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Contribution to NIE 11-14-64 Capabilities of Soviet General-Purpose Forces 1964-70, CIA/DI/ORR, 6 October 1964

Central Intelligence Agency · 53 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA Office of Research and Reports contribution to National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-64, dated 6 October 1964, on the capabilities of Soviet general-purpose forces from 1964 to 1970. It updates evidence on Soviet doctrine for theater warfare, the effect of low wartime birth rates on military conscription and the labor supply, tactical missile systems, the Soviet and Satellite tactical air forces, and Soviet naval submarine, surface and air forces. The report does not mention unidentified flying objects.

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CAPABILITIES OF SOVIET GENERAL-PURPOSE FORCES
1964-7o
I. Recent Trends in Soviet Policy and Doctrine Regarding General-
Purpose Forces
Soviet doctrine for the employment of general-purpose forces has
been changing in recent years as the focus of Soviet strategic thinking
has shifted from its traditional preoccupation with continental land
warfare to the problems of intercontinental warfare waged with advanced
weapons systems. Thus far this process has affected mainly the tech-
nical aspects of the employment doctrine -- questions concerning the
utilization of weapons, the composition of forces in theater operations,
command and control, and so forth. Broader questions affecting the re-
lationship between theater campaigns and global operations or the role
of theater warfare in a general nuclear war have been scarcely touched,
On these questions, Soviet doctrine has assumed until recently an
ambivalent position, holding, on the one hand, that general nuclear -ar
may be decided in its initial moments by nuclear missile strikes, and,
on the other, that the "final" victory in such a war will require the
coordinated action of all branches of the armed forces --. that is, the
action of general-purpose forces in theater operations.
The ambivalence of Soviet doctrine on these questions mirrors a
controversy on the level. of practical policy that has been agitating
the Soviet leadership for several years. Khrushchev's military policie>
during these years - aimed at focusing the Soviet defense effort cn
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 53 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.