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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 173 …At the Roosevelt-Churchill conference at sea in mid-August, Generals Marshall and Arnold had made…
  • p. 226 …Air Service Command under Col. L.S. Churchill. Because of a shortage of experienced officers, only…
  • p. 282 …President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill with their chiefs of staff, then meeting in Washington, had…
  • p. 287 …the arrival in Washington of Prime Minister Churchill, his chiefs of staff, and other high-ranking…
  • p. 290 …stipulated in ABC-I. A t Mr. Churchill’s request, U.S. troops were to relieve…
  • p. 302 …the U.S. forces, and by Mr. Churchill as British Prime Minister and Minister of Defense…
  • p. 303 …Field Marshal Sir John Dill representing Mr. Churchill as Minister of De- fense. Sir John Dill…
  • p. 304 …of such a personal representative of Mr. Churchill might make difficult the maintenance of normal military…
  • p. 425 …O n the same day, Prime Minister Churchill informed Gen. Sir Archibald Wavell of his selection…
  • p. 628 …Western Hemisphere. When the President and Mr. Churchill met with their military staffs in the ARCADIA…
  • p. 630 …strong support in a long cable from Churchill to Roosevelt, delivered on 5 March, in which…
  • p. 636 …first in a gen- eral meeting with Churchill, later among the airmen alone.34Arnold reviewed the…
  • p. 639 …Much had happened in the two months which had passed since Churchill had approved that plan…
  • p. 640 …Duncan, chief of staff for the Eighth Air Force, wrote from Washington to Spaatz that Churchill…
  • p. 641 …postponement was al- most tantamount to refusal. Churchill was back in London by the 27th. In…
  • p. 642 …then back in Washington, that Roosevelt and Churchill “believed” that T O R C H was…
  • p. 661 …Even during the Battle of Britain, Churchill could tell the House of Commons that “there seems…
  • p. 705 …4 1 . ~ ~The following month, Prime Minister Churchill in conference with Messrs. Harry Hopkins and Averell…
  • p. 810 …2 0 August 1940, in R.S. Churchill, ed., Into Battle (London, 1941),p. 2 5…
  • p. 811 …comp., Winston Churchill’s Secret Session Speeches (New York, 1946), p. 85. 161. Larner report, as…
  • p. 845 …L.S., 182 Churchill, Prime Minister Winston, 133, 1369 141, 232, 235-37, 2409 2431 252…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
the coast over an element heretofore regarded as almost exclusively
the Navy’s responsibility. A t the same time, the airplane offered to the
Navy a new weapon of growing potentialities in the performance of
such traditionally naval functions as patrol of coastal sea lanes. Placed
aboard a carrier, the airplane could be regarded merely as a new ele-
ment of the fleet, but the land-based plane carried ceriain advantages
in the fulfilment of some missions at sea. In the development of service
aviation, consequently, there was a tendency for the Navy to move
ashore and for the Army to extend its activities beyond the shore
line.177
In the resultant disputes-which focused from time to time on the
right of the Army to engage in seaward reconnaissance, on the right
of the Navy to acquire land-based planes, and increasingly on its right
to expand shore facilities for land-based planes at the risk of duplicat-
ing existing Army facilities-traditional delineations of function and
responsibility became blurred. Efforts to secure agreement all too
frequently ended in the airing of irreconcilable views, and such was
the peculiar perplexity of the problems raised that attempts to secure
some authoritative and definitive settlement had proved futile.”’
Readily understandable, therefore, is the very evident satisfaction
with which the W a r Department announced on 9 January 1931 the
conclusion of an agreement between Gen. Douglas MacArthur, Chief
of Staff, and Adm. William V. Pratt, Chief of Naval Operations,
intended to leave the air force of each service “free to develop within
well defined limits and each with a separate and distinct mission.”
In his annual report a few months later General MacArthur defined
the agreement in these terms:
Under it the naval air forces will be based on the fleet and move with it as
an important element in performing the essential missions of the forces afloat.
T h e Army air forces will be land based and employed as an element of the
Army in carrying out its missions of defending the coasts, both in the homeland
and in overseas possessions. Through this arrangement the fleet is assured
absolute freedom of action with no responsibility for coast defense, while the
dividing line thus established enables the air component of each service to
proceed with its own planning, training, and procurement activities with little
danger of duplicating those of its sister service.180
Before a congressional committee the following year, General Mac-
Arthur expressed the opinion that the question of coastal air defense
had been “completely and absolutely settled.”
In that same year the War Plans Division of the General Staff
6 2

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