“Nevers”44 pages
- p. 43 …cavalry mounted on gas driven flying horses” never arrived to
“sweep the Germans from the sky…
- p. 46 …Mitchell never received an American air force commensurate with
the ambitious idens of air power which…
- p. 49 …This project, like so many others, had lagged, and the Air Service was
never equipped during…
- p. 50 …the Army or the Air Corps?” but never, “Are
you in the Army or the Corps…
- p. 55 …any Air Service officers, and I have never heard
anybody yet-any Air Service officer-against…
- p. 69 …But one axiom,
with its corollaries, never varied. T o him the airplane was first and…
- p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be
completely stopped, but their effects could best…
- p. 94 …rate for the time being, the decision never-
theless left an open question as to how…
- p. 121 …large-scale warfare; production of combat types never exceeded 300
aircraft a month. The pattern of…
- p. 122 …the German Air Force, the
Regia Aeronautica never exhibited sufficient power to be decisive in
the…
- p. 133 …Except for a few raids against French
factories, the force had never been employed in a…
- p. 140 …into
a complete war economy production was never equal to the demands
of our own forces…
- p. 150 …Long-term needs
of the Air Corps and the sudden availability of funds in quantities
never…
- p. 181 …Actually, the Air Staff had
never approved of the method followed in RAINBOW No. 5 . l…
- p. 217 …Members of the Hawaiian Air Force, who had never flown
heavy bombers, began to receive intensive…
- p. 219 …were not then satisfactory for permanent garrisons. Never-
theless, the commander of the Hawaiian Department, Lt…
- p. 227 …T h e planes never reached their destination. Other
bombardment units were being prepared for transfer…
- p. 241 …responsible officers, a few crucial points
have never been satisfactorily explained.
T h e general pattern…
- p. 277 …motors, sole-
noids, and gun mounts-were never found. After many hours of fruit-
less search…
- p. 288 …planners and
from which AAF Headquarters was never to deviate.
The translation of the accepted grand…
- p. 303 …the principal features of the plan
were never challenged, it was subsequently revised in a draft…
- p. 309 …W a r Plans Division was
never incorporated into GHQ and remained a potential rival to…
- p. 336 …the shooting and wrote that they were never
able to make out an airplane.g6It is…
- p. 412 …As it happened, the B-24's never
returned to India, but, instead, remained in the…
- p. 457 …Meanwhile the Edsall with the remaining
pilots had headed for Java, never to be heard from…
- p. 492 …Squadron was assigned, but which it would never reach, going from
Australia to Tongatabu; ( 3 ) Christmas…
- p. 500 …deck of a carrier presented a problem never
before challenged by Army planes. Hence an accelerated…
- p. 502 …the bows and wetting the flight deck. Never before had this been
accomplished, yet now it…
- p. 509 …Island, in the
Louisiade Archipelago.” They were never needed, for on 7-8 May
the two…
- p. 513 …exist, it was at a point which never reached the
aircrews, for on the operational level…
- p. 524 …handicaps under which
AAF planes had operated. Never were more than fourteen B- I 7’s…
- p. 527 …AAF planners clung firmly to their belief that
proper observance of economy of force would never…
- p. 531 …Crews which had
previously never loaded torpedoes now for the first time fitted these
weapons into…
- p. 544 …But the Japanese never at
any time based their bombers in appreciable numbers a t either…
- p. 548 …26's in torpedo-dropping, but they never would be put into
All told, the record…
- p. 556 …until it had been thoroughly trained and never to com-
mit it piecemeal. General Magruder had…
- p. 560 …pressed into service against the Germans," and never reached the
CBI." Colonel Haynes had reached India…
- p. 606 …reason that the Antilles Air Task Force
never evolved, as did I Bomber Command, into an…
- p. 614 …that reason deserving a high
priority, could never dispose of the U-boat menace but must…
- p. 635 …In Washington the Munitions Assign-
ments Board t had never considered this schedule as more than…
- p. 670 …they bombed from 39,200 feet, and never
below 30,000. By AAF standards they had…
- p. 672 …Goering had never put enough bombers over England,
nor had he concentrated his forces on the…
- p. 690 …of co-operation and combined action probably never
before equaled by the military forces of two…
- p. 729 …shoot at aerial targets, and several
had never operated a turret in the air. This deficiency…
T H E A R M Y A I R A R M B E T W E E N T W O W A R S
undertook in collaboration with the OCAC an extended study which
served as the basis of a letter from the Chief of Staff to the command-
ing generals of all armies, corps areas, and departments dated 3 January
1933 and entitled “Employment of Army Aviation in Coast De-
fense.” l S 2 The function of the Army air arm therein stated was “to
conduct the land-based air operations in defense of the United States
and its overseas posses~ions.’~T w o distinct classes of aviation con-
cerned with frontier defense were recognized: ( I ) corps and army
observation units normally assigned to ground organizations, mobile
forces, and harbor defenses, and ( 2 ) “GHQ Aviation, the principal
and only component of which, in addition to army reserve aviation,
is the Air Force which normally operates initially directly under the
Commander of the Army Group.’’ The observation component of the
air force, it was declared, should include special equipment suited
to long-range reconnaissance over !and and water in order that
approaches to critical areas might be covered “to the limit of the
radius of action of the airplanes.” The role of Army aviation in defense
against an enemy attack was further described in terms of the follow-
ing operational phases: ( I ) reconnaissance and offensive operations
between the outermost range of the air force and the line of contact
with ground forces; ( 2 ) the support of other forces after the enemy
came within the range of ground weapons; ( 3 ) operations “in con-
nection with the use of all arms on our frontier.” During the first
phase Army aircraft would attempt to locate, observe, and destroy the
enemy vessels and forces. In the second it would lend support by
observation undertaken for the assistance of ground forces and by
further offensive operations. Should the enemy force the engagement
into the last phase, Army aviation would be employed in accordance
with general principles governing co-operation with land forces.
With its mission thus broadly and authoritatively defined, the way
was now open for the Air Corps to press forward with plans for
development of the special equipment required. During the course of
the aforementioned study, the Chief of the Air Corps, Maj. Gen.
B.D. Foulois, had pointed out to W P D the growing danger of
carrier-borne attack on our coasts, the necessity of keeping hostile
aviation a t least 2 5 0 miles a t sea, and the importance of developing
seaward reconnaissance units for operation under GHQ. It was his
feeling that the Air Corps at that time lacked both the equipment and
the organization for its newly approved missions.183With this con-
63