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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 173 …At the Roosevelt-Churchill conference at sea in mid-August, Generals Marshall and Arnold had made…
  • p. 226 …Air Service Command under Col. L.S. Churchill. Because of a shortage of experienced officers, only…
  • p. 282 …President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill with their chiefs of staff, then meeting in Washington, had…
  • p. 287 …the arrival in Washington of Prime Minister Churchill, his chiefs of staff, and other high-ranking…
  • p. 290 …stipulated in ABC-I. A t Mr. Churchill’s request, U.S. troops were to relieve…
  • p. 302 …the U.S. forces, and by Mr. Churchill as British Prime Minister and Minister of Defense…
  • p. 303 …Field Marshal Sir John Dill representing Mr. Churchill as Minister of De- fense. Sir John Dill…
  • p. 304 …of such a personal representative of Mr. Churchill might make difficult the maintenance of normal military…
  • p. 425 …O n the same day, Prime Minister Churchill informed Gen. Sir Archibald Wavell of his selection…
  • p. 628 …Western Hemisphere. When the President and Mr. Churchill met with their military staffs in the ARCADIA…
  • p. 630 …strong support in a long cable from Churchill to Roosevelt, delivered on 5 March, in which…
  • p. 636 …first in a gen- eral meeting with Churchill, later among the airmen alone.34Arnold reviewed the…
  • p. 639 …Much had happened in the two months which had passed since Churchill had approved that plan…
  • p. 640 …Duncan, chief of staff for the Eighth Air Force, wrote from Washington to Spaatz that Churchill…
  • p. 641 …postponement was al- most tantamount to refusal. Churchill was back in London by the 27th. In…
  • p. 642 …then back in Washington, that Roosevelt and Churchill “believed” that T O R C H was…
  • p. 661 …Even during the Battle of Britain, Churchill could tell the House of Commons that “there seems…
  • p. 705 …4 1 . ~ ~The following month, Prime Minister Churchill in conference with Messrs. Harry Hopkins and Averell…
  • p. 810 …2 0 August 1940, in R.S. Churchill, ed., Into Battle (London, 1941),p. 2 5…
  • p. 811 …comp., Winston Churchill’s Secret Session Speeches (New York, 1946), p. 85. 161. Larner report, as…
  • p. 845 …L.S., 182 Churchill, Prime Minister Winston, 133, 1369 141, 232, 235-37, 2409 2431 252…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
It is true that the twin-engine MB-2, a modification of the Martin
bomber of war years, had been followed by the Barling experimental
triplane NBL- I , which with six engines, a span of I 2 0 feet, and weight
of 27,703 pounds (empty) dwarfed all service models of earlier date
than the 1930’s.~T h e plane provided a significant indication of an
early interest in the big bomber, but it proved a disappointing experi-
ment.lB5O n the other hand, the twin-engine Curtiss NBS-4 of 1924
showed marked improvement over the MB-2. Had funds been more
liberally provided, there might have been further experimentation
with much larger bombers. A newly formed Bombardment Board in
the fall of 1926 favored the multi-engine bomber, partly because of its
greater safety in comparison with the single-engine plane.1G6That
same year, however, the Engineering Division at Dayton emphasized
in a study of its own the technical difficulties and the high cost that
would be involved in attempts to build and operate planes with more
than two engines.lB7Not until the 1930’s would anything comparable
in size to the NBL-I be attempted again.
Meanwhile, great progress was made with the two-engine bomber.
Between the MB-2 of the early twenties and the B-10 of the early
thirties the service ceiling was raised from 7,700 to 24,400 feet, the
maximum speed from 98 miles per hour to 2 I 3, and the normal bomb
load from 1,040 to 2,260 pounds. Fabric and wood had given way to
an all-metal construction; the biplane had been displaced by the
monoplane; and in the quest for cleaner lines the retractable landing
gear had been introduced.lG8If the advances made held for the airman
a promise of bigger and better planes to come, it was still true that
the B-10, with a range of 600 miles, raised no question of its practical
military value.
As early as 1928, however, sharp differences had developed between
Air Corps officers and the War Department over plans for bomber
construction. The airmen argued for the development of two distinct
types of bombing planes: ( I ) a plane of high speed, short range,
defensive power, and small bomb load for use in day operations, and
(2) a bomber of minimum defensive strength designed to carry heavy
bomb loads over longer distances in night operations.lG9A step toward
such a specialization of function had been taken when two years
earlier the LB-I became the first Army plane to bear the designation
* For purposes of comparison it may be noted that the MB-z had a span of 74 feet,
z inches, and weight of 7,069 pounds.
58

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