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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 173 …At the Roosevelt-Churchill conference at sea in mid-August, Generals Marshall and Arnold had made…
  • p. 226 …Air Service Command under Col. L.S. Churchill. Because of a shortage of experienced officers, only…
  • p. 282 …President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill with their chiefs of staff, then meeting in Washington, had…
  • p. 287 …the arrival in Washington of Prime Minister Churchill, his chiefs of staff, and other high-ranking…
  • p. 290 …stipulated in ABC-I. A t Mr. Churchill’s request, U.S. troops were to relieve…
  • p. 302 …the U.S. forces, and by Mr. Churchill as British Prime Minister and Minister of Defense…
  • p. 303 …Field Marshal Sir John Dill representing Mr. Churchill as Minister of De- fense. Sir John Dill…
  • p. 304 …of such a personal representative of Mr. Churchill might make difficult the maintenance of normal military…
  • p. 425 …O n the same day, Prime Minister Churchill informed Gen. Sir Archibald Wavell of his selection…
  • p. 628 …Western Hemisphere. When the President and Mr. Churchill met with their military staffs in the ARCADIA…
  • p. 630 …strong support in a long cable from Churchill to Roosevelt, delivered on 5 March, in which…
  • p. 636 …first in a gen- eral meeting with Churchill, later among the airmen alone.34Arnold reviewed the…
  • p. 639 …Much had happened in the two months which had passed since Churchill had approved that plan…
  • p. 640 …Duncan, chief of staff for the Eighth Air Force, wrote from Washington to Spaatz that Churchill…
  • p. 641 …postponement was al- most tantamount to refusal. Churchill was back in London by the 27th. In…
  • p. 642 …then back in Washington, that Roosevelt and Churchill “believed” that T O R C H was…
  • p. 661 …Even during the Battle of Britain, Churchill could tell the House of Commons that “there seems…
  • p. 705 …4 1 . ~ ~The following month, Prime Minister Churchill in conference with Messrs. Harry Hopkins and Averell…
  • p. 810 …2 0 August 1940, in R.S. Churchill, ed., Into Battle (London, 1941),p. 2 5…
  • p. 811 …comp., Winston Churchill’s Secret Session Speeches (New York, 1946), p. 85. 161. Larner report, as…
  • p. 845 …L.S., 182 Churchill, Prime Minister Winston, 133, 1369 141, 232, 235-37, 2409 2431 252…
T H E A R M Y A I R A R M B E T W E E N T W O W A R S
of “light bomber.” li0Since the practical difference between the light
and other bombers was as yet not too great, the distinction thus estab-
lished had for the moment only a limited significance, but that it
carried the promise of serious controversy was soon to be demon-
strated. In opposition to Air Corps proposals for specialization the
W a r Department in 1928 advocated, partly for reasons of economy,
concentration on a single all-purpose bomber.
Despite vigorous objections from such officers as Maj. Hugh J.
Knerr, then commanding the 2d Bombardment Group, the Chief of the
Air Corps in June directed the Materiel Division at Dayton to proceed
with the development of a twin-engine plane that would serve for
both day and night bombing and, in addition, for observation mis-
sions.l“ A prompt protest from the Materiel Division having served
to reopen the question, opponents of a “mediocre all-purpose airplane”
renewed their efforts in a discussion that continued into the following
year. Perhaps because it seemed politically advisable, they concen-
trated on an attempt to demonstrate the advantage in a specially
designed day bomber. T h e Bombardment Board and the Tactical
School joined in proposing for this purpose a plane with speed of 160
miles per hour, a service ceiling of 18,000 feet, a radius of 2 j o miles,
bomb load of 1,200 pounds, and armament of 6 machine guns.17*And
in February 1929 the authorities yielded to the extent, at least, of
directing the Materiel Division to develop a modified version of the
Curtiss XO-35 observation plane as a fast day bomber.173
But that success represented something less than a complete victory.
Though a principle of great importance to the future of the Air Corps
had been preserved, at any rate for the time being, the decision never-
theless left an open question as to how far the airmen would be
permitted to go in the development of types other than those specifi-
cally designed for support of ground forces. In fact, it is not easy to
determine the extent to which the full implications of the controversy
were appreciated by either side a t the time. T h e airmen themselves
had based their arguments on a distinction between day and night bom-
bardment, in accordance with experience in the first World War, and
it is significant that the Air Corps Tactical School on second thought
expressed its concern in 1930over the confusion likely to result from
such a d i s t i n ~ t i 0 n . l ~ ~It felt that, while the one type normally would
be used chiefly in the day and the other a t night, to distinguish between
light and heavy bombers would be less misleading; and such a usage,
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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.