Contribution to NIE 11-14-64 Capabilities of Soviet General-Purpose Forces 1964-70, CIA/DI/ORR, 6 October 1964

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the strategic forces at the expense of the traditional arms -- have
encountered persistent opposition from the military leadership. Public
contention has arisen over questions of the allocation of resources,
the structure of the armed forces, and the kind of war for which the
Soviet armed forces should be equipped and trained to fight. The
result has been something of an impasse in defense policy: Khrushchev's
efforts at reform have been deflected, modified, and even blocked. A
military establishment adapted to the requirements for large-scale
theater warfare on the European continent has continued to coexist
with a military doctrine increasingly oriented toward the threat of
nuclear warfare with a transoceanic enemy.
In recent months, signs have accumulated that this impasse may be
breaking. A new phase of controversy has been underway that appears to
reflect pressures for change at the policy level. The character of
the controversy, the circumstances in which it has developed, and the
trends that it has exhibited suggest that a new step is being taken
to resolve the inconsistencies in the existing doctrines concerning
strategic and theater warfare.
Tfhe latest phase in the controversy opened at the end of 1963,
when an announcement by Khrushchev that a military manpower cut was
being contemplated evoked a visible negative reaction from military
leaders. It is now known that this announcement came at a time when
a new program of strategic missile deployment was just getting underway.
This coincidence, plus the initiation in the military press at the same
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