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Contribution to NIE 11-14-64 Capabilities of Soviet General-Purpose Forces 1964-70, CIA/DI/ORR, 6 October 1964

Central Intelligence Agency · 53 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA Office of Research and Reports contribution to National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-64, dated 6 October 1964, on the capabilities of Soviet general-purpose forces from 1964 to 1970. It updates evidence on Soviet doctrine for theater warfare, the effect of low wartime birth rates on military conscription and the labor supply, tactical missile systems, the Soviet and Satellite tactical air forces, and Soviet naval submarine, surface and air forces. The report does not mention unidentified flying objects.

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3. Requirement for a Low-Altitude Capability
The USSR, as indicated in its military documents, appre-
ciates the requirement for a mobile, low-altitude SAM system that can
be deployed with frontaline troops. Nevertheless, the only SAM system
to which technical analysis permits attributing a low-altitude capa-
bility is the SA-3, whose components (although mounted on wheels) are
large and cumbersome (particularly the radar). As a result, rapid
movement of the system is probably impossible. This immobility may
account for its having been observed only at fixed sites in the USSR.
Therefore, if the GANEF, as technical analysis suggests, is not a low-
altitude system, a series deficiency exists in the SAM defense capa-
bilities of their ground forces. It follows that the USSR could be
developing such a system, but there is no basis for predicting when it
might become available,
4. Antitactical Ballistic Missile Developments
Statements in classified Soviet documents and attempts to
intercept about 19 short-range missiles fired into the Sary Shagan Anti-
ballistic Missile Test Center (SSATC) between 1960 and 1961 suggested
an early interest in the development of an antitactical ballistic
missile (A1E) system. In addition. analysis of photography through.
1963 covering Launch Area A at the SSATC suggested that Sites 1,'2, 3,
and 4 might be ATBM R&D facilities -- primarily because, unlike the
Leningrad prototypes at Sites 5 and 6, they lacked large structures,
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 53 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.