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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 125 …an invading army. For that job they were well equipped, trained, and organized. Though the Luftwaff…
  • p. 127 …For the first time, German parachute troops were successfully employed when the Nazi forces invaded Holland…
  • p. 131 …equipment for moving an invading force across the intervening waters. The army itself, caught unprepared, required…
  • p. 134 …By the first of June the British had been forced to yield Crete to the invaders…
  • p. 183 …Nevertheless, a land army should be prepared to invade the continent and Germany itself. T h…
  • p. 246 …this effort." Apparently the course of the invaders plotted earlier in the morning was not utilized…
  • p. 263 …tanks, but they too “strafed and restrafed the invaders.” As Lt. Samuel H. Marrett, squadron commander…
  • p. 461 …the invading forces was merely preliminary to the bringing in of bombers in preparation for the…
  • p. 493 …Its nickel and chrome mines were readily accessible to an invader. Admiral King believed that the…
  • p. 522 …after the action; not until the war ended and the teams of interrogators invaded Japan was…
  • p. 529 …There was no intention of invading the Alaskan mainland, or even Dutch Harbor; the objective was…
  • p. 535 …Four of the most efficient carriers had gone down, carrying with them the hopes of Admiral…
  • p. 559 …the latter presented the more immediate need for reinforcement. Tavoy had fallen to Japanese invaders as…
  • p. 630 …The Netherlands East Indies and Burma, already invaded, were doomed. T h e Indian Ocean was…
  • p. 633 …to the preliminary strategic bombardment and only modestly to direct support of the invading force. A…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
It is true that the twin-engine MB-2, a modification of the Martin
bomber of war years, had been followed by the Barling experimental
triplane NBL- I , which with six engines, a span of I 2 0 feet, and weight
of 27,703 pounds (empty) dwarfed all service models of earlier date
than the 1930’s.~T h e plane provided a significant indication of an
early interest in the big bomber, but it proved a disappointing experi-
ment.lB5O n the other hand, the twin-engine Curtiss NBS-4 of 1924
showed marked improvement over the MB-2. Had funds been more
liberally provided, there might have been further experimentation
with much larger bombers. A newly formed Bombardment Board in
the fall of 1926 favored the multi-engine bomber, partly because of its
greater safety in comparison with the single-engine plane.1G6That
same year, however, the Engineering Division at Dayton emphasized
in a study of its own the technical difficulties and the high cost that
would be involved in attempts to build and operate planes with more
than two engines.lB7Not until the 1930’s would anything comparable
in size to the NBL-I be attempted again.
Meanwhile, great progress was made with the two-engine bomber.
Between the MB-2 of the early twenties and the B-10 of the early
thirties the service ceiling was raised from 7,700 to 24,400 feet, the
maximum speed from 98 miles per hour to 2 I 3, and the normal bomb
load from 1,040 to 2,260 pounds. Fabric and wood had given way to
an all-metal construction; the biplane had been displaced by the
monoplane; and in the quest for cleaner lines the retractable landing
gear had been introduced.lG8If the advances made held for the airman
a promise of bigger and better planes to come, it was still true that
the B-10, with a range of 600 miles, raised no question of its practical
military value.
As early as 1928, however, sharp differences had developed between
Air Corps officers and the War Department over plans for bomber
construction. The airmen argued for the development of two distinct
types of bombing planes: ( I ) a plane of high speed, short range,
defensive power, and small bomb load for use in day operations, and
(2) a bomber of minimum defensive strength designed to carry heavy
bomb loads over longer distances in night operations.lG9A step toward
such a specialization of function had been taken when two years
earlier the LB-I became the first Army plane to bear the designation
* For purposes of comparison it may be noted that the MB-z had a span of 74 feet,
z inches, and weight of 7,069 pounds.
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