“Nevers”44 pages
- p. 43 …cavalry mounted on gas driven flying horses” never arrived to
“sweep the Germans from the sky…
- p. 46 …Mitchell never received an American air force commensurate with
the ambitious idens of air power which…
- p. 49 …This project, like so many others, had lagged, and the Air Service was
never equipped during…
- p. 50 …the Army or the Air Corps?” but never, “Are
you in the Army or the Corps…
- p. 55 …any Air Service officers, and I have never heard
anybody yet-any Air Service officer-against…
- p. 69 …But one axiom,
with its corollaries, never varied. T o him the airplane was first and…
- p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be
completely stopped, but their effects could best…
- p. 94 …rate for the time being, the decision never-
theless left an open question as to how…
- p. 121 …large-scale warfare; production of combat types never exceeded 300
aircraft a month. The pattern of…
- p. 122 …the German Air Force, the
Regia Aeronautica never exhibited sufficient power to be decisive in
the…
- p. 133 …Except for a few raids against French
factories, the force had never been employed in a…
- p. 140 …into
a complete war economy production was never equal to the demands
of our own forces…
- p. 150 …Long-term needs
of the Air Corps and the sudden availability of funds in quantities
never…
- p. 181 …Actually, the Air Staff had
never approved of the method followed in RAINBOW No. 5 . l…
- p. 217 …Members of the Hawaiian Air Force, who had never flown
heavy bombers, began to receive intensive…
- p. 219 …were not then satisfactory for permanent garrisons. Never-
theless, the commander of the Hawaiian Department, Lt…
- p. 227 …T h e planes never reached their destination. Other
bombardment units were being prepared for transfer…
- p. 241 …responsible officers, a few crucial points
have never been satisfactorily explained.
T h e general pattern…
- p. 277 …motors, sole-
noids, and gun mounts-were never found. After many hours of fruit-
less search…
- p. 288 …planners and
from which AAF Headquarters was never to deviate.
The translation of the accepted grand…
- p. 303 …the principal features of the plan
were never challenged, it was subsequently revised in a draft…
- p. 309 …W a r Plans Division was
never incorporated into GHQ and remained a potential rival to…
- p. 336 …the shooting and wrote that they were never
able to make out an airplane.g6It is…
- p. 412 …As it happened, the B-24's never
returned to India, but, instead, remained in the…
- p. 457 …Meanwhile the Edsall with the remaining
pilots had headed for Java, never to be heard from…
- p. 492 …Squadron was assigned, but which it would never reach, going from
Australia to Tongatabu; ( 3 ) Christmas…
- p. 500 …deck of a carrier presented a problem never
before challenged by Army planes. Hence an accelerated…
- p. 502 …the bows and wetting the flight deck. Never before had this been
accomplished, yet now it…
- p. 509 …Island, in the
Louisiade Archipelago.” They were never needed, for on 7-8 May
the two…
- p. 513 …exist, it was at a point which never reached the
aircrews, for on the operational level…
- p. 524 …handicaps under which
AAF planes had operated. Never were more than fourteen B- I 7’s…
- p. 527 …AAF planners clung firmly to their belief that
proper observance of economy of force would never…
- p. 531 …Crews which had
previously never loaded torpedoes now for the first time fitted these
weapons into…
- p. 544 …But the Japanese never at
any time based their bombers in appreciable numbers a t either…
- p. 548 …26's in torpedo-dropping, but they never would be put into
All told, the record…
- p. 556 …until it had been thoroughly trained and never to com-
mit it piecemeal. General Magruder had…
- p. 560 …pressed into service against the Germans," and never reached the
CBI." Colonel Haynes had reached India…
- p. 606 …reason that the Antilles Air Task Force
never evolved, as did I Bomber Command, into an…
- p. 614 …that reason deserving a high
priority, could never dispose of the U-boat menace but must…
- p. 635 …In Washington the Munitions Assign-
ments Board t had never considered this schedule as more than…
- p. 670 …they bombed from 39,200 feet, and never
below 30,000. By AAF standards they had…
- p. 672 …Goering had never put enough bombers over England,
nor had he concentrated his forces on the…
- p. 690 …of co-operation and combined action probably never
before equaled by the military forces of two…
- p. 729 …shoot at aerial targets, and several
had never operated a turret in the air. This deficiency…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
expeditionary force, and GHQ aviation, in addition to its role of close
support, would assist materially in off shore reconnaissance and inter-
ception of an enemy expedition. But such functions required a closer
definition of the respective responsibilities of the Army and Navy, a
problem that was referred to the Joint Board of the Army and Navy.
In a report, “Doctrines for the Employment of the GHQ Air Force,”
2 6 September 1934, the Joint Board accepted in substance the recom-
mendations of the Drum and Baker reports, but the tendency of both
chese reports to discount the role of air power was reflected in a much
less clearly defined statement of Air Corps responsibilities in national
defense than had been hoped for in 1931.12* A year later the Air Corps
mission was described more formally in a revision of Joint Action of
the Army and Navy, promulgated on I I September 1935. This pro-
vided that the Army air component was “ t o operate as an arm of the
mobile Army, both in the conduct of air operations over the land in
support of land operations and in the conduct of air operations over
the sea in direct defense of the coast”; under certain conditions Army
aviation was also to conduct “air operations in support of or in lieu of
naval forces.” lZ5These passages were ambiguous enough to be accept-
able to both Army and Navy and too ambiguous to be of service to
either.
In October 1934,Gen. Douglas MacArthur, Chief of Staff, had for-
warded to appropriate commands the Joint Board’s paper on employ-
ment of the GHQ Air Force.lZOIn anticipation of the imminent
reorganization of the Air Corps he directed that air doctrines be re-
stated “with a view to a broader understanding of the Air Corps’ place
in the scheme of national defense and in expectation of doing away
with misconceptions and interbranch prejudices.” lZ7
On 2 I December, Brig. Gen. C.E. Kilbourne of the General Staff’s
War Plans Division forwarded to the Chief of the Air Corps, as
a “sighting shot,” a draft proposal for “Doctrines of Army Air
Corps.’’ This paper drew heavily upon the Drum and Baker reports,
though it gave to the counterair activities of the GHQ Air Force a
greater prominence than had either. Kilbourne’s draft was criticized
severely by members of the Air Corps Tactical School and of the
Office of the Chief of the Air Corps, including Maj. Carl Spaatz, be-
cause it subordinated strategic bombardment to attacks on enemy air
power.12QA somewhat more acceptable statement appeared in a re-
vised edition of T R 440- I 5, Employment of the Air Forces of the
48