“US Navy”60+ pages
- p. 48 …This navy of the air is to be
expanded until no part of Germany is safe…
- p. 53 …the Navy, and civilian agencies-
the terms “independent,” “separate,” and “united air force” were used
interchangeably…
- p. 60 …n 5 September he
used the recent disaster to the Navy’s dirigible Sheizandoah as an…
- p. 62 …appointed in each of several departments-War, Navy, Commerce-
to supervise aviation.
The Lampert report, published…
- p. 71 …delaying them, so that bombardment had been
used to cut communications and to interfere with the…
- p. 86 …One might suppose that
Douhet, who “really struck the first blow,” was most useful; his work…
- p. 88 …the desired support of the War and Navy
departments. Only two months after the major submitted…
- p. 96 …issues between the Army and
the Navy over the use of aircraft in coastal defense.
Neither…
- p. 105 …The Navy would provide aircraPt for
don, scouting, and patrolling over the sea and for the…
- p. 107 …both the Army and the
Navy for aviation to be used in support of “the Infantry…
- p. 113 …Japanese Air Power
The Japanese air forces, divided into separate army and navy air
arms, had…
- p. 116 …T h e navy, on the other hand, gave
closer attention to the training of all…
- p. 117 …0 single-engine fighter used by both the Japanese army
and navy-was widely known to…
- p. 118 …In comparison with the I 1,000
pilots trained by the US. Army and Navy during…
- p. 120 …In the war against Ethiopia, 1935-36, Italian
bombers gained experience in the use of various…
- p. 125 …Under this arrangement the Luftwaffe, along with the
army and navy, had direct access to the…
- p. 126 …Goering had successfully
opposed the navy's desire for its own separate air arm, and the…
- p. 131 …The
German navy was unable to provide such a guarantee, and, moreover,
it lacked necessary equipment…
- p. 144 …This subject had been under study by the Army arid
Navy for more than a decade…
- p. 146 …even at the expense of speed
and useful load. A few months later Air Corps observers…
- p. 154 …a t best deny us the moral support of the
Royal Navy with its shipyards, and…
- p. 155 …use of a mobile striking
force to intercept an enemy approaching by sea. The Navy had…
- p. 156 …in support of or in lieu of US. Navy
forces against hostile fleet^.'^
In each case…
- p. 162 …announced the arrival on the
island of US. Navy At the suggestion of Iceland, the United…
- p. 170 …AAF and the British, 800 for
the US.Navy.’’’ This would total 60,000 aircraft a…
- p. 175 …T h e planners were concerned only with the mission of the
US. Army and Navy…
- p. 179 …In harmony with the general strategy advocated,
US. air forces in the Pacific and Far East…
- p. 180 …For each command, the mission of
the Army (including air forces) and the Navy was described…
- p. 200 …An alert system was in use twenty-four hours
a day, and air operations were carried…
- p. 206 …Scattered
throughout Panama were seven auxiliary airfields, two of which were
ready for immediate use, and…
- p. 218 …Since the
required number of planes represented more heavy bombers than
were then in use in…
- p. 224 …regarding the possibility of using fields
under construction by the Navy a t Palmyra and Samoa…
- p. 225 …I 942.* It devel-
oped that the Navy could not offer assistance in construction until
after…
- p. 228 …MacArthur had requested permission for emer-
gency use of airfields; and negotiations were furthered by conferences…
- p. 243 …This action lasted about an hour.‘ At its end the
Navy had suffered a crushing blow…
- p. 282 …But the US. Navy had been hard hit at Pearl Harbor, the bal-
ance of naval…
- p. 297 …the Secretary of the Navy as to allocation between
the using services. No relative priorities were…
- p. 305 …Army, Navy, and AAF, and similar representatives of the British
services. T h e American members…
- p. 306 …Joint Intelligence Committee, consisted of the directors of intelligence
from the Army, Navy, and AAF, and…
- p. 316 …So far as the Navy is concerned, Admiral King, as you
know, is not only Chief…
- p. 317 …AAF officers were schooled to avoid
use of the term “independent air force,” but in most…
- p. 326 …after 7 December 1941.T h e Navy was responsible for the general
strategic defense of…
- p. 328 …In the absence of adequate preparations, sirens on police cars
were used to warn the people…
- p. 335 …views between the W a r and Navy departments,
and the unsatisfying conjectures advanced by the…
- p. 410 …ready for use; and it had to
be divided between the Army and Navy.
On the…
- p. 424 …Agreements had
been reached for the use of Australian bases in the ferrying of heavy
366
- p. 464 …For inter-island air trans-
port, principal reliance was placed on two Navy PBY’s and…
- p. 489 …In their prior planning, Army and Navy commanders had devoted
scant attention to the problems of…
- p. 495 …Under the joint
Army-Navy plan, approximately 15,000 men of the 37th Division
were to…
- p. 497 …R I 1
precipitated the war, the US. Navy had taken a stand against im-
mediate…
- p. 501 …the end he refused to permit the use of the field at Chu-
chow. But the…
- p. 505 …into thickly settled districts, and
these were used by the Japanese to justify the subsequent execution…
- p. 508 …the S010mons.~~
As early as February, the US. Navy had definite indications of an
enemy offensive…
- p. 509 …The Navy’s lack of knowledge
of these sightings is unexplained.
4-48
- p. 514 …T o be sure, it would be impossible to use
Carrier Division Five, for the Shokaku…
- p. 527 …s and B-24's for naval use in long-range search
and tracking."' Furthermore, he…
- p. 529 …D W A R I 1
planes, useful in covering the northern approaches across the Pacific…
- p. 534 …For the US. forces on Unalaska Island, it represented a loss
of 2 2 , 0 0…
- p. 536 …T h e Japanese navy had
sustained its initial defeats, but the army as yet had…
- p. 588 …Army aircraft might, however, temporarily execute Navy functions
in support of or in lieu of Navy…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
Piarco airport, 162, 329
PINETREE, 622
Pittsburg, 598
Placentia Bay, 156
Plaines des Gaiacs, 433-34
Plan position indicator scope, 288
Plans, AC/AS, 472
Plans Div. (OCAC), 316
Ploesti oil fields, 341
Podington, 63 I
Pogue, L.W., 361-62
Pohl, Lt. Col. H.B., 331
Point Barrow, 170
Pointe Noire, 3 3 0
Polebrook, 63 I
Polifka, Capt. Karl, 425
Polish Air Force, 89
Portal, ACM Sir Charles, C/AS RAF,
248, 253, 559-60, 566-67, 5737 602, 6231
627, 631, 646, 652
Port Blair, 500
Port Elizabeth, 3 3 1 , 494
Port Hedland, 330-3 I
Portland (Maine), 5 2 3
Port Moresby, 178-79, 182, 184, 384, 386,
408, 41% 414, 416-179 425, 447-5'1 47'-
729 4741 477-80. 483, 504
Port of Spain, 321, 324
Portugal, 3 2 6
Potsdam conference, 2 5 2
Pound, Adm. Sir Dudley, 2 5 3
Poynton, 650
Pratt, Adm. W.V., 30, 61-62, 67
President of US., 20, 23, 6711, 180, 194,
265, 367, 371, 487. See also Coolidge;
Harding; Roosevelt; Wilson.
Presque Isle, 344, 347-49, 641, 644-45
Press comment: B-17, 662-63; danger of
attack on Western Hemisphere, 150,
271, 279, 282, 285-86; US-British rela-
tions, 610; World War I, 6, 15
Prestwick, 344, 346, 356, 641, 644-45
Richard, Lt. W.J., 389
Prince of Wales, 232, 377, 438
Priorities, Pacific vs. ETO, 435-36, 472,
Production, 245-50, 666-67; between
wars, 56-57, 106-9; World W a r I, 7-
Production Management, Office of, 106,
Project A (19331, 65-69
Project X, 3 3 2 - 3 6 , 341. See also X, Task
558, 666
10, 16, 37, 5 5
1317 '33
Force.
Prome, 499
Puerto Rico, 120, 123-24, 161-63, 193,
7 8 2
274-75, 282, 3201 324, 3297 3557 4941
534-37
Punta Borinquen, 161
Pursuit aviation: for bomber offensive,
584; as compared to bombardment, 36-
37, 57, 65; designation changed to
"fighter," 307 n; flight across Atlantic,
640; question of UI< defense, 622-23
Pyle, Ernie, 286
Q
Qantas, 375
Queen Elizabeth, 375, 640
Queen Mary, 375
Quonset Point, 340
R
Rabaul, 178-79, 182, 184, 372, 377, 382,
Radar: antisub. equipment, 5 2 5 , 527, 5 3 3 ,
547, 549; British types, 288-91; devel-
opment, 55, 287-89, 293-94; in Hemi-
sphere defense, 152-53, 290-92, 296,
298, 302-3, 307-8, 465-66, 469; in
Pacific, 174, 186, 197, 220, 377, 383-84,
469, 476; training, 295; in UK, 288-91,
625-26
Radiation Laboratory (Mass. Institute of
Technology), 293-94
Radio. See Radar.
386, 408, 4103 413-14, 416-177 419, 427-
283 446-47, 470-741 47'3-81
RAINBOW NO. 5 , 139-41, 144, 147, 184,
190, 204, 2 1 3 , 236, 239, 271, 55% 577-
86, 629, 634
Ramsbury, 648
Randolph Field, 112-13
Ranger, 340
Rangoon, 395, 488-90, 492-93, 500-501,
509-10
Rawls, Lt. D.G., zoo
Reagan, Lt. C.L., 386: 398
Reconnaissance aviation: as a category,
64, 521; operations, 417, 44'3-50, 480;
redesignation of recon. sqs. as bomb.
units, 425
Regia Aeronautica. See Italian Air Force.
Reinforcements. See theaters.
Renault works, 593
Replacement Control Depot, ~ z t h ,615,
648
108-9, 128, 549-51, 604-5
Repulse, 232, 377, 438
Research and development, 54-60, 69,