The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

“US Navy”60+ pages

• p. 48 …This navy of the air is to be expanded until no part of Germany is safe…
• p. 53 …the Navy, and civilian agencies- the terms “independent,” “separate,” and “united air force” were used interchangeably…
• p. 60 …n 5 September he used the recent disaster to the Navy’s dirigible Sheizandoah as an…
• p. 62 …appointed in each of several departments-War, Navy, Commerce- to supervise aviation. The Lampert report, published…
• p. 71 …delaying them, so that bombardment had been used to cut communications and to interfere with the…
• p. 86 …One might suppose that Douhet, who “really struck the first blow,” was most useful; his work…
• p. 88 …the desired support of the War and Navy departments. Only two months after the major submitted…
• p. 96 …issues between the Army and the Navy over the use of aircraft in coastal defense. Neither…
• p. 105 …The Navy would provide aircraPt for don, scouting, and patrolling over the sea and for the…
• p. 107 …both the Army and the Navy for aviation to be used in support of “the Infantry…
• p. 113 …Japanese Air Power The Japanese air forces, divided into separate army and navy air arms, had…
• p. 116 …T h e navy, on the other hand, gave closer attention to the training of all…
• p. 117 …0 single-engine fighter used by both the Japanese army and navy-was widely known to…
• p. 118 …In comparison with the I 1,000 pilots trained by the US. Army and Navy during…
• p. 120 …In the war against Ethiopia, 1935-36, Italian bombers gained experience in the use of various…
• p. 125 …Under this arrangement the Luftwaffe, along with the army and navy, had direct access to the…
• p. 126 …Goering had successfully opposed the navy's desire for its own separate air arm, and the…
• p. 131 …The German navy was unable to provide such a guarantee, and, moreover, it lacked necessary equipment…
• p. 144 …This subject had been under study by the Army arid Navy for more than a decade…
• p. 146 …even at the expense of speed and useful load. A few months later Air Corps observers…
• p. 154 …a t best deny us the moral support of the Royal Navy with its shipyards, and…
• p. 155 …use of a mobile striking force to intercept an enemy approaching by sea. The Navy had…
• p. 156 …in support of or in lieu of US. Navy forces against hostile fleet^.'^ In each case…
• p. 162 …announced the arrival on the island of US. Navy At the suggestion of Iceland, the United…
• p. 170 …AAF and the British, 800 for the US.Navy.’’’ This would total 60,000 aircraft a…
• p. 175 …T h e planners were concerned only with the mission of the US. Army and Navy…
• p. 179 …In harmony with the general strategy advocated, US. air forces in the Pacific and Far East…
• p. 180 …For each command, the mission of the Army (including air forces) and the Navy was described…
• p. 200 …An alert system was in use twenty-four hours a day, and air operations were carried…
• p. 206 …Scattered throughout Panama were seven auxiliary airfields, two of which were ready for immediate use, and…
• p. 218 …Since the required number of planes represented more heavy bombers than were then in use in…
• p. 224 …regarding the possibility of using fields under construction by the Navy a t Palmyra and Samoa…
• p. 225 …I 942.* It devel- oped that the Navy could not offer assistance in construction until after…
• p. 228 …MacArthur had requested permission for emer- gency use of airfields; and negotiations were furthered by conferences…
• p. 243 …This action lasted about an hour.‘ At its end the Navy had suffered a crushing blow…
• p. 282 …But the US. Navy had been hard hit at Pearl Harbor, the bal- ance of naval…
• p. 297 …the Secretary of the Navy as to allocation between the using services. No relative priorities were…
• p. 305 …Army, Navy, and AAF, and similar representatives of the British services. T h e American members…
• p. 306 …Joint Intelligence Committee, consisted of the directors of intelligence from the Army, Navy, and AAF, and…
• p. 316 …So far as the Navy is concerned, Admiral King, as you know, is not only Chief…
• p. 317 …AAF officers were schooled to avoid use of the term “independent air force,” but in most…
• p. 326 …after 7 December 1941.T h e Navy was responsible for the general strategic defense of…
• p. 328 …In the absence of adequate preparations, sirens on police cars were used to warn the people…
• p. 335 …views between the W a r and Navy departments, and the unsatisfying conjectures advanced by the…
• p. 410 …ready for use; and it had to be divided between the Army and Navy. On the…
• p. 424 …Agreements had been reached for the use of Australian bases in the ferrying of heavy 366
• p. 464 …For inter-island air trans- port, principal reliance was placed on two Navy PBY’s and…
• p. 489 …In their prior planning, Army and Navy commanders had devoted scant attention to the problems of…
• p. 495 …Under the joint Army-Navy plan, approximately 15,000 men of the 37th Division were to…
• p. 497 …R I 1 precipitated the war, the US. Navy had taken a stand against im- mediate…
• p. 501 …the end he refused to permit the use of the field at Chu- chow. But the…
• p. 505 …into thickly settled districts, and these were used by the Japanese to justify the subsequent execution…
• p. 508 …the S010mons.~~ As early as February, the US. Navy had definite indications of an enemy offensive…
• p. 509 …The Navy’s lack of knowledge of these sightings is unexplained. 4-48
• p. 514 …T o be sure, it would be impossible to use Carrier Division Five, for the Shokaku…
• p. 527 …s and B-24's for naval use in long-range search and tracking."' Furthermore, he…
• p. 529 …D W A R I 1 planes, useful in covering the northern approaches across the Pacific…
• p. 534 …For the US. forces on Unalaska Island, it represented a loss of 2 2 , 0 0…
• p. 536 …T h e Japanese navy had sustained its initial defeats, but the army as yet had…
• p. 588 …Army aircraft might, however, temporarily execute Navy functions in support of or in lieu of Navy…