under two commanders in peacetime for economy. The combat equipment for all four divisions and the army support units is stored in eastern Czechoslovakia, but only about half of the wartime requirement of wheeled vehicles is on hand. In an emergency, the Czechs planned to fill up the army and divisional units partly with reservists. The necessary additional wheeled vehicles along with their drivers were to be requisitioned from the civilian economy. the Czechs planned t pe re nr moniizai on in three days. In that time they expected to deploy their two western armies into combat and assemble the army from eastern Czechoslovakia. We believe that the Czechs would probably have been capable of deploying their two western armies within three days or less. Their plan. to complete the mobili-. zation and deployment of the third army and of the Front support organization in this time period was less realistic since it would have depended on the successful completion of complex procedures. These would include the transfer of numerous officers and NCO's from terminated peacetime activities and their integration into the Front and army organization, and the mobilization of some 40,000 reservists and as many as 10,000 vehicles. The completion of this mobilization, which was never fully tested, might have required a week or more. - 36 - TOP BEGRET
Not linked to a story yet.
FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 115 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.