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OSR Contribution to NIE 11-14-68, Soviet and East European General Purpose Forces, CIA/DI/OSR, October 1968.

Central Intelligence Agency · 115 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is an October 1968 contribution by the Central Intelligence Agency's Office of Strategic Research to National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-68 on Soviet and East European general purpose forces. It covers Warsaw Pact war plans for Central Europe, the effects of the Czechoslovak crisis, and the doubling of Soviet forces on the Chinese border since 1965. It also assesses ground, tactical air, naval and coastal defense forces. The text does not mention UFOs or unidentified aerial phenomena.

control of general purpose forces. A Front would
consist of about three field armies and a tactical
air army plus combat and service support. The rear
services of the Front are responsible for most of the
administrarive. suppmL u0t the COunu.>aL unIILs, IlUldim
supply, evacuation, medical service, construction,
and maintenance. The very low provision of these
kinds of support at division and army level makes
the efficient operation of the Front's rear services
from the very beginning of military operations a
critical requirement, since the combined total of
mobile stocks of POL and ammunition in divisions
and field armies would be sufficient for only four
to five days of intensive combat.
Short-range tactical airborne sup-
port is provided by medium and heavy helicopters
assigned to the tactical air components of a Front.
The overall strength and disposition of the helicopter
forces, however, are not adequate for the lift of
large ground units.
The Group of Soviet Forces in
Germany (GSFG) is virtually a Front in being. As
such, it is the only completely mobilized Warsaw
Pact Front. Several potential Fronts planned for
Central Europe are known to exist. Prior to the
Czechoslovak invasion the Polish and Czech military
establishments were each responsible for forming a
Front in wartime, as was the Soviet Carpathian
Military District (MD) and probably the Belorussian
MD. In each of these potential Front areas there
were currently three or more field armies, a tactical
air army, and limited additional combat and service
su _port units.I
For each potential Front, except he GFG,
much of the higher command and control structure and
a majority of the service support units would have to
be created by mobilization.
Other potential Soviet and East
European Fronts probably exist in Bulgaria, the
southern and far eastern USSR, and possibly, in the
northwestern USSR. Ground armies and tactical air
armies are stationed in each of these regions.
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 115 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.