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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 14 …with the commanding general, who in some instances moved in advance of promptings from Wash- ington…
  • p. 25 …EASTERNAND WESTERNAPPROACHESTO PANAMACANAL ALASKAAND THE ALEUTIANISLANDS PRINCIPALSEAAND AIR ROUTESAS DESIGNATEDBY WASH- ATLANTICFERRYINGAND TRANSPORTROUTESPRIORTO . . . . . . . . . . 297 30' 305…
  • p. 229 …the importance of the Far East Air Force in American strategy, the Air Staff in Wash…
  • p. 292 …Even so, there was in Wash- ington too little intelligence concerning the fluid tactical situation to…
  • p. 302 …The suggestion had been carried out in 1941 with the establishment of the U.S. Special…
  • p. 306 …work permanently with the British Joint Intelligence Committee in Wash- ington. The Combined Military Transportation Committee…
  • p. 389 …to delay the take-off was granted only after an appeal to Wash- ington.’O 3…
  • p. 442 …the time and attention of U.S. officers at Brisbane and of headquarters in Wash- ington…
  • p. 443 …Accidents delayed three planes en route, and one of the P-40’s was completely “washed…
  • p. 454 …promise of weakening the enemy. Attention already had been given in Wash- ington to establishment of…
  • p. 554 …In China, he found the procurement of necessary equipment, even be- fore the outbreak of war…
  • p. 636 …After further negotiations in Wash- ington, the Arnold-Towers-Portal agreement was adopted on z I…
  • p. 693 …Accordingly, Wash- ington was requested to send immediately 50 intelligence officers for training by the RAF…
  • p. 747 …before the Committee on Military Af- fairs, House of Representatives (Wash- 23. See, for instance, William…
  • p. 772 …The exact date of the arrival of air units is not known, as the latter source…
  • p. 799 …The road from Haiphong, Indo- China, to Yunnan was closed by the Vichy government in 1940…
  • p. 814 …Overseas (Ferrying), Air Min- istry, Memorandum on the Movement by Air of US. Forces to the…
T H E A R M Y A I R A R M B E T W E E N T W O W A R S
Army (15 October 1935). Ostensibly a compromise, this manual in-
clined toward the General Staff’s point of view. In listing functions
of the GHQ Air Force “beyond the sphere of influence of the.Ground
Forces,” it included strikes at “military and civil objectives alike”-
air installations, shipping, munitions and aircraft factories, transporta-
tion, etc. There is no effort to establish absolute priorities, since the
relative importance of objectives varies with the situation, but the
judgment is made that as targets “air forces [are] generally of primary
importance.” 1 3 0 There were in T R 4 4 0 - 1 5 few statements to which
the Air Corps could take exception, but its very lack of emphasis made
it a weak instrument for indoctrination. T h e manual remained in force
until 1940, but a sampling of Air Corps opinion during that interval
u7ill indicate that its tenets were by no means universally accepted.
Within the Air Corps two fairly distinct points of view may be
discerned, but it is difficult to determine any principle of alignment
within the several air agencies. One attitude, which for convenience
may be called that of compromise, stressed on political grounds the
defense mission of aviation, but as an interim rather than a permanent
policy. This way of thinking may be seen in an Air Corps Tactical
School critique of General Kilbdurne’s proposed doctrines and in a
counterproposal of 3 I January 1935 called “Suggested Foundation for
GHQ Air Force Doctrine.” l S 1 T h e latter starts with the assumption
that “national policy, geographic location of bases and the present
range of planes which does not permit the air attack of the national
structure of any probable enemy, dictate the role of the GHQ Air
Force as one of air defense and fix its true objective.” 13’ In keeping
with this opinion, first priority is given to preventing an enemy from
setting up air bases within range of the United States, second priority
to defeat of enemy forces operating from such bases.
Similar conclusions may be found in a study, “The Functions of
the Army Air Forces,” presented by the Air Corps Board on 29 Oc-
tober 1936. Assuming that, with current performance of aircraft,
sustained attacks could not be carried out against the homeland of any
major foreign power from bases in U.S. territory, the board declared
that the Air Corps should be immediately and primarily concerned
with national defense and the preservation of internal order. Until an
adequate defense was assured, “the diversion of effort incident to
preparations for strategically offensive operations is not justified.” 133
T h e real intention of this study was to secure for the Air Corps a
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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.