“US Navy”60+ pages
- p. 48 …This navy of the air is to be
expanded until no part of Germany is safe…
- p. 53 …the Navy, and civilian agencies-
the terms “independent,” “separate,” and “united air force” were used
interchangeably…
- p. 60 …n 5 September he
used the recent disaster to the Navy’s dirigible Sheizandoah as an…
- p. 62 …appointed in each of several departments-War, Navy, Commerce-
to supervise aviation.
The Lampert report, published…
- p. 71 …delaying them, so that bombardment had been
used to cut communications and to interfere with the…
- p. 86 …One might suppose that
Douhet, who “really struck the first blow,” was most useful; his work…
- p. 88 …the desired support of the War and Navy
departments. Only two months after the major submitted…
- p. 96 …issues between the Army and
the Navy over the use of aircraft in coastal defense.
Neither…
- p. 105 …The Navy would provide aircraPt for
don, scouting, and patrolling over the sea and for the…
- p. 107 …both the Army and the
Navy for aviation to be used in support of “the Infantry…
- p. 113 …Japanese Air Power
The Japanese air forces, divided into separate army and navy air
arms, had…
- p. 116 …T h e navy, on the other hand, gave
closer attention to the training of all…
- p. 117 …0 single-engine fighter used by both the Japanese army
and navy-was widely known to…
- p. 118 …In comparison with the I 1,000
pilots trained by the US. Army and Navy during…
- p. 120 …In the war against Ethiopia, 1935-36, Italian
bombers gained experience in the use of various…
- p. 125 …Under this arrangement the Luftwaffe, along with the
army and navy, had direct access to the…
- p. 126 …Goering had successfully
opposed the navy's desire for its own separate air arm, and the…
- p. 131 …The
German navy was unable to provide such a guarantee, and, moreover,
it lacked necessary equipment…
- p. 144 …This subject had been under study by the Army arid
Navy for more than a decade…
- p. 146 …even at the expense of speed
and useful load. A few months later Air Corps observers…
- p. 154 …a t best deny us the moral support of the
Royal Navy with its shipyards, and…
- p. 155 …use of a mobile striking
force to intercept an enemy approaching by sea. The Navy had…
- p. 156 …in support of or in lieu of US. Navy
forces against hostile fleet^.'^
In each case…
- p. 162 …announced the arrival on the
island of US. Navy At the suggestion of Iceland, the United…
- p. 170 …AAF and the British, 800 for
the US.Navy.’’’ This would total 60,000 aircraft a…
- p. 175 …T h e planners were concerned only with the mission of the
US. Army and Navy…
- p. 179 …In harmony with the general strategy advocated,
US. air forces in the Pacific and Far East…
- p. 180 …For each command, the mission of
the Army (including air forces) and the Navy was described…
- p. 200 …An alert system was in use twenty-four hours
a day, and air operations were carried…
- p. 206 …Scattered
throughout Panama were seven auxiliary airfields, two of which were
ready for immediate use, and…
- p. 218 …Since the
required number of planes represented more heavy bombers than
were then in use in…
- p. 224 …regarding the possibility of using fields
under construction by the Navy a t Palmyra and Samoa…
- p. 225 …I 942.* It devel-
oped that the Navy could not offer assistance in construction until
after…
- p. 228 …MacArthur had requested permission for emer-
gency use of airfields; and negotiations were furthered by conferences…
- p. 243 …This action lasted about an hour.‘ At its end the
Navy had suffered a crushing blow…
- p. 282 …But the US. Navy had been hard hit at Pearl Harbor, the bal-
ance of naval…
- p. 297 …the Secretary of the Navy as to allocation between
the using services. No relative priorities were…
- p. 305 …Army, Navy, and AAF, and similar representatives of the British
services. T h e American members…
- p. 306 …Joint Intelligence Committee, consisted of the directors of intelligence
from the Army, Navy, and AAF, and…
- p. 316 …So far as the Navy is concerned, Admiral King, as you
know, is not only Chief…
- p. 317 …AAF officers were schooled to avoid
use of the term “independent air force,” but in most…
- p. 326 …after 7 December 1941.T h e Navy was responsible for the general
strategic defense of…
- p. 328 …In the absence of adequate preparations, sirens on police cars
were used to warn the people…
- p. 335 …views between the W a r and Navy departments,
and the unsatisfying conjectures advanced by the…
- p. 410 …ready for use; and it had to
be divided between the Army and Navy.
On the…
- p. 424 …Agreements had
been reached for the use of Australian bases in the ferrying of heavy
366
- p. 464 …For inter-island air trans-
port, principal reliance was placed on two Navy PBY’s and…
- p. 489 …In their prior planning, Army and Navy commanders had devoted
scant attention to the problems of…
- p. 495 …Under the joint
Army-Navy plan, approximately 15,000 men of the 37th Division
were to…
- p. 497 …R I 1
precipitated the war, the US. Navy had taken a stand against im-
mediate…
- p. 501 …the end he refused to permit the use of the field at Chu-
chow. But the…
- p. 505 …into thickly settled districts, and
these were used by the Japanese to justify the subsequent execution…
- p. 508 …the S010mons.~~
As early as February, the US. Navy had definite indications of an
enemy offensive…
- p. 509 …The Navy’s lack of knowledge
of these sightings is unexplained.
4-48
- p. 514 …T o be sure, it would be impossible to use
Carrier Division Five, for the Shokaku…
- p. 527 …s and B-24's for naval use in long-range search
and tracking."' Furthermore, he…
- p. 529 …D W A R I 1
planes, useful in covering the northern approaches across the Pacific…
- p. 534 …For the US. forces on Unalaska Island, it represented a loss
of 2 2 , 0 0…
- p. 536 …T h e Japanese navy had
sustained its initial defeats, but the army as yet had…
- p. 588 …Army aircraft might, however, temporarily execute Navy functions
in support of or in lieu of Navy…
N O T E S T O P A G E S 6 3 6 - 4 1
and XXW; Conference, Col. McGinnis,
CO, VIII AFSC and Col. McMullen,
Foreign Liaison Officer, ASC, 16 May
1942; ltr., Col. Lyon to CG AAF, 19
May 1942.
1 2 3 . Proposed msg., Spaatz to Chaney
for Eaker, 27 Apr. 1942.
124. Ltr., T A G to CG AAF, 27 Apr.
'942.
1 2 5 . Memo for Arnold from Spaatz,
z May 1942.
1 2 6 . VIII BC Diary, 1 1 - 1 2 May 1942.
127. VIII BC Diary, passim.
128. Msg., Black 831, Joint Planners,
Washington to Joint Planners, London,
30 Apr. 1942; ltr., CG Eighth AF to CG
AAF, 26 May 1942; File 706, 5 June
1 9 4 ~ ;memo for CG's AGF, AAF, SOS
from Eisenhower, AC/S WDGS, 18 May
'942.
129. Warning Orders, Hq. AAF to
Hq. Eighth AF, 30 Apr. 1942; ltr., W D
to All Activities Concerned, 13 May
1942; interview with Col. N.P. Beville,
as cited in n. 29; G O 2, Hq. Eighth AF
Staging Area Command, Ft. Dix, N.J.,
1 3 June 1942.
1 3 0 . History, VIII AFSC, chap. ii, p.
3 2 ; VIII BC Diary, 1 2 June 1942; memo
for Col. Craig from Gen. Kuter, 16 June
1942*
1 3 1 . Station List, Eighth Air Force,
3 1 Aug. 1942.
1 3 2 . History, North Atlantic Div.,
1 3 3 . Ibid., pp. 198-99; account of
meeting at Bolling Field with Gen.
George, Col. Giles, and Col. A.D. Smith,
in File 706, 6 June 1942; Report of
the Committee Appointed to take Neces-
sary Action for the Bolero Movement,
I May 1942; ltr., Hq. AAF to Gen. G.C.
Brant, C G Newfoundland Base Com-
mand, 4 May 1942.
134. File 706, 18 Apr. 1942; Re-
port.. . for the Bolero Movement, I May
'942.
1 3 5 . VIII FC Diary, 18 Apr. 1942;
ltr.; Spaatz to Hunter, 28 Apr. 1942;
memo for CG Eighth AF from CG
AAF, 17 May 1942.
136. Memo for CG's Third and
ATC, I, Pt. I, 192-94, 196-98.
74'
28 Oct. 1941; memo for C/S SPOBS
from Col. Davison, 5 Nov. 1941.
108. Memo for A-4, Hq. AAF from
Lt. Col. C.E. Duncan, S/AS, I Z Jan. 1942.
109. Ltr., Eaker to Spaatz, 1 1 Mar.
1942.
110. Ltr., Col. Lyon to C/S Hq.
USAFBI, 13 Apr. 1942; Eaker Diary, 2 3
Apr. 1942; memo for Robert A. Lovett,
AS/W for Air from Arnold, 2 7 Apr.
1942; Eighth AF Extract Diary, 28 Apr.
1942; msg. #1329, USAFBI to AGWAR,
29 Apr. 1942.
I I I . Memo for Lovett from Arnold,
2 7 Apr. 1942; ltr., Brig. Gen. Muir S.
Fairchild, Hq. AAF to Eaker, z May
'942.
I 1 2 . Conference, Gcn. Chanev and
Col. Llewellin, Minister of Aircraft Pro-
duction, n.d., probably late April or
early May 1 9 4 ~ ;ltr., Col. J,lewellin to
Gen. Bolte, C/S Hq. USAFBI, 2 3 May
'942.
1 1 3 . Standing Order #229, Burton-
wood Repair Depot, 3 0 June 1942.
114. Ltr., A.N. Duncan to Spaatz, 16
June 1942.
I 15. R&R, Air Officer, Hq. ETOUSA
to G-4 and G-3, Hq. ETOUSA, 20 June
'942.
116. Ltr, Spaatz to Arnold, 5 July
'942.
117. For a brief discussion of this
subject, see Bomber Command Plan, G-4
Annex, p. 4.
I 18. Ibid.
119. Ltr., Hq. AAF to CG's First,
Second, Third, Fourth, Eighth AF's, 7
May 1942; Accommodations of US.
AAF, as cited in n. 76, p. 3 ; memo for
CG AAF from Col. Eugene H. Beebe, I
June 1942.
120. Ltr., Eaker to Spaatz, 18 May
'942.
121. Ltr., Col. J.H. Hicks to Gen.
Lyon, 8 June 1942; ltr., Col. J.H. Hicks
to C G Air Service Command, 2 6 June
'942.
1 2 2 . Memo for A-4, Hq. AAF from
Col. George, 19 Jan. 1942; VIII BC
Diary, 27 Feb. 1942; ltr., Eaker to
Arnold, 11 Mar. 1942; JOMUS, Secs. XI1