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This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.
“Pacific Ocean”16 pages
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1 clusion W P D agreed, at least to the extent of informing the Chief of Staff on 14 November 1932 that the Air Corps “should develop a long range reconnaissance plane for use with the observation component of the GHQ Air Force and for overseas garrisons.” 18-( During the first half of 1933 the focus of attention in the Air Corps was on special command and staff exercises intended to test the value of a GHQ air force under simulated wartime conditions. With authori- zation from the War Department of 18 January 1933, a GHQ Air Force (Provisional) was organized and placed under the command of Brig. Gen. Oscar Westover, Assistant Chief of the Air Corps. Its mission was to concentrate a substantial part of the Army Air Corps on the West Coast in exercises to be conducted in the late spring for study of the problem of repelling an enemy overseas expedition. Despite rigid financial limitations which forced many compromises with what was considered desirable (the Air Corps had $19,500 that year for maneuvers), the exercises proved generally very successful. General Westover’s report concluded that “all Air Force units could be concentrated on either coast within two and one-half days, and possibly within two days should it be desirable to press the move- ment”; made constructive recommendations for the organization and command of a GHQ air force as a permanent part of the national defense; and stressed the need for “adequate and suitable equipment and materiel” for overwater reconnaissance. The report drew a dis- tinction between the equipment required for reconnaissance and bombardment and in the former category evidently assumed that improved amphibians would carry the main burden of long-range reconnaissance. It recognized the possibility, however, that provision of “flotation equipment and special characteristics in bombardment aircraft” might “enable them to fulfill their own observation missions in operations over water.” l S 5 More significant was the inclination to regard reconnaissance and bombardment as the most important functions of a GHQ air force. “The modern trend of thought,” wrote General Westover, “is that high speed and otherwise high performing bombardment aircraft, together with observation aviation of superior speed and range and communications characteristics, will suffice for the adequate air defense of this country.” The immediate occasion for this observation was a discussion of the disparity in performance between bombard- ment and pursuit planes which raised in General Westover’s mind a 64
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