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Baker report, 1968 congressional hearings

NICAP · 1968 · 68 pages · text from the file's own layer

This NICAP extract reproduces the statement of Dr. Robert M. L. Baker, Jr., a Computer Sciences Corporation scientist and UCLA engineering faculty member, to the House Committee on Science and Astronautics symposium on unidentified flying objects on July 29, 1968. Baker reviews his analyses of the Utah, Montana, Venezuela and Vandenberg films. He argues that current radar and optical sensors are poorly suited to detecting anomalistic phenomena and urges a well-funded, long-term interdisciplinary research program. The extract ends with panel discussion including Hynek and Hall.

even if they are not neglected, they are usually classified as spurious images or misassociated targets, and are stored away
on magnetic tape, and forgotten.
One space surveillance site operates a detection radar (FPS-17) and a tracking radar (FPS-79). If a new space object is
sensed by the detection radar's fans, then the tracking radar can be oriented to achieve lockon. The orientation is governed
by a knowledge of the appropriate "normal" object's astrodynamic laws of motion, or by an assumption as to launch point.
Thus, if an unknown is detected, and if it follows an unusual path, it is unlikely that it could, or would, be tracked.
Furthermore, the director of the radar may make a decision that the unknown object detected is not of interest (because of
the location of the FPS-17 fan penetration or because of the lack of prior information on a possible new launch). In the
absence of detection fan penetration (the fan has a rather limited coverage), the FPS-79 tracking radar is tasked to follow
other space objects on a schedule provided by the Space Defense Center, and again there is almost no likelihood that an
anomalistic object could, or would, be tracked.
The NASA radars, such as those at Millstone and Goldstone, are not intended to be surveillance radars, and only track
known space objects on command. Again the chances of their tracking anomalistic objects are nearly nil. The new phased-
array radar at Eglin AFB (FPS-85) has considerable capability for deploying detection fans and tracking space objects in a
simultaneous fashion. Such versatility raises certain energy-management problems -- that is, determining how much energy
to allocate to detection and how much to tracking -- but this sensor might have a capability (albeit, perhaps, limited) to
detect and track anomalistic objects. The problem is that the logic included in the software associated with the FPS-85's
control computers is not organized in a fashion to detect and track anomalistic objects (I will indicate in a moment how the
logic could be modified). Furthermore, the FPS-85, like the other surveillance radars is usually tasked to track a list of
catalogued space objects in the Space Defense Center's data base and the opportunity to "look around" for anomalistic
objects is quite limited.
There are a number of other radar surveillance systems such as a detection fence across the United States. In the case of
this fence, we have a situation similar to BMEWS, in which the time interval between successive penetrations (in this case
separated by an orbital period for satellites) must follow prescribed astrodynamical laws. If they do not, then the fence
penetrations are either deleted from
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the data base or classified as "unknowns" or "uncorrelated targets," filed, and forgotten.
There is only one surveillance system, known to me, that exhibits sufficient and continuous coverage to have even a slight
opportunity of betraying the presence of anomalistic phenomena operating above the Earth's atmosphere. The system is
partially classified and, hence, I cannot go into great detail at an unclassified meeting. I can, however, state that yesterday
(July 28, 1968) I traveled to Colorado Springs (location of the Air Defense Command) and confirmed that since this
particular sensor system has been in operation, there have been a number of anomalistic alarms. Alarms that, as of this
date, have not been explained on the basis of natural phenomena interference, equipment malfunction or inadequacy, or
manmade space objects.
PART 3. HYPOTHETICAL SOURCES FOR ANOMALISTIC OBSERVATIONS AND JUSTIFICATION FOR
THEIR STUDY
In Baker and Makemson (1967), I discussed the usual candidates for the natural sources of anomalistic observations. For
example, some scanning radars -- such as airport radars -- pick up anomalistic returns termed "angels." A variety of
explanations have been proposed, variously involving ionized air inversion layers, etc. (see Tacker (1960) and even insects
(see Glover, et al. (1966)). With respect to human observation of anomalistic luminous phenomena, some rather strong
positions have been taken by such authorities as Menzel (1953), who feels that the predominant natural phenomenon is
atmospheric mirages; by Klass (1958a), who feels that the predominant natural phenomenon is related to ball lightning
triggered by high-tension line coronal discharge, jet aircraft, electrical storms, etc.; by Robey (1960), who feels that the
observations are of "cometoids" entering the earth's atmosphere, etc. The list of hypothetical sources for anomalistic
observational phenomena is long indeed, but from the photographic data that I have personally analyzed, I am convinced
that none of these explanations is valid.
The analyses that I have carried out to date have dealt with observational evidence that I term "hard data" -- that is,
permanent photographic data. Although I will not discuss in detail the analyses of eyewitness reports (which I term "soft

Cases discussed

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Hearing transcript, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 68 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.