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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 125 …an invading army. For that job they were well equipped, trained, and organized. Though the Luftwaff…
  • p. 127 …For the first time, German parachute troops were successfully employed when the Nazi forces invaded Holland…
  • p. 131 …equipment for moving an invading force across the intervening waters. The army itself, caught unprepared, required…
  • p. 134 …By the first of June the British had been forced to yield Crete to the invaders…
  • p. 183 …Nevertheless, a land army should be prepared to invade the continent and Germany itself. T h…
  • p. 246 …this effort." Apparently the course of the invaders plotted earlier in the morning was not utilized…
  • p. 263 …tanks, but they too “strafed and restrafed the invaders.” As Lt. Samuel H. Marrett, squadron commander…
  • p. 461 …the invading forces was merely preliminary to the bringing in of bombers in preparation for the…
  • p. 493 …Its nickel and chrome mines were readily accessible to an invader. Admiral King believed that the…
  • p. 522 …after the action; not until the war ended and the teams of interrogators invaded Japan was…
  • p. 529 …There was no intention of invading the Alaskan mainland, or even Dutch Harbor; the objective was…
  • p. 535 …Four of the most efficient carriers had gone down, carrying with them the hopes of Admiral…
  • p. 559 …the latter presented the more immediate need for reinforcement. Tavoy had fallen to Japanese invaders as…
  • p. 630 …The Netherlands East Indies and Burma, already invaded, were doomed. T h e Indian Ocean was…
  • p. 633 …to the preliminary strategic bombardment and only modestly to direct support of the invading force. A…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
expeditionary force, and GHQ aviation, in addition to its role of close
support, would assist materially in off shore reconnaissance and inter-
ception of an enemy expedition. But such functions required a closer
definition of the respective responsibilities of the Army and Navy, a
problem that was referred to the Joint Board of the Army and Navy.
In a report, “Doctrines for the Employment of the GHQ Air Force,”
2 6 September 1934, the Joint Board accepted in substance the recom-
mendations of the Drum and Baker reports, but the tendency of both
chese reports to discount the role of air power was reflected in a much
less clearly defined statement of Air Corps responsibilities in national
defense than had been hoped for in 1931.12* A year later the Air Corps
mission was described more formally in a revision of Joint Action of
the Army and Navy, promulgated on I I September 1935. This pro-
vided that the Army air component was “ t o operate as an arm of the
mobile Army, both in the conduct of air operations over the land in
support of land operations and in the conduct of air operations over
the sea in direct defense of the coast”; under certain conditions Army
aviation was also to conduct “air operations in support of or in lieu of
naval forces.” lZ5These passages were ambiguous enough to be accept-
able to both Army and Navy and too ambiguous to be of service to
either.
In October 1934,Gen. Douglas MacArthur, Chief of Staff, had for-
warded to appropriate commands the Joint Board’s paper on employ-
ment of the GHQ Air Force.lZOIn anticipation of the imminent
reorganization of the Air Corps he directed that air doctrines be re-
stated “with a view to a broader understanding of the Air Corps’ place
in the scheme of national defense and in expectation of doing away
with misconceptions and interbranch prejudices.” lZ7
On 2 I December, Brig. Gen. C.E. Kilbourne of the General Staff’s
War Plans Division forwarded to the Chief of the Air Corps, as
a “sighting shot,” a draft proposal for “Doctrines of Army Air
Corps.’’ This paper drew heavily upon the Drum and Baker reports,
though it gave to the counterair activities of the GHQ Air Force a
greater prominence than had either. Kilbourne’s draft was criticized
severely by members of the Air Corps Tactical School and of the
Office of the Chief of the Air Corps, including Maj. Carl Spaatz, be-
cause it subordinated strategic bombardment to attacks on enemy air
power.12QA somewhat more acceptable statement appeared in a re-
vised edition of T R 440- I 5, Employment of the Air Forces of the
48

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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.