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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 173 …At the Roosevelt-Churchill conference at sea in mid-August, Generals Marshall and Arnold had made…
  • p. 226 …Air Service Command under Col. L.S. Churchill. Because of a shortage of experienced officers, only…
  • p. 282 …President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill with their chiefs of staff, then meeting in Washington, had…
  • p. 287 …the arrival in Washington of Prime Minister Churchill, his chiefs of staff, and other high-ranking…
  • p. 290 …stipulated in ABC-I. A t Mr. Churchill’s request, U.S. troops were to relieve…
  • p. 302 …the U.S. forces, and by Mr. Churchill as British Prime Minister and Minister of Defense…
  • p. 303 …Field Marshal Sir John Dill representing Mr. Churchill as Minister of De- fense. Sir John Dill…
  • p. 304 …of such a personal representative of Mr. Churchill might make difficult the maintenance of normal military…
  • p. 425 …O n the same day, Prime Minister Churchill informed Gen. Sir Archibald Wavell of his selection…
  • p. 628 …Western Hemisphere. When the President and Mr. Churchill met with their military staffs in the ARCADIA…
  • p. 630 …strong support in a long cable from Churchill to Roosevelt, delivered on 5 March, in which…
  • p. 636 …first in a gen- eral meeting with Churchill, later among the airmen alone.34Arnold reviewed the…
  • p. 639 …Much had happened in the two months which had passed since Churchill had approved that plan…
  • p. 640 …Duncan, chief of staff for the Eighth Air Force, wrote from Washington to Spaatz that Churchill…
  • p. 641 …postponement was al- most tantamount to refusal. Churchill was back in London by the 27th. In…
  • p. 642 …then back in Washington, that Roosevelt and Churchill “believed” that T O R C H was…
  • p. 661 …Even during the Battle of Britain, Churchill could tell the House of Commons that “there seems…
  • p. 705 …4 1 . ~ ~The following month, Prime Minister Churchill in conference with Messrs. Harry Hopkins and Averell…
  • p. 810 …2 0 August 1940, in R.S. Churchill, ed., Into Battle (London, 1941),p. 2 5…
  • p. 811 …comp., Winston Churchill’s Secret Session Speeches (New York, 1946), p. 85. 161. Larner report, as…
  • p. 845 …L.S., 182 Churchill, Prime Minister Winston, 133, 1369 141, 232, 235-37, 2409 2431 252…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I1
with the addition in time of “medium” and “very heavy” categories,
became the rule. There was reassurance as to the future of heavy
bombardment in the decisions leading by way of the 193I competition
to the development of the B-10. Its many superior qualities, however,
did not include a range in excess of what was generally accepted as
useful for a supporting mission, and it was already becoming apparent
that the real test of policy would come on a question of range.
The problem of extending the effective range of the airplane had
been a major concern of American aviation throughout the 1920’s.
Witness the Army’s round-the-world flight of 1924 and its flight from
California to Hawaii in the same year that saw Lindbergh and Byrd
each span the Atlantic in a single hop. In such tests as the endurance
record of 151 hours set in 1929 by Maj. Carl Spaatz and Capt. Ira C.
Eaker, the Air Corps had contributed further to study of the complex
problems of design and engineering which were fundamental, among
other things, to the quest for greater range. Given the current effi-
ciency of motors and design, range was a matter of size, and by the
I ~ ~ o ’ s ,when aeronautical science had reached a stage in its develop-
ment that brought a truly big plane within practical reach, an issue
within the Army which first had been debated in terms of day and
night bombardment, and which then had been restated by the Air
Corps in terms of heavy and light bombardment, became almost
imperceptibly a question of the long-range bomber.
Maj. Gen. Frank M. Andrews, in writing a few years later on
“Types of Airplanes Required T o Execute Air Force Missions,”
prefaced his discussion by the following observation:
The tactical and strategical employment of Air Forces and the status of
development of aeronautical science exercise a profound mutual influence, each
upon the other. The needs of employment spur the designers and manufacturers
to produce equipment that can meet those needs, and likewise, the equipment
on hand, or definitely foreseen, limits or extends the sphere of influence of
Air Power.175
It is in the light of this fundamental consideration, perhaps, that the
origins of the long-range bomber can most profitably be considered
here. On an earlier page notice has been taken of doctrinal develop-
ments within the Air Corps which by the 1930’s emphasized the need
for a long-range bomber. That these developments depended partly
upon the assurance that such a plane could be built is hardly less certain
than that the new doctrine drew continuing support from the techni-
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