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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 2 THE UNIVERSITYOF CHICAGOPRESS, CHICAGO8 LONDON The University of Toronto Press, Toronto 5, Canada Copyright 1948 by…
  • p. 48 …An Associated Press dispatch of 10 October gave a contemporary judgment of the importance of this…
  • p. 55 …Air Service (Corps) found it difficult to press vigorously for reorgani- zation and, by default, leadership…
  • p. 56 …In 1919the W a r Department was pressing for a drastic revision of the military establishment…
  • p. 61 …It held that there was no danger of an air attack on the United States and…
  • p. 64 …GHQ Air Forcq a trial than to press for more radical measures, and Howell’s group…
  • p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be completely stopped, but their effects could best…
  • p. 98 …based air operations in defense of the United States and its overseas posses~ions.’~T w…
  • p. 99 …General Westover’s report concluded that “all Air Force units could be concentrated on either coast…
  • p. 130 …the Admiralty began to press for control of naval air units, while the army attempted to…
  • p. 149 …basic and advanced Responsibility for crew and unit train- ing was vested in the GHQ Air…
  • p. 164 …A m y air units in the Territory existed primarily for the defense of this and…
  • p. 176 …no military alliances were made which would commit the United States to war; the plans only…
  • p. 278 …There were also grounds for hoping that heavy bomber units now based on Darwin might increase…
  • p. 285 …From 1938 the United States had invoked sanctions against Japan in the form of moral em…
  • p. 287 …Over-all Strategy and lmmediate Deployment On 2 2 December, the press announced dramatically the arrival…
  • p. 289 …ground units sent in that direction were not destined for immediate combat. No major invasion of…
  • p. 323 …Seizure of bases in Canada or Mexico for later attacks on the United States. Capture of…
  • p. 366 …United state^,^ and the British them- selves were forced to withdraw some pilots from combat units…
  • p. 380 …Upon the request of the Ferrying Command, the State Depart- ment again pressed for an answer…
  • p. 397 …the summer and fall, first as the United States Middle East Air Force and later as…
  • p. 430 …Attempts had been made to replace these obsolete craft by purchase from the United States, but…
  • p. 440 …But as the Japanese pressed forward the Americans were given no opportunity to get set. The…
  • p. 463 …personnel that would be reassigned to infantry units whose rosters already included many representatives of the…
  • p. 552 …pines and more recently of American air units operating in the Netherlands East Indies, he was…
  • p. 560 …Moreover, examination proved that most of the basic equipment of the units, including badly needed trucks…
  • p. 563 …Grady arrived from the United States for a comprehensive survey of Indian resources with reference to…
  • p. 564 …TO C H I N A graphic units, and unfavorable atmospheric conditions combined to make high…
  • p. 607 …Thus the AAF units engaged in the anti-U-boat war became almost a t once…
  • p. 628 …Army air bombardment units would operate offensively in collaboration with the Royal Air Force, primarily against…
  • p. 658 …was to operate in the United Kingdom.14' All air units initially based there were to…
  • p. 683 …of the units of the infant Eighth until their departure for the United Kingdom several months…
  • p. 691 …The RAF proposed that American fighter units be integrated with its own under a plan eventually…
  • p. 748 …533.) By 1928he was (Patrick, United States in the Air, pp. 190-91.) 38. Charges of…
  • p. 770 …y.W D Press Release, 2 1 June 1941. 9 1 . AR 95-5, 3a. 92…
  • p. 857 …Presque Isle, 344, 347-49, 641, 644-45 Press comment: B-17, 662-63; danger of…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I1
with the addition in time of “medium” and “very heavy” categories,
became the rule. There was reassurance as to the future of heavy
bombardment in the decisions leading by way of the 193I competition
to the development of the B-10. Its many superior qualities, however,
did not include a range in excess of what was generally accepted as
useful for a supporting mission, and it was already becoming apparent
that the real test of policy would come on a question of range.
The problem of extending the effective range of the airplane had
been a major concern of American aviation throughout the 1920’s.
Witness the Army’s round-the-world flight of 1924 and its flight from
California to Hawaii in the same year that saw Lindbergh and Byrd
each span the Atlantic in a single hop. In such tests as the endurance
record of 151 hours set in 1929 by Maj. Carl Spaatz and Capt. Ira C.
Eaker, the Air Corps had contributed further to study of the complex
problems of design and engineering which were fundamental, among
other things, to the quest for greater range. Given the current effi-
ciency of motors and design, range was a matter of size, and by the
I ~ ~ o ’ s ,when aeronautical science had reached a stage in its develop-
ment that brought a truly big plane within practical reach, an issue
within the Army which first had been debated in terms of day and
night bombardment, and which then had been restated by the Air
Corps in terms of heavy and light bombardment, became almost
imperceptibly a question of the long-range bomber.
Maj. Gen. Frank M. Andrews, in writing a few years later on
“Types of Airplanes Required T o Execute Air Force Missions,”
prefaced his discussion by the following observation:
The tactical and strategical employment of Air Forces and the status of
development of aeronautical science exercise a profound mutual influence, each
upon the other. The needs of employment spur the designers and manufacturers
to produce equipment that can meet those needs, and likewise, the equipment
on hand, or definitely foreseen, limits or extends the sphere of influence of
Air Power.175
It is in the light of this fundamental consideration, perhaps, that the
origins of the long-range bomber can most profitably be considered
here. On an earlier page notice has been taken of doctrinal develop-
ments within the Air Corps which by the 1930’s emphasized the need
for a long-range bomber. That these developments depended partly
upon the assurance that such a plane could be built is hardly less certain
than that the new doctrine drew continuing support from the techni-
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