Documents / FOIA release
This CIA Historical Review Program release, dated 1966-07-28 and released under the JFK Act, reproduces a New York Review article by Richard H. Popkin reviewing Edward Jay Epstein's Inquest and Harold Weisberg's Whitewash. The article argues that Oswald could not have fired all the shots in the Kennedy assassination. It points to FBI reports, the Zapruder film and bullet No. 399. Popkin proposes a two-assassin conspiracy involving a 'second Oswald' and calls for release of the autopsy photographs and X-rays.
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ag aund 12.93 and went to Oak Cliff. Onenight add some of the data on Tippie murder as "hard fact" but Oswald role in this incident is too much in suspil All of this certainly made augge case that, difficulties notwithstanding, all of the shooting-three shots-wadone by Oswald with his own title. NO THE MATERIAL presented by Epstein Salandria, and to a lesser extent Cook and Weisberg, undermundthe Commission's case in two ways first, they closely examine both the hence of the shots and the availabledical evidence in order to demonstre that all three shots could not have been fired by Oswald. Secondly, theyow that the Commission's theory is conflict with the rni's on a number crucial points: Indeed, one can onlclude either that both theories, coired together, are impossible, or thaey establish that more than one and was firing at the President. of the most important pieces of evile underlying this demonstration are IBI's summary reports on the case the film taken by Abraham Zaker, a bystander during the assassin. The IBI's first summary report dated December 9, 1963, just after theren Commission was appointed. Transport is not in the twenty-six voluend is published for the first time, anly in part, in Epstein's book. In it, IBI states simply that "three shang out. Two bullets struck Kennend one wounded Governor Conn. This seemed to account for all thunds; but it ignored incontrovertibility that one shot missed the car to have wounded over the President and Connally in separate shots. Epstein writes that, in early March, Arlen Specter, a Commission lawyer, discussed this time problem informally with Commanders Humes and Boswell, the Navy doctors who had performed the autopsy on President Kennedy. "According to Specter, Commander Humes suggested that since both Kennedy and Connally apparently had been hit within a second of each other, it was medically possible that both men had been hit by the same bullet and that Connally had had a delayed reaction. This hypothesis would explain how both men were wounded in less time than that in which the murder weapon could be fired twice . . ." (Inquest, p. 115). On March 16, 1964, when Dr. Humes's undated autopsy report was first introduced in evidence, it directly contradicted both the rmt report of December 9, 1963, and the subsequent rmt report of January 13, 1964. Dr. Humes's report stated that the first bullet struck the back of Kennedy's neck and exited through his throat. The rmt had said "Medical examination of the President's body had revealed that the bullet which entered his back penetrated to a distance of less than a finger length. (Exhibits 59 and 60)." These exhibits, reproduced in Epstein's book on pp. 56-57, are photographs of Kennedy's jacket and shirt. They show clearly a bullet hole 51/2-6 inches below the neckline, i.e., in his back. If the bullet had been shot from the Book Depository, it was on a downward course, and thus could not enter the back and exit through the throat unless it was detected. Further, the rmt report had said, "Medical examination language, that their reports were in error. Even before publication, I pstein's book had the effect of bringing a lot of information to light. Besides the portions of the 1811 reports he has published, newspaper and magazine accounts have given the 1811 explanations, the history of the autopsy report, etc., items which the Commission did not bother to clarify. If the 1811 did make a mistake, one explanation may be found in Fletcher Knebel's article in the July 12, 1966 issue of Look. Knebel attributes his explanation to three commission lawyers and one of the autopsy doctors (apparently Dr. Boswell). At the autopsy proper on November 22, 8-11 p.m., the doctors had not found an exit wound (or a bullet channel) and were puzzled. The next day they learned from Dr. Malcolm Perry of Parkland Hospital, Dallas, that there had been a bullet wound in the throat, obliterated by a tracheotomy operation. This led the doctors to conclude that the throat wound (which they never saw) was the exit wound. Their report was completed on November 24, and sent to the White House on the 25th. The Secret Service then received the report, and, according to statements published recently, sent it to the Commission on December 20 and to the 1811 on December 23. If this is what happened, it could account for the discrepancy between the rm's first report and the autopsy report. But why didn't the supposedly thorough rm ask for the autopsy report, or check with the doctors? How, indeed, could the rm have conducted an effective investigation without at least ascertaining the contents of the autopsy report? Is the De- So it would seem that even when the rmt states bluntly that "X is the case." this can be wrong, and only based on hearsay. This raises the problem of determining when the rmt is reliable. (Was it when it said Oswald was not an rmt agent?) How reliable are its many, many reports in the twenty-six volumes? When is the rmt to be taken at its word? If the rnt reports are false, is the Commission position then defensible, in view of the rnt photos of Kennedy's jacket and shirt published in Epstein's book? Its one-bullet theory depends in part on this bullet following approximately the path described in the sketch in the Commission Exhibit 385, entering the back of Kennedy's neck, and exiting at his throat on a downward path, then entering Connally's back and exiting below the nipple, going through his wrist, and finally reaching his femur (Commission Exhibits 679-80 and 689). But if Kennedy was shot in the back, then there is something basically wrong with the very possibility of the Commission theory. A bullet traveling downward would have exited from the chest, where there was no wound, and would have struck Connally at too low a point to inflict the damage. So the rni pictures of the President's clothing become very significant. Some of the comments on Epstein's book by hostile critics who were associated with the Commission appear to concede that the rni may have been right in locating the bullet in the back; and the rni photographs definitely indicate that this was the case. Suggestions have appeared that Kennedy could have been bending over at the time, The New York Review
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. The text was read from the page images by GLM-OCR; expect the odd misread word. 15 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.