“US Navy”60+ pages
- p. 48 …This navy of the air is to be
expanded until no part of Germany is safe…
- p. 53 …the Navy, and civilian agencies-
the terms “independent,” “separate,” and “united air force” were used
interchangeably…
- p. 60 …n 5 September he
used the recent disaster to the Navy’s dirigible Sheizandoah as an…
- p. 62 …appointed in each of several departments-War, Navy, Commerce-
to supervise aviation.
The Lampert report, published…
- p. 71 …delaying them, so that bombardment had been
used to cut communications and to interfere with the…
- p. 86 …One might suppose that
Douhet, who “really struck the first blow,” was most useful; his work…
- p. 88 …the desired support of the War and Navy
departments. Only two months after the major submitted…
- p. 96 …issues between the Army and
the Navy over the use of aircraft in coastal defense.
Neither…
- p. 105 …The Navy would provide aircraPt for
don, scouting, and patrolling over the sea and for the…
- p. 107 …both the Army and the
Navy for aviation to be used in support of “the Infantry…
- p. 113 …Japanese Air Power
The Japanese air forces, divided into separate army and navy air
arms, had…
- p. 116 …T h e navy, on the other hand, gave
closer attention to the training of all…
- p. 117 …0 single-engine fighter used by both the Japanese army
and navy-was widely known to…
- p. 118 …In comparison with the I 1,000
pilots trained by the US. Army and Navy during…
- p. 120 …In the war against Ethiopia, 1935-36, Italian
bombers gained experience in the use of various…
- p. 125 …Under this arrangement the Luftwaffe, along with the
army and navy, had direct access to the…
- p. 126 …Goering had successfully
opposed the navy's desire for its own separate air arm, and the…
- p. 131 …The
German navy was unable to provide such a guarantee, and, moreover,
it lacked necessary equipment…
- p. 144 …This subject had been under study by the Army arid
Navy for more than a decade…
- p. 146 …even at the expense of speed
and useful load. A few months later Air Corps observers…
- p. 154 …a t best deny us the moral support of the
Royal Navy with its shipyards, and…
- p. 155 …use of a mobile striking
force to intercept an enemy approaching by sea. The Navy had…
- p. 156 …in support of or in lieu of US. Navy
forces against hostile fleet^.'^
In each case…
- p. 162 …announced the arrival on the
island of US. Navy At the suggestion of Iceland, the United…
- p. 170 …AAF and the British, 800 for
the US.Navy.’’’ This would total 60,000 aircraft a…
- p. 175 …T h e planners were concerned only with the mission of the
US. Army and Navy…
- p. 179 …In harmony with the general strategy advocated,
US. air forces in the Pacific and Far East…
- p. 180 …For each command, the mission of
the Army (including air forces) and the Navy was described…
- p. 200 …An alert system was in use twenty-four hours
a day, and air operations were carried…
- p. 206 …Scattered
throughout Panama were seven auxiliary airfields, two of which were
ready for immediate use, and…
- p. 218 …Since the
required number of planes represented more heavy bombers than
were then in use in…
- p. 224 …regarding the possibility of using fields
under construction by the Navy a t Palmyra and Samoa…
- p. 225 …I 942.* It devel-
oped that the Navy could not offer assistance in construction until
after…
- p. 228 …MacArthur had requested permission for emer-
gency use of airfields; and negotiations were furthered by conferences…
- p. 243 …This action lasted about an hour.‘ At its end the
Navy had suffered a crushing blow…
- p. 282 …But the US. Navy had been hard hit at Pearl Harbor, the bal-
ance of naval…
- p. 297 …the Secretary of the Navy as to allocation between
the using services. No relative priorities were…
- p. 305 …Army, Navy, and AAF, and similar representatives of the British
services. T h e American members…
- p. 306 …Joint Intelligence Committee, consisted of the directors of intelligence
from the Army, Navy, and AAF, and…
- p. 316 …So far as the Navy is concerned, Admiral King, as you
know, is not only Chief…
- p. 317 …AAF officers were schooled to avoid
use of the term “independent air force,” but in most…
- p. 326 …after 7 December 1941.T h e Navy was responsible for the general
strategic defense of…
- p. 328 …In the absence of adequate preparations, sirens on police cars
were used to warn the people…
- p. 335 …views between the W a r and Navy departments,
and the unsatisfying conjectures advanced by the…
- p. 410 …ready for use; and it had to
be divided between the Army and Navy.
On the…
- p. 424 …Agreements had
been reached for the use of Australian bases in the ferrying of heavy
366
- p. 464 …For inter-island air trans-
port, principal reliance was placed on two Navy PBY’s and…
- p. 489 …In their prior planning, Army and Navy commanders had devoted
scant attention to the problems of…
- p. 495 …Under the joint
Army-Navy plan, approximately 15,000 men of the 37th Division
were to…
- p. 497 …R I 1
precipitated the war, the US. Navy had taken a stand against im-
mediate…
- p. 501 …the end he refused to permit the use of the field at Chu-
chow. But the…
- p. 505 …into thickly settled districts, and
these were used by the Japanese to justify the subsequent execution…
- p. 508 …the S010mons.~~
As early as February, the US. Navy had definite indications of an
enemy offensive…
- p. 509 …The Navy’s lack of knowledge
of these sightings is unexplained.
4-48
- p. 514 …T o be sure, it would be impossible to use
Carrier Division Five, for the Shokaku…
- p. 527 …s and B-24's for naval use in long-range search
and tracking."' Furthermore, he…
- p. 529 …D W A R I 1
planes, useful in covering the northern approaches across the Pacific…
- p. 534 …For the US. forces on Unalaska Island, it represented a loss
of 2 2 , 0 0…
- p. 536 …T h e Japanese navy had
sustained its initial defeats, but the army as yet had…
- p. 588 …Army aircraft might, however, temporarily execute Navy functions
in support of or in lieu of Navy…
N O T E S T O P A G E S 5 7 8 - 8 5
is given in History, SPOBS, chap. i.
Something of the importance attached to
them in the winter of 1941-42 may be
sensed from the great amount of per-
tinent correspondence in AAF Hq. files.
(For TURBINLFTE see especially,
memo for Arnold from C.E. Duncan,
S/AS, Plan to Establish and Train il
Turbiiilite Squadron [N.F.] in the Brit-
ish Isles, 12 Jan. 1942; memo for Arnold
from Kuter, DC/AS, z May 1942. The
one squadron which was dispatched to
England for this purpose was redesig-
nated 15th Bombardment Squadron [L]
and was the first AAF unit to see action
in the ETO. For cancellation of
SHADOW 82, see RetR, Establishment
of a Shadow Organization in N. Ireland,
AFAEP to AFDOP, 2 5 Apr. 1942. On
TRIGGER, see especially, ltr., Mc-
Narney to Portal, 30 Sept. 1941; AWPD
Division Digest, 9 Apr. 1942.)
87. History, SPOBS, chap. ii.
88. Ltr., Ma!. Gen. A.E. Nye, Dir. of
Staff Duties, War Office to Chaney, 2 7
Sept. 1941; Chaney to Nye, n.d., but in
reply.
89. Ltr., Arnold to Chaney, 8 Nov.
1947.
90. Ltr., Chaney to C/S, Command
Arrangements, US Army Forces in Great
Britain, 20 Sept. 1941.
91. Ltr., Lt. Col. H.L. George,
AWPD to Col. H.L. McClelland, SPOBS,
8 Nov. 1941.
92. Ltr., Chaney to Arnold, 5 Dec.
‘941.
93. Ibid., 1x1. I , Graphic Outline of
the Basic Organization of US Forces in
Great Britain.
94. Memo for Gen. McNarney from
Chaney, 6 Dec. 1941.
95. Letter of Instruction No. 2 , 1 1
Dec. 1941.
96. CM, AGWAR to SPOBS, 8 Jan.
1942.
97. Memo for C G AFCC, etc. from
Arnold, Channels of Communications
with Gen. Chaney, 2 Feb. 1942.
98. See the many requisitions for staff
personnel, of which the following are
examples: CM-368, SPOBS to AGWAR,
7 Jan. 1942; CM-429, London to AG-
7 34
WAR, 16 Jan. 1942; CM-465, London to
AGWAR, 24 Jan. 1942; CM-92, London
to AGWAR, 2 1 Feb. 1942; CM-634,
London to AGWAR, 24 Feb. 1942; CM-
726, London to AGWAR, 9 Mar. 1942.
99. History, VIII AFSC, chap. i.
100. Ltr., Eaker to H.L. George, 5
Mar. 1942.
1 0 1 . The chart, Schematic Organiza-
tion US. Army Air Forces in the United
Kingdom, was indorsed: “Concur for
tentative approval. Chart to be referred
to General Chaney for remark. Lt. Gen.
L.J. McNair.”
1 0 2 . Memo for C/S USAAF in Brit-
ish Isles from Arnold as DC/S, 26 Jan.
‘942.
103. Directive for A-I by C/AS,
Activation of AAF Units for British Isles,
1 1 Feb. 1942.
104. CM-OUT-399 (1-24-42), Arnold
to SPOBS, AF 1/401, 24 Jan. 1942.
10s. CM-465, London to AGWAR,
24 Jan. 1942; CM-495, London to AG-
WAR, 30 Jan. 1942.
106. CM-52, Chaney to GHQ, 3 1 Jan.
1942; memo for A G from C G GHQ,
Organization of US Army Forces in the
UK, 3 Feb. 1942.
107. CCS 40, 16 Feb. 1942.
108. Ltr., Arnold to Eaker, Initial
Directive to Bomber Commander in Eng-
land, 31 Jan. 1942.
109. CM-OUT-472 (26-42), C G
AAF to SPOBS, AF 2/105, 5 Feb. 1942.
1 1 0 . Details Which Must Be Accom-
plished by Bomber Command Advance
Echelon, n.d.
I I I . Memo for JSP, 24 Feb. 1942.
1 1 2 . C M - O U T - ~ I ~(2-12-42), Arnold
113. CM-634, CM-635, CM-636, all
114. Ltrs., Eaker to George, 5 Mar.
1 1 5 . Ltr., Eaker to Spaatz, I Mar.
116. lbid.
117. Ltr., Eaker to George, 5 Mar.
to SPOBS, AF 2/207, 1 2 Feb. 1942.
London to AGWAR, 24 Feb. 1942.
1942; Eaker to Spaatz, I Mar. 1942.
1942.
I942 *