Contribution to NIE 11-14-64 Capabilities of Soviet General-Purpose Forces 1964-70, CIA/DI/ORR, 6 October 1964

T>~ECRET __
employment of theater forces in nuclear war -- namely, the ambivalent
position that the outcome of such a war might be decided in its initial
moments and yet require the coordinated action of all arms to insure
final victory. According to the new formulation -- presented in an
authoritative article written by Marshal Sokolovskiy -- the outcome of
a future nuclear war will be decided in "minutes, hours, and days" and
cannot be protracted.
Other Soviet spokesmen, including Khrushchev, have previously pre-
dicted that a nuclear war might be short, but none has previously
asserted categorically that it could not be long. The importance of
the new formulation lies in the fact that it removes a conceptual
premise on which the advocates of capabilities for large theater forces
have heretofore pressed their case -- namely, the view that a nuclear
war could not be successfully brought to a conclusion without the
destruction of the enemy's forces on the ground and the seizure of
his territory. The new formulation does not rule out a role for theater
forces in a future nuclear war, but it appears to clear the ground for
a more precise definition of that role and for a differentiation of
that role from that of the strategic forces.
Other aspects of the Sokolovskiy article bear out this general
assessment. The picture that it projects of theater operations in a
general nuclear war suggests greater flexibility in the employment of
forces than has heretofore been evident in similar discussions of this
subject. The possibility that ground troops may not be required in
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