Documents / FOIA release
This CIA Oral History Program transcript records former Director of Central Intelligence Richard Helms interviewed by R. Jack Smith on 21 April 1982, approved for release in March 2008. Helms disputes criticism in the Rockefeller Commission Report and discusses the Oxcart aircraft, Watergate and the Plumbers, the war in Laos, and allegations about National Estimates. He also recalls warning President Johnson before the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and passing on warnings of the 1973 Yom Kippur war. It contains no UFO material.
S*/ /2 03 00809 forgotten which month of summer, [Jordan’s]King Hussein came to visit the Shah [of Iran] and was staying at a private home which the court had taken over for his comfort on the shores of the Caspian. I can’t remember now, whether he asked to see me or whether the State Department sent me to see him. In either event this was my introduction to an interesting matter of protocol, which was that if I wanted to visit King Hussein, I had to get the Shah’s permission since he was his guest. In other words, this was not something I could just go off and do, I had to go to the court and get permission and so forth. Anyway, I flew down to the Caspian on one of the planes of the court and went to see King Hussein. Well, after we had finished with whatever the business was that I’d been sent down there on in the first place, he gave me a detailed rundown on reports they’d been getting fiom a Syrian agent about the fact that the Syrians were intending to wage war on the Israelis. They had already missed one date for this attack to take place, as I recall the story. But they were sure of their agent; they were sure this was gonna happen; and they wanted me to know about it. They laid it out in considerable detail. So when I got back to Tehran, I obviously sent my telegrams back and one of them was encompassing this information. So why it was the intelligencepeople with the Agency who missed on the Yom Kippur war to me is still an enigma because this material looked so solid that even if you thought it was irrational for the Egyptians to attack the Barlev line, the fact remains that it was gonna be an active possibility. So something went askew, no doubt about it. End of transcript *//20300809
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 15 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.