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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 2 THE UNIVERSITYOF CHICAGOPRESS, CHICAGO8 LONDON The University of Toronto Press, Toronto 5, Canada Copyright 1948 by…
  • p. 48 …An Associated Press dispatch of 10 October gave a contemporary judgment of the importance of this…
  • p. 55 …Air Service (Corps) found it difficult to press vigorously for reorgani- zation and, by default, leadership…
  • p. 56 …In 1919the W a r Department was pressing for a drastic revision of the military establishment…
  • p. 61 …It held that there was no danger of an air attack on the United States and…
  • p. 64 …GHQ Air Forcq a trial than to press for more radical measures, and Howell’s group…
  • p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be completely stopped, but their effects could best…
  • p. 98 …based air operations in defense of the United States and its overseas posses~ions.’~T w…
  • p. 99 …General Westover’s report concluded that “all Air Force units could be concentrated on either coast…
  • p. 130 …the Admiralty began to press for control of naval air units, while the army attempted to…
  • p. 149 …basic and advanced Responsibility for crew and unit train- ing was vested in the GHQ Air…
  • p. 164 …A m y air units in the Territory existed primarily for the defense of this and…
  • p. 176 …no military alliances were made which would commit the United States to war; the plans only…
  • p. 278 …There were also grounds for hoping that heavy bomber units now based on Darwin might increase…
  • p. 285 …From 1938 the United States had invoked sanctions against Japan in the form of moral em…
  • p. 287 …Over-all Strategy and lmmediate Deployment On 2 2 December, the press announced dramatically the arrival…
  • p. 289 …ground units sent in that direction were not destined for immediate combat. No major invasion of…
  • p. 323 …Seizure of bases in Canada or Mexico for later attacks on the United States. Capture of…
  • p. 366 …United state^,^ and the British them- selves were forced to withdraw some pilots from combat units…
  • p. 380 …Upon the request of the Ferrying Command, the State Depart- ment again pressed for an answer…
  • p. 397 …the summer and fall, first as the United States Middle East Air Force and later as…
  • p. 430 …Attempts had been made to replace these obsolete craft by purchase from the United States, but…
  • p. 440 …But as the Japanese pressed forward the Americans were given no opportunity to get set. The…
  • p. 463 …personnel that would be reassigned to infantry units whose rosters already included many representatives of the…
  • p. 552 …pines and more recently of American air units operating in the Netherlands East Indies, he was…
  • p. 560 …Moreover, examination proved that most of the basic equipment of the units, including badly needed trucks…
  • p. 563 …Grady arrived from the United States for a comprehensive survey of Indian resources with reference to…
  • p. 564 …TO C H I N A graphic units, and unfavorable atmospheric conditions combined to make high…
  • p. 607 …Thus the AAF units engaged in the anti-U-boat war became almost a t once…
  • p. 628 …Army air bombardment units would operate offensively in collaboration with the Royal Air Force, primarily against…
  • p. 658 …was to operate in the United Kingdom.14' All air units initially based there were to…
  • p. 683 …of the units of the infant Eighth until their departure for the United Kingdom several months…
  • p. 691 …The RAF proposed that American fighter units be integrated with its own under a plan eventually…
  • p. 748 …533.) By 1928he was (Patrick, United States in the Air, pp. 190-91.) 38. Charges of…
  • p. 770 …y.W D Press Release, 2 1 June 1941. 9 1 . AR 95-5, 3a. 92…
  • p. 857 …Presque Isle, 344, 347-49, 641, 644-45 Press comment: B-17, 662-63; danger of…
T H E A R M Y A I R A R M B E T W E E N T W O W A R S
of “light bomber.” li0Since the practical difference between the light
and other bombers was as yet not too great, the distinction thus estab-
lished had for the moment only a limited significance, but that it
carried the promise of serious controversy was soon to be demon-
strated. In opposition to Air Corps proposals for specialization the
W a r Department in 1928 advocated, partly for reasons of economy,
concentration on a single all-purpose bomber.
Despite vigorous objections from such officers as Maj. Hugh J.
Knerr, then commanding the 2d Bombardment Group, the Chief of the
Air Corps in June directed the Materiel Division at Dayton to proceed
with the development of a twin-engine plane that would serve for
both day and night bombing and, in addition, for observation mis-
sions.l“ A prompt protest from the Materiel Division having served
to reopen the question, opponents of a “mediocre all-purpose airplane”
renewed their efforts in a discussion that continued into the following
year. Perhaps because it seemed politically advisable, they concen-
trated on an attempt to demonstrate the advantage in a specially
designed day bomber. T h e Bombardment Board and the Tactical
School joined in proposing for this purpose a plane with speed of 160
miles per hour, a service ceiling of 18,000 feet, a radius of 2 j o miles,
bomb load of 1,200 pounds, and armament of 6 machine guns.17*And
in February 1929 the authorities yielded to the extent, at least, of
directing the Materiel Division to develop a modified version of the
Curtiss XO-35 observation plane as a fast day bomber.173
But that success represented something less than a complete victory.
Though a principle of great importance to the future of the Air Corps
had been preserved, at any rate for the time being, the decision never-
theless left an open question as to how far the airmen would be
permitted to go in the development of types other than those specifi-
cally designed for support of ground forces. In fact, it is not easy to
determine the extent to which the full implications of the controversy
were appreciated by either side a t the time. T h e airmen themselves
had based their arguments on a distinction between day and night bom-
bardment, in accordance with experience in the first World War, and
it is significant that the Air Corps Tactical School on second thought
expressed its concern in 1930over the confusion likely to result from
such a d i s t i n ~ t i 0 n . l ~ ~It felt that, while the one type normally would
be used chiefly in the day and the other a t night, to distinguish between
light and heavy bombers would be less misleading; and such a usage,
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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.