Documents / FOIA release

OSR Contribution to NIE 11-14-68, Soviet and East European General Purpose Forces, CIA/DI/OSR, October 1968.

Central Intelligence Agency · 115 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is an October 1968 contribution by the Central Intelligence Agency's Office of Strategic Research to National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-68 on Soviet and East European general purpose forces. It covers Warsaw Pact war plans for Central Europe, the effects of the Czechoslovak crisis, and the doubling of Soviet forces on the Chinese border since 1965. It also assesses ground, tactical air, naval and coastal defense forces. The text does not mention UFOs or unidentified aerial phenomena.

TOP iSRET
3. Combat Readiness
a. Order of Battle and Equipment Levels
We have reassessed the order of battle
and equipment levels of the ground forces in the Belo-
russian, Carpathian, Kiev, and Moscow military dis-
tricts and in the 11th Guards Arm area (Kalinin rad
Oblast) of the Baltic MD.
permit a high-confidence estimate of the
numbers and locations of armies and line divisions
in these areas and of the equipment levels of the
divisions.
Our analysis has confirmed the
existence of nine field armies in four of the MD's
under review. These nine armies contain 35 divisions
-- 19 tank and 16 motorized rifle. Another six divi-
sions--including two airborne--are located in the
vicinity of these army areas but apparently are not
subordinate to them.
We have assessed these divisions
against the equipment levels of combat-ready Soviet
divisions in Germany and find that about 11 are
probably equipped at similar levels. The results
of this assessment are illustrated in Figure 5
(opposite page). It should be noted that equipment
strength is not the only criterion for categorizing
divisions--although it is the principal one. Other
factors such as activity levels, training, and sub-
ordination were also considered. In a few instances,
apparent equipment levels which suggest combat-
ready status for some of these divisions were
discounted by such other evidence.
These findings are consistent with
our observations that these same divisions tend to
have larger and more frequently used training facil-
ities, and garrisons which appear generally more
active, than the other divisions in the western USSR.
The two airborne divisions--one in the Baltic MD and
one in the Belorussian MD--are also combat ready.
- 22 -
TOP'&ECRET

Not linked to a story yet.

About this file

FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 115 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.