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The Roswell Report: Fact vs. Fiction in the New Mexico Desert

USAF / The Black Vault · 1995 · 882 pages · text by OCR

The Roswell Report: Fact versus Fiction in the New Mexico Desert was published by Headquarters United States Air Force in 1995. The Black Vault distributes this copy. It reproduces the report by Col. Richard L. Weaver and the synopsis by 1st Lt. James McAndrew, both written after a General Accounting Office inquiry requested by Representative Steven Schiff. The Air Force search found no evidence of an extraterrestrial craft or crew. It concluded that the Roswell debris most likely came from NYU Flight No. 4, a Project MOGUL balloon train.

  • p. 39 …An advance ground team, led by Albert P. Cray, preceded the NYU group to Alamogordo Army…
  • p. 96 …OSI also developed an advanced Narcotics Investigations Course designed to teach the latest technics in combatting…
  • p. 174 …Dr Crary and Dr Peoples were the advance people and scientific monitors for our project. Dr…
  • p. 247 …Spilly was a consultant, and even in his advancing age he was still an enormous source…
  • p. 273 …the advance party of the balloon group arrived by B-17. $ ^{21} $ On May 29, the…
  • p. 617 …in advance of balloon release and a second notice will be filed at the time of…
  • p. 618 …Upon attaining the desired altitude, the auxiliary lifting balloons will be released from the main balloon…
  • p. 694 …in advance of balloon release and a second notice will be filed at the time of…
  • p. 695 (1) The type balloon to be used in this phase of the project will be a…
Flight 12 was designed to overcome the difficulties encountered in flights 8 and 11, and, by the use of a thin tear-drop balloon (General Mills balloon) to carry the load to a higher altitude than flight 10. To guarantee a predetermined constant ballast flow, the manual ballast valve was added to the flight train. The minimum pressure switch replaced the fixed pressure switch to activate the automatic ballast valve, whether or not a predetermined activation altitude was reached. Figure 46 shows the train; figure 47 shows the time-altitude curve, which exhibits a marked departure from the ideal. The minimum pressure switch failed to operate or operated near surface pressure, effectively preventing the operation of the automatic ballast valve. The manual ballast valve did not provide sufficient flow to prevent the gradual descent of the balloon. Finally, the heavy load necessitated almost complete inflation of the balloon at the surface. This distention permitted continual mixing of air through the open bottom of the balloon. Instead of reaching the pre-calculated 38,000 feet maximum altitude, this flight had a peak of 14,000 feet from which it slowly descended. Since the blowout patch was set to act upon descent to 20,000 feet, it also failed to operate.

Five of the succeeding flights (nos. 13, 14, 15, 16 and 20) had as a prime objective the development of a satisfactory appendix to overcome the loss of buoyancy due to mixing during launching and ascent. The types considered have been discussed in Section II, Part A of this report and the (two foot) appendix stiffened with battens, which was finally evolved, is shown in figure 5. Figures 48, 49 and 50 show the time-altitude curves for these flights. Either short flight or limited radio reception curtailed the trajectory data.

In flight 19, the danger to personnel of the blowout patch was

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Report, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. The text was read from the page images by an OCR model; expect the odd misread word. 882 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.