Documents / FOIA release
This Central Intelligence Agency memorandum to the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, dated December 1961, sends a verbatim translation of a Soviet article from the TOP SECRET version of the journal Military Thought. The article, "The Theory of Military Art Needs Review" by Colonel-General A. Gastilovich, appeared in the first 1960 issue. It argues that nuclear missiles call for short "blitz" wars, smaller ground forces and missile troops as the main arm. It has no UFO content.
' 11110hS1.1. El'
blare convenient for him and, comemonlay, cluster s cattle array
and operational formation. In this cosmetic(' en important role in
defense is played by broad utilization of obstacles and terrsins
presenting natural obstructiont for i elowing the to of the men/
advance. layover, the fate of modern defense is decided in the final
anal:is by the maneuver of missiles, chiefly the shifting of their
trajectories, and the availability of nuclear warheads, in conjunction
with ccunterettacks and counterblows of the reserves.
It appears to us that under conteeporary conditions defense, in
the pest meaning of this tern, "can take place only on a tactical scale.
Army and front operational defense, deliberately subordinated to the
interests of offensive operations in other directicsuo or dictated by
a sharp change in the situation in the enemy's favor, will, of course,
also have its place. Dot it met be based on the sans methods of
operation as in offensive operations; i.e., on heated neeting battles
and aniagaments. For this, the army and front my have a number of
large its and a scale of some of action egealtothan a an fumy
and frost parrying ant offensive opmetioes. The difference will be
in the presence or a smeller quantity of nuclear warheads, which will
necessitate loss of. part .ot-the forces and territca7 in order to
win tine.
Defensive operations of the front and army, differing from
offensive operations in aim of entice and quantity of unclear
weapon, will resemble the latter in methods of large it tactical
operations.
It defensive operatics*, mrtainerades of the front and certain
large units of armies, taking advantage of a convenient local situation
which has arisen as smolt of swift actions or =clew strikes, will
fretmently carry out an offensive with limited gpals.
In a coutemporary operational depose, the formation at defensive
zones is not advisable because they do not justify their designation.
day large wait defending itself in place will be sumihilated by
nuclear strikes of the easyon elsay ineesed. On the opereticael
male, the tern °stable defame" Mould be relegated to the archives
because under modern conditions it mobs neither solid nor stable.
Slowirmithe to of the advancing mairby mass at defense is based
on cannterattacks and counterstrikes carried out from differemt
directions, on skilful and matt diseqpiehente the swab sal
on broad use of barridades sad utillastioa of natural terrain Obstacles,
until the time s poselbility presents itself to destroy the meg,
with a nuclear strike.
-A-
lla CP RFT Not linked to a story yet.
FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 28 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.