“RAF”60+ pages
- p. 12 …T h e term “first narrative,” bor-
rowed from the RAF, was frequently used to describe…
- p. 16 …history would constitute a lifetime assignment-the RAF’s history of
World W a r I…
- p. 47 …being made
up of aircraft from the RAF’s Independent Force, the whole of the
French…
- p. 48 …early 1917.O n 6 June 1918the RAF’s Independent Force had been
established with its…
- p. 53 …Most radical was the independent air force,
usually drawing heavily upon the RAF and its Air…
- p. 114 …I when a
British mission of retired RAF officers and others arrived in Japan to
assist…
- p. 127 …At Dunkirk the Luftwaff e momentarily yielded supremacy to the
RAF, which was able to gain…
- p. 128 …After French surrender on 2 2 June, only the RAF remained
for the Luftwaffe to conquer…
- p. 129 …T h e RAF and the Battle of Britain
The German bombing of Britain in World…
- p. 130 …The RAF retained its autonomy; but, even so, sentiment for
many years, like that in the…
- p. 131 …it was
hoped that the badly ournumbered RAF would be able to hold off
any German…
- p. 132 …By the end of September the RAF had asserred its control of the air
over rhe…
- p. 133 …It will take no credit from the RAF’s outnumbered “few” to sug-
gest that the…
- p. 136 …Operations of the RAF after the fall of 1940 were as widely dis-
persed as were…
- p. 137 …on strategic bombardment, would find in the RAF a stout and under-
standing ally. It is…
- p. 171 …British requirements amounted to
49,385 planes, including first-line strength and wastage for the RAF…
- p. 186 …with fresh data and a familiarity with RAF
experience. Actual authorship of a military document is…
- p. 290 …to
prewar plans, was to join the RAF in the attack on Germany. This
project was…
- p. 338 …Fortunately, the RAF,
magnificently served by such advisers as Robert Watson-Watt,
rapidly went beyond the…
- p. 341 …enjoyed
through the co-operation of the RAF unusual opportunities to com-
pare results with those…
- p. 343 …United States military mission in London, the
RAF offered the services of Robert Watson-Watt, Scientific…
- p. 369 …The majority
of the Hudsons were delivered a t Montreal to the RAF Ferry Com-
mand…
- p. 391 …of its production was required by the
RAF to meet current operational commitments. The gasoline had…
- p. 398 …an
initial mission to participate with the RAF in the bombardment of
Germany. Questions remained regarding…
- p. 404 …air force personnel were
concentrated at the RAF base a t Reykjavik, occupying facilities on
the…
- p. 553 …of models considered obsolescent for AAF and RAF needs,
and cadres of American pilots and ground…
- p. 555 …were considered obsolescent by the AAF and
RAF) previously allocated to Sweden were released for the…
- p. 556 …in addition to collaboration with a small RAF contingent in
defense of Rangoon, he provided patrol…
- p. 557 …Even when the
enemy after his first experience sought to wipe out the RAF and
A…
- p. 565 …General Naiden’s survey indicated that the normal
run should be between the RAF base a…
- p. 566 …Unable to
challenge seriously the enemy’s supremacy in the air, meager RAF
and A V…
- p. 568 …May, the bombers struck at
Mingaladon, former RAF airdrome near Rangoon which the Japanese
were using…
- p. 570 …fensive efforts between the Tenth and the RAF, and on 1 5 April the
War Department…
- p. 571 …Accordingly, on
24 May the order committing the Tenth Air Force to operations
under RAF supervision…
- p. 609 …It also reflected the profound influence exerted by the RAF
Coastal Command on AAF thinking. That…
- p. 610 …Fleet
Air Arm by creating a special RAF command, equipped and trained
for sea search and…
- p. 614 …control in terms comparable to those governing RAF
Coastal Command. Almost from the beginning, the question…
- p. 615 …it had
been the experience of the RAF “that a purely defensive policy only
leads to…
- p. 619 …On the tactical side,
valuable assistance was obtained from an experienced RAF crew
which flew two…
- p. 626 …bomber crews
flying borrowed Bostons in an RAF routine sweep against enemy
airfields." During the seven…
- p. 628 …current allocation of heavy bombers to the RAF.6 N o immediate cut
was contemplated; and…
- p. 630 …was suggested that for the present the RAF
would assume sole responsibility for the air offensive…
- p. 633 …the conduct in co-operation with the
RAF of an offensive against western Europe in 1942…
- p. 634 …T o
the Air Staff, as to RAF Bomber Command, the bomber offensive
had figured as…
- p. 635 …Now that the SLEDGEHAMMERJROUNDUP strategy had
been accepted, the RAF wanted the United States to increase…
- p. 636 …the British desire for reinforcement of the
Middle East; the RAF Coastal Command’s request for…
- p. 637 …I ) allocate to
Great Britain for the RAF and Dominion air forces aircraft according
to an…
- p. 647 …TRIGGER,
a plan to set up in America, with RAF aid, a model air defense sector…
- p. 648 …important fea-
tures were borrowed from the RAF. H e proposed to effect a sharp
cleavage…
- p. 649 …Because AAF bombers would have the special mission, in co-operation
with the RAF, of attacking…
- p. 653 …Chaney must provide for their operational control with-
out recourse to the RAF. Chaney’s immediate…
- p. 656 …forces and the RAF, provision must be
made for two chains of command-that of the…
- p. 657 …i.e., Eighth Air
Force = RAF; VIII Bomber Command = RAF Bomber Command) ;
and while it provided…
- p. 659 …Under these conditions, relations with
RAF Bomber Command were more important for the Eighth Air
Force…
- p. 660 …ning for the bomber offensive with the RAF.
Daylight or Dark?
As an argument in favor…
- p. 661 …weapons are the Russian army and the RAF.” 1 5 5
It is significant that this…
- p. 662 …Critics complained of the RAF’s failure to provide adequate close
support for ground operations in…
- p. 663 …Messages from that office cast doubts upon the results of the RAF
bomber offensive and criticized…
- p. 664 …When in 1941 the two air staffs began planning their combined
attack on Germany, the RAF…
- p. 665 …Even before the war, RAF preference had run to night tactics for
strategic bombardment, an attitude…
N O T E S T O P A G E S 5 7 8 - 8 5
is given in History, SPOBS, chap. i.
Something of the importance attached to
them in the winter of 1941-42 may be
sensed from the great amount of per-
tinent correspondence in AAF Hq. files.
(For TURBINLFTE see especially,
memo for Arnold from C.E. Duncan,
S/AS, Plan to Establish and Train il
Turbiiilite Squadron [N.F.] in the Brit-
ish Isles, 12 Jan. 1942; memo for Arnold
from Kuter, DC/AS, z May 1942. The
one squadron which was dispatched to
England for this purpose was redesig-
nated 15th Bombardment Squadron [L]
and was the first AAF unit to see action
in the ETO. For cancellation of
SHADOW 82, see RetR, Establishment
of a Shadow Organization in N. Ireland,
AFAEP to AFDOP, 2 5 Apr. 1942. On
TRIGGER, see especially, ltr., Mc-
Narney to Portal, 30 Sept. 1941; AWPD
Division Digest, 9 Apr. 1942.)
87. History, SPOBS, chap. ii.
88. Ltr., Ma!. Gen. A.E. Nye, Dir. of
Staff Duties, War Office to Chaney, 2 7
Sept. 1941; Chaney to Nye, n.d., but in
reply.
89. Ltr., Arnold to Chaney, 8 Nov.
1947.
90. Ltr., Chaney to C/S, Command
Arrangements, US Army Forces in Great
Britain, 20 Sept. 1941.
91. Ltr., Lt. Col. H.L. George,
AWPD to Col. H.L. McClelland, SPOBS,
8 Nov. 1941.
92. Ltr., Chaney to Arnold, 5 Dec.
‘941.
93. Ibid., 1x1. I , Graphic Outline of
the Basic Organization of US Forces in
Great Britain.
94. Memo for Gen. McNarney from
Chaney, 6 Dec. 1941.
95. Letter of Instruction No. 2 , 1 1
Dec. 1941.
96. CM, AGWAR to SPOBS, 8 Jan.
1942.
97. Memo for C G AFCC, etc. from
Arnold, Channels of Communications
with Gen. Chaney, 2 Feb. 1942.
98. See the many requisitions for staff
personnel, of which the following are
examples: CM-368, SPOBS to AGWAR,
7 Jan. 1942; CM-429, London to AG-
7 34
WAR, 16 Jan. 1942; CM-465, London to
AGWAR, 24 Jan. 1942; CM-92, London
to AGWAR, 2 1 Feb. 1942; CM-634,
London to AGWAR, 24 Feb. 1942; CM-
726, London to AGWAR, 9 Mar. 1942.
99. History, VIII AFSC, chap. i.
100. Ltr., Eaker to H.L. George, 5
Mar. 1942.
1 0 1 . The chart, Schematic Organiza-
tion US. Army Air Forces in the United
Kingdom, was indorsed: “Concur for
tentative approval. Chart to be referred
to General Chaney for remark. Lt. Gen.
L.J. McNair.”
1 0 2 . Memo for C/S USAAF in Brit-
ish Isles from Arnold as DC/S, 26 Jan.
‘942.
103. Directive for A-I by C/AS,
Activation of AAF Units for British Isles,
1 1 Feb. 1942.
104. CM-OUT-399 (1-24-42), Arnold
to SPOBS, AF 1/401, 24 Jan. 1942.
10s. CM-465, London to AGWAR,
24 Jan. 1942; CM-495, London to AG-
WAR, 30 Jan. 1942.
106. CM-52, Chaney to GHQ, 3 1 Jan.
1942; memo for A G from C G GHQ,
Organization of US Army Forces in the
UK, 3 Feb. 1942.
107. CCS 40, 16 Feb. 1942.
108. Ltr., Arnold to Eaker, Initial
Directive to Bomber Commander in Eng-
land, 31 Jan. 1942.
109. CM-OUT-472 (26-42), C G
AAF to SPOBS, AF 2/105, 5 Feb. 1942.
1 1 0 . Details Which Must Be Accom-
plished by Bomber Command Advance
Echelon, n.d.
I I I . Memo for JSP, 24 Feb. 1942.
1 1 2 . C M - O U T - ~ I ~(2-12-42), Arnold
113. CM-634, CM-635, CM-636, all
114. Ltrs., Eaker to George, 5 Mar.
1 1 5 . Ltr., Eaker to Spaatz, I Mar.
116. lbid.
117. Ltr., Eaker to George, 5 Mar.
to SPOBS, AF 2/207, 1 2 Feb. 1942.
London to AGWAR, 24 Feb. 1942.
1942; Eaker to Spaatz, I Mar. 1942.
1942.
I942 *