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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 303 …of Naval Opera- tions; Adm. Ernest J. King, Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet; Gen. George…
  • p. 316 …So far as the Navy is concerned, Admiral King, as you know, is not only Chief…
  • p. 493 …Admiral King believed that the mines offered a tempting bait to the Japanese who were currently…
  • p. 526 …Hence Admiral King placed a bid for suffi- 461
  • p. 527 …t this stage of the war Admiral King had accepted the belief that his carrier planes…
  • p. 538 …plan by 2 9 June, when Admiral King submitted to the Joint Chiefs a proposal that…
  • p. 607 …type * O n 5 March 1942, Admiral King wrote to General Arnold as follows: “The experience…
  • p. 608 …s.’l A formal request by Admiral King to the Chief of the Army Air Forces…
  • p. 609 …In a letter of 9 March 1942 to Admiral King, he proposed “the estab- lishment of…
  • p. 614 …In June, Admiral King expressed the official Navy position on this point with the utmost clarity…
  • p. 615 …In a memorandum to Admiral King, General McNarney, Deputy Chief of Staff, on 26 May outlined…
  • p. 616 …viewed as a temporary deta~hment.?~ Admiral King’s reaction to these cautious proposals was expressed…
  • p. 618 …the same words as used by Admiral King a month earlier: the answer to the antisubmarine…
  • p. 621 …On 14 September, General Marshall wrote to Admiral King: “Experience with the First Bomber Command in…
  • p. 622 …T o General Marshall’s proposal of 14 September, Admiral King had replied that, although he…
  • p. 641 …54 A week later General Marshall, Admiral King, Harry Hopkins, and a small staff flew to…
  • p. 645 …that scheduled to operate from the United King- dom. Dry topic or no, organization must figure…
  • p. 684 …the principal air task in the United King- dom had long been conceived as strategic bombardment…
  • p. 707 …establishment of base depots in the United King- dom became the basis of action in January…
  • p. 724 …Implicit in all of the arrangements being made in the United King- dom was the belief…
  • p. 788 …Force, Pt. I ; Fleet Adm. Ernest J. King, First Official Report to the Secretary of the…
  • p. 793 …Memo for Adm, King from C/S, 17 Mar. 1 % ~ . 34. JPS 2I/j/D, 7…
  • p. 795 …4 Aug. 1942. 108. Zbid. 109. Adm. King’s Report on Battle of Midway, incl. in…
  • p. 797 …306, 29 June 1942; memos for Adm. King from Mar- shall, 26 June 1942, and for…
  • p. 802 …1942; CM-IN-0629, Chung- king to AGWAR, # # z , 3 Apr. 1942; memo for Gen. Arnold…
  • p. 805 …Ltr., Arnold to King, 2 5 Feb. 1942. certain evidence from all Allied and enemy sources…
  • p. 806 …Memo for King from McNarney, 26 May 1942. 7 1 . Ltr., King to Marshall, 10 June…
  • p. 807 …Ltr., Marshall to King, 14 Sept. 1942, TAB XIVA, in Bowles report; memo for C G…
  • p. 808 …to notes from Mar- shall and Adm. King). 3 2 . A I c m o for…
  • p. 814 …Forces to the United King- dom, App. A, 19 Aug. 1942. 50. Ltr., Col. H.L…
  • p. 851 …C.E., 48-50 Killin, Pfc, 219 Kilner Board, 1 2 0 Kimbolton, 63 I King…
  • p. 854 …in Chief, 515, 5 2 2 , 544. (see also King); controversy over air power vs. battleship…
T H E A R M Y A I R A R M B E T W E E N T W O W A R S
of “light bomber.” li0Since the practical difference between the light
and other bombers was as yet not too great, the distinction thus estab-
lished had for the moment only a limited significance, but that it
carried the promise of serious controversy was soon to be demon-
strated. In opposition to Air Corps proposals for specialization the
W a r Department in 1928 advocated, partly for reasons of economy,
concentration on a single all-purpose bomber.
Despite vigorous objections from such officers as Maj. Hugh J.
Knerr, then commanding the 2d Bombardment Group, the Chief of the
Air Corps in June directed the Materiel Division at Dayton to proceed
with the development of a twin-engine plane that would serve for
both day and night bombing and, in addition, for observation mis-
sions.l“ A prompt protest from the Materiel Division having served
to reopen the question, opponents of a “mediocre all-purpose airplane”
renewed their efforts in a discussion that continued into the following
year. Perhaps because it seemed politically advisable, they concen-
trated on an attempt to demonstrate the advantage in a specially
designed day bomber. T h e Bombardment Board and the Tactical
School joined in proposing for this purpose a plane with speed of 160
miles per hour, a service ceiling of 18,000 feet, a radius of 2 j o miles,
bomb load of 1,200 pounds, and armament of 6 machine guns.17*And
in February 1929 the authorities yielded to the extent, at least, of
directing the Materiel Division to develop a modified version of the
Curtiss XO-35 observation plane as a fast day bomber.173
But that success represented something less than a complete victory.
Though a principle of great importance to the future of the Air Corps
had been preserved, at any rate for the time being, the decision never-
theless left an open question as to how far the airmen would be
permitted to go in the development of types other than those specifi-
cally designed for support of ground forces. In fact, it is not easy to
determine the extent to which the full implications of the controversy
were appreciated by either side a t the time. T h e airmen themselves
had based their arguments on a distinction between day and night bom-
bardment, in accordance with experience in the first World War, and
it is significant that the Air Corps Tactical School on second thought
expressed its concern in 1930over the confusion likely to result from
such a d i s t i n ~ t i 0 n . l ~ ~It felt that, while the one type normally would
be used chiefly in the day and the other a t night, to distinguish between
light and heavy bombers would be less misleading; and such a usage,
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