“US Navy”60+ pages
- p. 48 …This navy of the air is to be
expanded until no part of Germany is safe…
- p. 53 …the Navy, and civilian agencies-
the terms “independent,” “separate,” and “united air force” were used
interchangeably…
- p. 60 …n 5 September he
used the recent disaster to the Navy’s dirigible Sheizandoah as an…
- p. 62 …appointed in each of several departments-War, Navy, Commerce-
to supervise aviation.
The Lampert report, published…
- p. 71 …delaying them, so that bombardment had been
used to cut communications and to interfere with the…
- p. 86 …One might suppose that
Douhet, who “really struck the first blow,” was most useful; his work…
- p. 88 …the desired support of the War and Navy
departments. Only two months after the major submitted…
- p. 96 …issues between the Army and
the Navy over the use of aircraft in coastal defense.
Neither…
- p. 105 …The Navy would provide aircraPt for
don, scouting, and patrolling over the sea and for the…
- p. 107 …both the Army and the
Navy for aviation to be used in support of “the Infantry…
- p. 113 …Japanese Air Power
The Japanese air forces, divided into separate army and navy air
arms, had…
- p. 116 …T h e navy, on the other hand, gave
closer attention to the training of all…
- p. 117 …0 single-engine fighter used by both the Japanese army
and navy-was widely known to…
- p. 118 …In comparison with the I 1,000
pilots trained by the US. Army and Navy during…
- p. 120 …In the war against Ethiopia, 1935-36, Italian
bombers gained experience in the use of various…
- p. 125 …Under this arrangement the Luftwaffe, along with the
army and navy, had direct access to the…
- p. 126 …Goering had successfully
opposed the navy's desire for its own separate air arm, and the…
- p. 131 …The
German navy was unable to provide such a guarantee, and, moreover,
it lacked necessary equipment…
- p. 144 …This subject had been under study by the Army arid
Navy for more than a decade…
- p. 146 …even at the expense of speed
and useful load. A few months later Air Corps observers…
- p. 154 …a t best deny us the moral support of the
Royal Navy with its shipyards, and…
- p. 155 …use of a mobile striking
force to intercept an enemy approaching by sea. The Navy had…
- p. 156 …in support of or in lieu of US. Navy
forces against hostile fleet^.'^
In each case…
- p. 162 …announced the arrival on the
island of US. Navy At the suggestion of Iceland, the United…
- p. 170 …AAF and the British, 800 for
the US.Navy.’’’ This would total 60,000 aircraft a…
- p. 175 …T h e planners were concerned only with the mission of the
US. Army and Navy…
- p. 179 …In harmony with the general strategy advocated,
US. air forces in the Pacific and Far East…
- p. 180 …For each command, the mission of
the Army (including air forces) and the Navy was described…
- p. 200 …An alert system was in use twenty-four hours
a day, and air operations were carried…
- p. 206 …Scattered
throughout Panama were seven auxiliary airfields, two of which were
ready for immediate use, and…
- p. 218 …Since the
required number of planes represented more heavy bombers than
were then in use in…
- p. 224 …regarding the possibility of using fields
under construction by the Navy a t Palmyra and Samoa…
- p. 225 …I 942.* It devel-
oped that the Navy could not offer assistance in construction until
after…
- p. 228 …MacArthur had requested permission for emer-
gency use of airfields; and negotiations were furthered by conferences…
- p. 243 …This action lasted about an hour.‘ At its end the
Navy had suffered a crushing blow…
- p. 282 …But the US. Navy had been hard hit at Pearl Harbor, the bal-
ance of naval…
- p. 297 …the Secretary of the Navy as to allocation between
the using services. No relative priorities were…
- p. 305 …Army, Navy, and AAF, and similar representatives of the British
services. T h e American members…
- p. 306 …Joint Intelligence Committee, consisted of the directors of intelligence
from the Army, Navy, and AAF, and…
- p. 316 …So far as the Navy is concerned, Admiral King, as you
know, is not only Chief…
- p. 317 …AAF officers were schooled to avoid
use of the term “independent air force,” but in most…
- p. 326 …after 7 December 1941.T h e Navy was responsible for the general
strategic defense of…
- p. 328 …In the absence of adequate preparations, sirens on police cars
were used to warn the people…
- p. 335 …views between the W a r and Navy departments,
and the unsatisfying conjectures advanced by the…
- p. 410 …ready for use; and it had to
be divided between the Army and Navy.
On the…
- p. 424 …Agreements had
been reached for the use of Australian bases in the ferrying of heavy
366
- p. 464 …For inter-island air trans-
port, principal reliance was placed on two Navy PBY’s and…
- p. 489 …In their prior planning, Army and Navy commanders had devoted
scant attention to the problems of…
- p. 495 …Under the joint
Army-Navy plan, approximately 15,000 men of the 37th Division
were to…
- p. 497 …R I 1
precipitated the war, the US. Navy had taken a stand against im-
mediate…
- p. 501 …the end he refused to permit the use of the field at Chu-
chow. But the…
- p. 505 …into thickly settled districts, and
these were used by the Japanese to justify the subsequent execution…
- p. 508 …the S010mons.~~
As early as February, the US. Navy had definite indications of an
enemy offensive…
- p. 509 …The Navy’s lack of knowledge
of these sightings is unexplained.
4-48
- p. 514 …T o be sure, it would be impossible to use
Carrier Division Five, for the Shokaku…
- p. 527 …s and B-24's for naval use in long-range search
and tracking."' Furthermore, he…
- p. 529 …D W A R I 1
planes, useful in covering the northern approaches across the Pacific…
- p. 534 …For the US. forces on Unalaska Island, it represented a loss
of 2 2 , 0 0…
- p. 536 …T h e Japanese navy had
sustained its initial defeats, but the army as yet had…
- p. 588 …Army aircraft might, however, temporarily execute Navy functions
in support of or in lieu of Navy…
N O T E S T O P A G E S 5 5 2 - 6 6
because it tallies neither with I Bomber
Command assessments nor with those
made by COMINCH.
82. Memo for S/W from Bowles, 7
Aug. 1942.
83. Ltr., Marshall to King, 14 Sept.
1942, TAB XIVA, in Bowles report;
memo for C G AAF from McNarney, 7.2
Sept. 1942, Tab XIV C, in Bowles report.
84. GO 84, First AF, 15 Oct. 1942;
memo by Maj. F. E. Bauer, zo Nov.
1942; ltr., Col. F. C. Milner to C G
AAFAC, 2 8 Dec. 1942; memo by Milner,
2 8 Dec. 1942; ltr., Mai. Gen. G.E. Strate-
meyer to Air Marshal L.S. Breadner,
RCAF, 9 June 1943; all correspondence
in AAFAC files 2 1 1 , 2 1 1 . 1 , 2 1 2 .
85. JCS 38th Mtg., 20 Oct. 1942; notes
on JCS 38th Mtg., attached to JCS 93/1.
I.
2.
7.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 16
ABC-I, 2 7 Mar. 1941, par. 13.
JCCSS-I, 24 Dec. 1941.
ABC-4/6, 10 Jan. 1942; JCCSS-11,
13 Jan. 1942.
4. ABC-I: 32 squadrons of bombers
and fighters, more in 1942. RAINBOW
No. 5 , Concentration Plan (approved 19
August 1941): 3 groups HR, I group MB
for England: z groups of pursuits for
Northern Ireland, I for Scotland. RAIN-
BOW No. 5 , Basic Plan, Revision No. I ,
19 November 1941: 3 groups HB, z
groups MB, 3 groups of pursuits for the
British Isles.
5 . Memo for AC/S, WPD, Revision
of Joint Army and Navy Basic W a r
Plan, 31 Oct. 1941.
6. JCCSs-I.
7. R&R, Arnold to Spaatz, Conversa-
tion with Portal, I Jan. 1942; ltr., Arnold
to Portal, z Jan. 1942.
8. Memo for AC/S, W P D from
AC/AS, A-3, Air Corps Garrison Desig-
nated as BR, 5 Jan. 1942.
9. Memo for AAG from AC/AS,
A-3, Priority and Organization of Task
Forces, 15 Jan. 1942.
10. CCS zd Mtg., 27 Jan. 1942.
11. CCS 40, 16 Feb. 1942; draft memo
7 3 2
for C/AAF, Plan to Move z HB Groups,
n.d.
12. VIl’I Bomber Command Diary, 4
Feb. 1942.
1 3 . In the memo cited in note 8 above,
the 29th and 44th Bombardment groups
(H) were designated for BR.
14. Ltr., Portal to Arnold, 14 Jan.
‘942.
15. Ltr., Arnold to Portal, 14 Jan.
‘942.
16. CCS 47, 2 2 Feb. 1942.
17. CCS 56, 5 Mar. 1942.
18. Memo for Col. Craig from E.E.P.
[artridgel, Conference, 6 Mar. 1942; CCS
y6/1, 6 Mar. r g q .
19. Memo for C/AAF from D.D.
Eisenhower, AC/S, Establishment of
USAAF in the UK, 4 Mar. 1942.
20. Memo for the C/S, Air Support
of a Continental Invasion from the Brit-
ish Isles (to accompany W P D App., Sec.
V of Plan for Operations in N.W.
Europe, Mar. 2 7 , 1942), 30 Mar. 1942.
2 1 . CPS 26/1, 3 Apr. 1942.
22. C.O.S. (42) r3d Mtg. ( O ) , War
Cabinet Chiefs of Staff Committee, part
of C.O.S. (42) 112th Mtg., 9 Apr. 1942.
23. Ibid.
24. C.O.S. (42) 97 (O), 13 Apr. 1942;
C.O.S. (42) 118th Mtg., 14 Apr. 1942.
The substance of these papers is con-
tained in CM-2400, Amembassy to
MILID, 14 Apr. 1942.
2 5 . CM-70, “Former Naval Person” to
President, 17 Apr. 1942.
26. CPS 26/2/D, 28 Apr. 1942.
27. C.O.S. (42) 23d Mtg., 9 Apr.
1942; ltr., Eaker to CG USAFIB, 26 Apr.
1942.
28. File 706, 15 May 1942.
29. Memo for Adm. Stark from
Arnold, 2 3 Apr. 1942.
3 0 . Memo for Arnold from AC/AS,
Plans, British Offer to Equip with Spit-
fires our Pursuit Units going to Great
Britain, 22 Apr. 1942; CCS 69, 4 May
1942. The Air Staff did not favor this
proposal.
31. Memo for Marshall from FDR, 6