“RAF”60+ pages
- p. 12 …T h e term “first narrative,” bor-
rowed from the RAF, was frequently used to describe…
- p. 16 …history would constitute a lifetime assignment-the RAF’s history of
World W a r I…
- p. 47 …being made
up of aircraft from the RAF’s Independent Force, the whole of the
French…
- p. 48 …early 1917.O n 6 June 1918the RAF’s Independent Force had been
established with its…
- p. 53 …Most radical was the independent air force,
usually drawing heavily upon the RAF and its Air…
- p. 114 …I when a
British mission of retired RAF officers and others arrived in Japan to
assist…
- p. 127 …At Dunkirk the Luftwaff e momentarily yielded supremacy to the
RAF, which was able to gain…
- p. 128 …After French surrender on 2 2 June, only the RAF remained
for the Luftwaffe to conquer…
- p. 129 …T h e RAF and the Battle of Britain
The German bombing of Britain in World…
- p. 130 …The RAF retained its autonomy; but, even so, sentiment for
many years, like that in the…
- p. 131 …it was
hoped that the badly ournumbered RAF would be able to hold off
any German…
- p. 132 …By the end of September the RAF had asserred its control of the air
over rhe…
- p. 133 …It will take no credit from the RAF’s outnumbered “few” to sug-
gest that the…
- p. 136 …Operations of the RAF after the fall of 1940 were as widely dis-
persed as were…
- p. 137 …on strategic bombardment, would find in the RAF a stout and under-
standing ally. It is…
- p. 171 …British requirements amounted to
49,385 planes, including first-line strength and wastage for the RAF…
- p. 186 …with fresh data and a familiarity with RAF
experience. Actual authorship of a military document is…
- p. 290 …to
prewar plans, was to join the RAF in the attack on Germany. This
project was…
- p. 338 …Fortunately, the RAF,
magnificently served by such advisers as Robert Watson-Watt,
rapidly went beyond the…
- p. 341 …enjoyed
through the co-operation of the RAF unusual opportunities to com-
pare results with those…
- p. 343 …United States military mission in London, the
RAF offered the services of Robert Watson-Watt, Scientific…
- p. 369 …The majority
of the Hudsons were delivered a t Montreal to the RAF Ferry Com-
mand…
- p. 391 …of its production was required by the
RAF to meet current operational commitments. The gasoline had…
- p. 398 …an
initial mission to participate with the RAF in the bombardment of
Germany. Questions remained regarding…
- p. 404 …air force personnel were
concentrated at the RAF base a t Reykjavik, occupying facilities on
the…
- p. 553 …of models considered obsolescent for AAF and RAF needs,
and cadres of American pilots and ground…
- p. 555 …were considered obsolescent by the AAF and
RAF) previously allocated to Sweden were released for the…
- p. 556 …in addition to collaboration with a small RAF contingent in
defense of Rangoon, he provided patrol…
- p. 557 …Even when the
enemy after his first experience sought to wipe out the RAF and
A…
- p. 565 …General Naiden’s survey indicated that the normal
run should be between the RAF base a…
- p. 566 …Unable to
challenge seriously the enemy’s supremacy in the air, meager RAF
and A V…
- p. 568 …May, the bombers struck at
Mingaladon, former RAF airdrome near Rangoon which the Japanese
were using…
- p. 570 …fensive efforts between the Tenth and the RAF, and on 1 5 April the
War Department…
- p. 571 …Accordingly, on
24 May the order committing the Tenth Air Force to operations
under RAF supervision…
- p. 609 …It also reflected the profound influence exerted by the RAF
Coastal Command on AAF thinking. That…
- p. 610 …Fleet
Air Arm by creating a special RAF command, equipped and trained
for sea search and…
- p. 614 …control in terms comparable to those governing RAF
Coastal Command. Almost from the beginning, the question…
- p. 615 …it had
been the experience of the RAF “that a purely defensive policy only
leads to…
- p. 619 …On the tactical side,
valuable assistance was obtained from an experienced RAF crew
which flew two…
- p. 626 …bomber crews
flying borrowed Bostons in an RAF routine sweep against enemy
airfields." During the seven…
- p. 628 …current allocation of heavy bombers to the RAF.6 N o immediate cut
was contemplated; and…
- p. 630 …was suggested that for the present the RAF
would assume sole responsibility for the air offensive…
- p. 633 …the conduct in co-operation with the
RAF of an offensive against western Europe in 1942…
- p. 634 …T o
the Air Staff, as to RAF Bomber Command, the bomber offensive
had figured as…
- p. 635 …Now that the SLEDGEHAMMERJROUNDUP strategy had
been accepted, the RAF wanted the United States to increase…
- p. 636 …the British desire for reinforcement of the
Middle East; the RAF Coastal Command’s request for…
- p. 637 …I ) allocate to
Great Britain for the RAF and Dominion air forces aircraft according
to an…
- p. 647 …TRIGGER,
a plan to set up in America, with RAF aid, a model air defense sector…
- p. 648 …important fea-
tures were borrowed from the RAF. H e proposed to effect a sharp
cleavage…
- p. 649 …Because AAF bombers would have the special mission, in co-operation
with the RAF, of attacking…
- p. 653 …Chaney must provide for their operational control with-
out recourse to the RAF. Chaney’s immediate…
- p. 656 …forces and the RAF, provision must be
made for two chains of command-that of the…
- p. 657 …i.e., Eighth Air
Force = RAF; VIII Bomber Command = RAF Bomber Command) ;
and while it provided…
- p. 659 …Under these conditions, relations with
RAF Bomber Command were more important for the Eighth Air
Force…
- p. 660 …ning for the bomber offensive with the RAF.
Daylight or Dark?
As an argument in favor…
- p. 661 …weapons are the Russian army and the RAF.” 1 5 5
It is significant that this…
- p. 662 …Critics complained of the RAF’s failure to provide adequate close
support for ground operations in…
- p. 663 …Messages from that office cast doubts upon the results of the RAF
bomber offensive and criticized…
- p. 664 …When in 1941 the two air staffs began planning their combined
attack on Germany, the RAF…
- p. 665 …Even before the war, RAF preference had run to night tactics for
strategic bombardment, an attitude…
N O T E S T O P A G E S 5 5 2 - 6 6
because it tallies neither with I Bomber
Command assessments nor with those
made by COMINCH.
82. Memo for S/W from Bowles, 7
Aug. 1942.
83. Ltr., Marshall to King, 14 Sept.
1942, TAB XIVA, in Bowles report;
memo for C G AAF from McNarney, 7.2
Sept. 1942, Tab XIV C, in Bowles report.
84. GO 84, First AF, 15 Oct. 1942;
memo by Maj. F. E. Bauer, zo Nov.
1942; ltr., Col. F. C. Milner to C G
AAFAC, 2 8 Dec. 1942; memo by Milner,
2 8 Dec. 1942; ltr., Mai. Gen. G.E. Strate-
meyer to Air Marshal L.S. Breadner,
RCAF, 9 June 1943; all correspondence
in AAFAC files 2 1 1 , 2 1 1 . 1 , 2 1 2 .
85. JCS 38th Mtg., 20 Oct. 1942; notes
on JCS 38th Mtg., attached to JCS 93/1.
I.
2.
7.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 16
ABC-I, 2 7 Mar. 1941, par. 13.
JCCSS-I, 24 Dec. 1941.
ABC-4/6, 10 Jan. 1942; JCCSS-11,
13 Jan. 1942.
4. ABC-I: 32 squadrons of bombers
and fighters, more in 1942. RAINBOW
No. 5 , Concentration Plan (approved 19
August 1941): 3 groups HR, I group MB
for England: z groups of pursuits for
Northern Ireland, I for Scotland. RAIN-
BOW No. 5 , Basic Plan, Revision No. I ,
19 November 1941: 3 groups HB, z
groups MB, 3 groups of pursuits for the
British Isles.
5 . Memo for AC/S, WPD, Revision
of Joint Army and Navy Basic W a r
Plan, 31 Oct. 1941.
6. JCCSs-I.
7. R&R, Arnold to Spaatz, Conversa-
tion with Portal, I Jan. 1942; ltr., Arnold
to Portal, z Jan. 1942.
8. Memo for AC/S, W P D from
AC/AS, A-3, Air Corps Garrison Desig-
nated as BR, 5 Jan. 1942.
9. Memo for AAG from AC/AS,
A-3, Priority and Organization of Task
Forces, 15 Jan. 1942.
10. CCS zd Mtg., 27 Jan. 1942.
11. CCS 40, 16 Feb. 1942; draft memo
7 3 2
for C/AAF, Plan to Move z HB Groups,
n.d.
12. VIl’I Bomber Command Diary, 4
Feb. 1942.
1 3 . In the memo cited in note 8 above,
the 29th and 44th Bombardment groups
(H) were designated for BR.
14. Ltr., Portal to Arnold, 14 Jan.
‘942.
15. Ltr., Arnold to Portal, 14 Jan.
‘942.
16. CCS 47, 2 2 Feb. 1942.
17. CCS 56, 5 Mar. 1942.
18. Memo for Col. Craig from E.E.P.
[artridgel, Conference, 6 Mar. 1942; CCS
y6/1, 6 Mar. r g q .
19. Memo for C/AAF from D.D.
Eisenhower, AC/S, Establishment of
USAAF in the UK, 4 Mar. 1942.
20. Memo for the C/S, Air Support
of a Continental Invasion from the Brit-
ish Isles (to accompany W P D App., Sec.
V of Plan for Operations in N.W.
Europe, Mar. 2 7 , 1942), 30 Mar. 1942.
2 1 . CPS 26/1, 3 Apr. 1942.
22. C.O.S. (42) r3d Mtg. ( O ) , War
Cabinet Chiefs of Staff Committee, part
of C.O.S. (42) 112th Mtg., 9 Apr. 1942.
23. Ibid.
24. C.O.S. (42) 97 (O), 13 Apr. 1942;
C.O.S. (42) 118th Mtg., 14 Apr. 1942.
The substance of these papers is con-
tained in CM-2400, Amembassy to
MILID, 14 Apr. 1942.
2 5 . CM-70, “Former Naval Person” to
President, 17 Apr. 1942.
26. CPS 26/2/D, 28 Apr. 1942.
27. C.O.S. (42) 23d Mtg., 9 Apr.
1942; ltr., Eaker to CG USAFIB, 26 Apr.
1942.
28. File 706, 15 May 1942.
29. Memo for Adm. Stark from
Arnold, 2 3 Apr. 1942.
3 0 . Memo for Arnold from AC/AS,
Plans, British Offer to Equip with Spit-
fires our Pursuit Units going to Great
Britain, 22 Apr. 1942; CCS 69, 4 May
1942. The Air Staff did not favor this
proposal.
31. Memo for Marshall from FDR, 6