/specialCollection/SovietandWarsawPact/1961/1961-12-18.pdf

11111! S I IR I .7'
actions, but is yle!.ding to meeting engagements and envelopment.
• The taking of radioactively contaminated zones created ty the
enemy acquires great importance. It must be carried out by large
units, depending upon the tasks they are fulfilling, the meteorological
situation, and the degree of permissible dosage of radiation received
during the period of action. Depending upon these conditions, the
contaminated zones are taken either by a rapid forvard push or by
bypassing, or in the final analysis, tee troops continue to carry
out their mission in the contaminated zone vithout regard to possible
losses. Al]. discussions regarding the creation of passages into
contaminated zones, the surmounting of them in helicopters and others
are utopian at the present time. •
In planning contemporary offensive operations on the scale of
a trent and armies, it is impossible to prcceed frcm an single "D"
(day). In terms of time, operations viii flow in different directions,
at different tempos an it is more advisable to plan then by calendar
days (except, of course, the initia, retaliatory vissile strike).
Moreover, concrete army and large unit tasks can be established for
only 1-2 days and for a longer period it is sufficient to indicate
the general direction, the nature. of the activities and final goal
of the operation. More detailed planning is highly problematical,
since sharp changes in tie situation are unav'idable as a result of
enemy nuclear strikes.
The tempos of contemporary operations may be planned, as already
mentioned, up to 80 to 100 and more kilometers during a 24-hr. period
but it must be kept in mind that, as a result of enemy nuclear
strikes on our deep rear, the front vill not be ab le to rely an
systematic delivery from the rear of the country. Everything which
is essential must already be stored in the theaters in peacetinm and
such supplies as POL must, tc a significant degree, be sought out
from war trophies in the course of th. advance.
It is also essential to take into account the cumulative physical
tension on tank and truck drivers (it will be necessary to have two
reliefs for interchange of crew =ethers) and the large *weber of
vehicles which Will go out of commission.
Vigorous maneuver and nuclear strikes mast become the basis of
contemporary tefense. le who sits in place, even in prepared positions,
will be knocke- out by nuclear weapons or bypassed. Only a relatively
small part of the forces can hold separate areas or positions with
the aim of slowing the tempo of the enes7 advance along axes 'which
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