The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

T H E A R M Y A I R A R M B E T W E E N T W O W A R S
been only England or France. And, whereas Mitchell had placed great
importance upon the moral effects of bombing, these disciples of his
stressed rather the material effects of the air weapon.
In any event, the newly formulated doctrine involved three prac-
tical measures. One was the acquisition of more advanced bases. That
was a political matter, wholly foreign to the Air Corps, which was to
be effected in 1940-41 by actions of other government agencies. A
second was the study of profitable targets within the national structure
of potential enemy countries. This was begun, on a modest scale and
not without opposition from the General Staff, in the tiny economic
analysis branch of the intelligence section, established in the OCAC
in 1939.’~’But the one measure which was of most immediate concern
to the Air Corps was purely technological-increasing the range of its
bombardment planes. This was not in 1935 a new issue. In the 1926
edition of TR 440-15 it had been stated that “it is necessary, therefore,
to determine, from a purely tactical standpoint, what purposes air-
planes are to serve in war, and to build different types with appropriate
characteristics.” 1 4 9 Once the Air Corps had chosen as its chief func-
tion the destruction of an enemy’s “national structure,” this involved
the development of a bomber of long range and great bomb capacity.
These same characteristics were equally important if the air arm was
to be considered merely as a weapon for national defense. By 1935 the
successful flight of the Boeing B-17 had indicated what could be ac-
complished by American industry working in harmony with the
OCAC. But the Air Corps was not content. The student officer whose
study served as an introduction to this section showed his appreciation
of the true situation when he remarked that the Air Corps building
program (in 1938) “indicates that the primary role is long range stra-
tegical operations.” 150
The building program, like the doctrine it was meant to implement
and the organization which was deemed necessary for a successful air
war, had not always enjoyed the desired support of the War and Navy
departments. Only two months after the major submitted his report
(29 June 1938) the Joint Board arrived at the following conclusion:
“Based on the present situation it is not considered probable that the
Army Air Corps will be called upon in war to perform any missions
that require the use of reconnaissance and heavy bombardment planes
of greater practical ferrying range, greater tactical radius, and greater
carrying capacity than those of the B-17.” 15’ A brief account of
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