Contribution to NIE 11-14-64 Capabilities of Soviet General-Purpose Forces 1964-70, CIA/DI/ORR, 6 October 1964

TOPSECRET
military forces as a source of civilian manpower, although desirable,
were not "mandatory."
Nevertheless, the requirement for civilian labor was a factor
contributing to the decision to reduce the military force in 1960.
Soviet officials could not have been certain of the ultimate level of
success to be achieved in their campaign to increase labor participa-
tion rates; and a reduction of 1.2 million men in the military forces
would have provided an important annual increment during each of 2
critical years, 1960 and 1961. Also of importance is the fact that men
of the age for military conscription are "prime" labor, higher in
quality than the marginal workers acquired by government "persuasion."
In sheer numbers, military manpower is a very small part of the
total labor force. Total civilian employment in the USSR in 1963 is
estimated to have been more than 110 million persons. The primary
impact of the military manpower requirements is not so much the number
of men included in the armed forces as it is the growing number of
skilled workers and technicians necessary to the military establishment
to operate its rapidly growing inventory of complex weapons systems.
The nature of the equipment being operated and maintained by the Soviet
armed forces has changed drastically over the last 10 to 15 years. Not
only have totally new weapons systems like guided missiles and nuclear
submarines been introduced in large numbers, but also much of the
equipment of the "conventional forces" has increased markedly in com-
plexity. These developments have increased the military demands for
- 12 -
TOP CRET _ _]