“US Navy”60+ pages
- p. 48 …This navy of the air is to be
expanded until no part of Germany is safe…
- p. 53 …the Navy, and civilian agencies-
the terms “independent,” “separate,” and “united air force” were used
interchangeably…
- p. 60 …n 5 September he
used the recent disaster to the Navy’s dirigible Sheizandoah as an…
- p. 62 …appointed in each of several departments-War, Navy, Commerce-
to supervise aviation.
The Lampert report, published…
- p. 71 …delaying them, so that bombardment had been
used to cut communications and to interfere with the…
- p. 86 …One might suppose that
Douhet, who “really struck the first blow,” was most useful; his work…
- p. 88 …the desired support of the War and Navy
departments. Only two months after the major submitted…
- p. 96 …issues between the Army and
the Navy over the use of aircraft in coastal defense.
Neither…
- p. 105 …The Navy would provide aircraPt for
don, scouting, and patrolling over the sea and for the…
- p. 107 …both the Army and the
Navy for aviation to be used in support of “the Infantry…
- p. 113 …Japanese Air Power
The Japanese air forces, divided into separate army and navy air
arms, had…
- p. 116 …T h e navy, on the other hand, gave
closer attention to the training of all…
- p. 117 …0 single-engine fighter used by both the Japanese army
and navy-was widely known to…
- p. 118 …In comparison with the I 1,000
pilots trained by the US. Army and Navy during…
- p. 120 …In the war against Ethiopia, 1935-36, Italian
bombers gained experience in the use of various…
- p. 125 …Under this arrangement the Luftwaffe, along with the
army and navy, had direct access to the…
- p. 126 …Goering had successfully
opposed the navy's desire for its own separate air arm, and the…
- p. 131 …The
German navy was unable to provide such a guarantee, and, moreover,
it lacked necessary equipment…
- p. 144 …This subject had been under study by the Army arid
Navy for more than a decade…
- p. 146 …even at the expense of speed
and useful load. A few months later Air Corps observers…
- p. 154 …a t best deny us the moral support of the
Royal Navy with its shipyards, and…
- p. 155 …use of a mobile striking
force to intercept an enemy approaching by sea. The Navy had…
- p. 156 …in support of or in lieu of US. Navy
forces against hostile fleet^.'^
In each case…
- p. 162 …announced the arrival on the
island of US. Navy At the suggestion of Iceland, the United…
- p. 170 …AAF and the British, 800 for
the US.Navy.’’’ This would total 60,000 aircraft a…
- p. 175 …T h e planners were concerned only with the mission of the
US. Army and Navy…
- p. 179 …In harmony with the general strategy advocated,
US. air forces in the Pacific and Far East…
- p. 180 …For each command, the mission of
the Army (including air forces) and the Navy was described…
- p. 200 …An alert system was in use twenty-four hours
a day, and air operations were carried…
- p. 206 …Scattered
throughout Panama were seven auxiliary airfields, two of which were
ready for immediate use, and…
- p. 218 …Since the
required number of planes represented more heavy bombers than
were then in use in…
- p. 224 …regarding the possibility of using fields
under construction by the Navy a t Palmyra and Samoa…
- p. 225 …I 942.* It devel-
oped that the Navy could not offer assistance in construction until
after…
- p. 228 …MacArthur had requested permission for emer-
gency use of airfields; and negotiations were furthered by conferences…
- p. 243 …This action lasted about an hour.‘ At its end the
Navy had suffered a crushing blow…
- p. 282 …But the US. Navy had been hard hit at Pearl Harbor, the bal-
ance of naval…
- p. 297 …the Secretary of the Navy as to allocation between
the using services. No relative priorities were…
- p. 305 …Army, Navy, and AAF, and similar representatives of the British
services. T h e American members…
- p. 306 …Joint Intelligence Committee, consisted of the directors of intelligence
from the Army, Navy, and AAF, and…
- p. 316 …So far as the Navy is concerned, Admiral King, as you
know, is not only Chief…
- p. 317 …AAF officers were schooled to avoid
use of the term “independent air force,” but in most…
- p. 326 …after 7 December 1941.T h e Navy was responsible for the general
strategic defense of…
- p. 328 …In the absence of adequate preparations, sirens on police cars
were used to warn the people…
- p. 335 …views between the W a r and Navy departments,
and the unsatisfying conjectures advanced by the…
- p. 410 …ready for use; and it had to
be divided between the Army and Navy.
On the…
- p. 424 …Agreements had
been reached for the use of Australian bases in the ferrying of heavy
366
- p. 464 …For inter-island air trans-
port, principal reliance was placed on two Navy PBY’s and…
- p. 489 …In their prior planning, Army and Navy commanders had devoted
scant attention to the problems of…
- p. 495 …Under the joint
Army-Navy plan, approximately 15,000 men of the 37th Division
were to…
- p. 497 …R I 1
precipitated the war, the US. Navy had taken a stand against im-
mediate…
- p. 501 …the end he refused to permit the use of the field at Chu-
chow. But the…
- p. 505 …into thickly settled districts, and
these were used by the Japanese to justify the subsequent execution…
- p. 508 …the S010mons.~~
As early as February, the US. Navy had definite indications of an
enemy offensive…
- p. 509 …The Navy’s lack of knowledge
of these sightings is unexplained.
4-48
- p. 514 …T o be sure, it would be impossible to use
Carrier Division Five, for the Shokaku…
- p. 527 …s and B-24's for naval use in long-range search
and tracking."' Furthermore, he…
- p. 529 …D W A R I 1
planes, useful in covering the northern approaches across the Pacific…
- p. 534 …For the US. forces on Unalaska Island, it represented a loss
of 2 2 , 0 0…
- p. 536 …T h e Japanese navy had
sustained its initial defeats, but the army as yet had…
- p. 588 …Army aircraft might, however, temporarily execute Navy functions
in support of or in lieu of Navy…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S
NEI, 372, 374; North Atlantic, 156-
60; Philippines, 176-79, 185-86, 191-91,
201-3, 218, 226, 407, 411-12; South
Pacific, 43 1-37, 474-75; UK, 644-46,
652-53
Strother, Capt. D.R., 389
Subic Bay, 405
Submarine warfare, 514-53; attacks, 281-
North Atlantic, 157, 277 n, 514-18;
Caribbean and Gulf areas, 530, 534;
North Atlantic convoy lanes and
North Africa, 536; shipping toll, 515-
Antisub. defense.
83, 5'4-183 527. 5309 534-36, 54'9 547;
18, 530, 533-36, 541, 547. See also
Sudetenland, 89
Suez region, 148
Sumatfa. 372, 379, 388, 394
Sungei Patani, 379
SUPER-GYMNAST, 240, 612-15
Supply, 151, 259, 264, 566; Aleutians, 469;
CBI, 375, 488-89, 494, 496, 510; Hawaii,
454; North Atlantic, 347; South Pa-
cific, 433-34; Supply Div. (OCAC),
55; Supply Gp. (AS), 56; SWPA, 227-
28, 3 5 3 7 375, 378, 3819 3 8 5 , 400, 407,
4 2 2 . 482
Support aviation. See Air doctrine; Air
power; Navy.
Surinam, 124, 536
Sutherland, Brig. Gen. R.K., 188n, 204-
Suva, 181, 192, 226, 431-32
Swanton Morley, 658
Sweden, 177
Sweeney, Lt. Col. W.C., Jr., 457
Sydney, 411, 422-23
5, 2 0 7 , 209
T
Tactics, 575; British conclusions, 53 1-32;
CBI, 489, 496-97; fighter, in SWPA,
4737 476-77; Japanese, 403
Taiwan Field, 208-9
Takao, 466, 469
Takoradi, 320-22, 3 3 1 , 339-40, 492
Talara, 301
Tampa, 3 3 2
Tanaga, 465
Tanganyika, 330
Tarakan, 377,, 379-80, 404
Target selectm, 148, 565, 595-97, 599,
621-22, 624
Tarlac, 207, 209
Tash, Lt. Earl, Z I I
786
I N W O R L D W A R I 1
Task Force 8, 464
Tate, Col. Robert, 498, 508
Taylor, Lt. K.A., 199
TBF, a t Midway, 456, 458
Technical Services, Director of, 550
Technical Training Comd., I I 2
Teddington, 645
Tehran, 329, 338, 354
Tehuantepec, 301
Ternate Field, 186
Thacker, Lt. R.E., 2 0 0
Thailand, 377, 489
Theobald, Rear Adm. R.A., 464
Thomas, Cap. L.M., 326
Thornbrough, Capt. G.W., 468
Thurleigh, 63 I
Timor, 372, 377, 385-87, 390-93, 414, 417,
Tinker, Maj. Gen. C.L., 454
Tjilatjap, 397
Tocumwal, 4 2 3
Tokyo, Doolittle raid against, 298, 438-
Tonga, 435
Tongatabu, 431, 435-37
Tontouta, 432
TORCH, 573-76, 588, 590, 607, 614, 628,
Toungoo, 488, 49z7 499
Towers, Adm. J.H., 538-39, 566
Townsville, 181, 184, 2 3 1 , 376, 385, 408,
411, 413, 416, 422, 447-50, 4771 480, 483
Training, 110-12, 496-97, 566, 605, 610;
(1941) 260, 264, (1942) 249-50, 264; Air
Service manuals, 35, 45; Alaska, 166;
antisub., 514, 524-25; for Australia,
2 3 0 ; in bombing, 439-40; CBI, 486, 488,
495-96; center at Karachi, 495; direc-
tive for GHQAF, 260; in ETO, 1 5 1 ,
656-57; by factory representatives, 423;
of ground crewmen, I I I ; joint exercises
(Army-Navy), 521; inadequacy for
Coral Sea battle, 450, for crews in
Pacific, 450, 454, 482, for Java cam-
paign, 400, for Midway, 461; New
Guinea,. 481; programs for pilots, I IO-
1 1 ; Project X, 334-35; of radar tech-
nicians, 295; in torpedo-dropping,
48 1
Training Regulation 44-15, 45, 48-49,
Transcontinental & Western Air, 347,
Tavoy, 492
474
447 45'. 498, 506
653-54
53
3529 355-57
Trans-India Ferry, 498, 507-8
Transportation targets, 596