“US Navy”60+ pages
- p. 48 …This navy of the air is to be
expanded until no part of Germany is safe…
- p. 53 …the Navy, and civilian agencies-
the terms “independent,” “separate,” and “united air force” were used
interchangeably…
- p. 60 …n 5 September he
used the recent disaster to the Navy’s dirigible Sheizandoah as an…
- p. 62 …appointed in each of several departments-War, Navy, Commerce-
to supervise aviation.
The Lampert report, published…
- p. 71 …delaying them, so that bombardment had been
used to cut communications and to interfere with the…
- p. 86 …One might suppose that
Douhet, who “really struck the first blow,” was most useful; his work…
- p. 88 …the desired support of the War and Navy
departments. Only two months after the major submitted…
- p. 96 …issues between the Army and
the Navy over the use of aircraft in coastal defense.
Neither…
- p. 105 …The Navy would provide aircraPt for
don, scouting, and patrolling over the sea and for the…
- p. 107 …both the Army and the
Navy for aviation to be used in support of “the Infantry…
- p. 113 …Japanese Air Power
The Japanese air forces, divided into separate army and navy air
arms, had…
- p. 116 …T h e navy, on the other hand, gave
closer attention to the training of all…
- p. 117 …0 single-engine fighter used by both the Japanese army
and navy-was widely known to…
- p. 118 …In comparison with the I 1,000
pilots trained by the US. Army and Navy during…
- p. 120 …In the war against Ethiopia, 1935-36, Italian
bombers gained experience in the use of various…
- p. 125 …Under this arrangement the Luftwaffe, along with the
army and navy, had direct access to the…
- p. 126 …Goering had successfully
opposed the navy's desire for its own separate air arm, and the…
- p. 131 …The
German navy was unable to provide such a guarantee, and, moreover,
it lacked necessary equipment…
- p. 144 …This subject had been under study by the Army arid
Navy for more than a decade…
- p. 146 …even at the expense of speed
and useful load. A few months later Air Corps observers…
- p. 154 …a t best deny us the moral support of the
Royal Navy with its shipyards, and…
- p. 155 …use of a mobile striking
force to intercept an enemy approaching by sea. The Navy had…
- p. 156 …in support of or in lieu of US. Navy
forces against hostile fleet^.'^
In each case…
- p. 162 …announced the arrival on the
island of US. Navy At the suggestion of Iceland, the United…
- p. 170 …AAF and the British, 800 for
the US.Navy.’’’ This would total 60,000 aircraft a…
- p. 175 …T h e planners were concerned only with the mission of the
US. Army and Navy…
- p. 179 …In harmony with the general strategy advocated,
US. air forces in the Pacific and Far East…
- p. 180 …For each command, the mission of
the Army (including air forces) and the Navy was described…
- p. 200 …An alert system was in use twenty-four hours
a day, and air operations were carried…
- p. 206 …Scattered
throughout Panama were seven auxiliary airfields, two of which were
ready for immediate use, and…
- p. 218 …Since the
required number of planes represented more heavy bombers than
were then in use in…
- p. 224 …regarding the possibility of using fields
under construction by the Navy a t Palmyra and Samoa…
- p. 225 …I 942.* It devel-
oped that the Navy could not offer assistance in construction until
after…
- p. 228 …MacArthur had requested permission for emer-
gency use of airfields; and negotiations were furthered by conferences…
- p. 243 …This action lasted about an hour.‘ At its end the
Navy had suffered a crushing blow…
- p. 282 …But the US. Navy had been hard hit at Pearl Harbor, the bal-
ance of naval…
- p. 297 …the Secretary of the Navy as to allocation between
the using services. No relative priorities were…
- p. 305 …Army, Navy, and AAF, and similar representatives of the British
services. T h e American members…
- p. 306 …Joint Intelligence Committee, consisted of the directors of intelligence
from the Army, Navy, and AAF, and…
- p. 316 …So far as the Navy is concerned, Admiral King, as you
know, is not only Chief…
- p. 317 …AAF officers were schooled to avoid
use of the term “independent air force,” but in most…
- p. 326 …after 7 December 1941.T h e Navy was responsible for the general
strategic defense of…
- p. 328 …In the absence of adequate preparations, sirens on police cars
were used to warn the people…
- p. 335 …views between the W a r and Navy departments,
and the unsatisfying conjectures advanced by the…
- p. 410 …ready for use; and it had to
be divided between the Army and Navy.
On the…
- p. 424 …Agreements had
been reached for the use of Australian bases in the ferrying of heavy
366
- p. 464 …For inter-island air trans-
port, principal reliance was placed on two Navy PBY’s and…
- p. 489 …In their prior planning, Army and Navy commanders had devoted
scant attention to the problems of…
- p. 495 …Under the joint
Army-Navy plan, approximately 15,000 men of the 37th Division
were to…
- p. 497 …R I 1
precipitated the war, the US. Navy had taken a stand against im-
mediate…
- p. 501 …the end he refused to permit the use of the field at Chu-
chow. But the…
- p. 505 …into thickly settled districts, and
these were used by the Japanese to justify the subsequent execution…
- p. 508 …the S010mons.~~
As early as February, the US. Navy had definite indications of an
enemy offensive…
- p. 509 …The Navy’s lack of knowledge
of these sightings is unexplained.
4-48
- p. 514 …T o be sure, it would be impossible to use
Carrier Division Five, for the Shokaku…
- p. 527 …s and B-24's for naval use in long-range search
and tracking."' Furthermore, he…
- p. 529 …D W A R I 1
planes, useful in covering the northern approaches across the Pacific…
- p. 534 …For the US. forces on Unalaska Island, it represented a loss
of 2 2 , 0 0…
- p. 536 …T h e Japanese navy had
sustained its initial defeats, but the army as yet had…
- p. 588 …Army aircraft might, however, temporarily execute Navy functions
in support of or in lieu of Navy…
57. Memo for Arnold from Towers,
14 Feb. 1942. The AAF had sought in-
formation concerning the proposed em-
ployment of the planes requested (see
R&R, Arnold to Harmon, 3 Feb. 1942).
In his memorandum of 14 February
Admiral Towers declared: “The uncer-
tainty as to the precise areas in which
the Fleet may be called upon to operate
makes it impracticable to list with pre-
cision the operating areas and bases of
the requested landplane bombers. rn
general, they are assigned to Fleet Patrol
Wings, with the exception of two Marine
medium bombardment groups for de-
fense of outlying bases for which the
Navy has accepted responsibility. It may
be expected that they will be employed
in northern waters, where seaplane op-
eration is difficult or impossible by reason
of ice conditions, and from shore bases
elsewhere, in the discharge of Naval air
functions, where their performance ren-
ders them superior to seaplane patrol
planes.”
58. See for example, memo for C/S
from Arnold, 2 5 Feb. 1942; R&R, Arnold
to Maj. Gen. M.F. Harmon, 2 Feb. 1942.
59. Ltr., Arnold to King, 9 Mar. 1942.
60. See AAFAC files 1 1 5 . 5 1 and
I 15.52; report, The Coastal Command
System of Operational Control, 17 Feb.
1942; conference with Comdr. R.B. Mar-
tineau, 17 July 1942; digest of agreement,
Admiralty and Air Ministry, covering
exercise of operational control, 24 Apr.
1941, supplied through courtesy of Dr.
E.L. Bowles; Coastal Command, T h e Air
Ministry Account of the Part Played by
Coastal Command in the Battle of the
Seas, 1939-1942 (New York, 1943).
61. Lt. Gen. Joseph T. McNarney’s
notes on trip to First Air Force and
I Bomber Command, 2 3 Apt. 1942;memo
for Arnold [from AFRDBI, 20 May
1942; memo for T A G by OPD, 27 May
1942; ltr., Hq. Third AF to C G AAF,
15 June 1942.
62. Memo for Col. Glantzberry from
Col. F.R. Pitts, 20 Aug. 1942;McNarney’s
notes, as cited in n. 61.
63. See sources as cited in n. 62; also
ltr., Marshall to King, 17 Sept. 1942, Tab
XIVA, in Bowles report to S/W, The
N O T E S T O P A G E S 5 4 0 - 5 1
Acute Problem of Ocean-borne Trans-
port and Supply.
64. Draft of plans, n.d., ns., and notes
for conference on improvement in anti-
submarine operations, I June 1942, in
AAFAC files 1 1 3 . 3 and 001. Cf. memo
for AC/S, OPD from AC/AS, Plans, 4
June 1942, in Plans file 111-R-2, Bk. I ,
which is Virtually the same plan.
65. Memo for Marshall from King, 2 1
June 1942, Tab XIIB, in Bowles report.
66. See sources cited in n. 64.
67. Ltr., AM P.B. Joubert to Lord
Halifax, 16 Aug. 1942,Tab II B, in Three
Essays. This letter was sent in answer
to Lord Halifax’s request for information
concerning British experience which
might be of help to the United States in
its antisubmarine campaign.
68. Memo for CG EDC from AC/S,
OPD, 2 0 May 1942; memo for C G AAF
from AC/S, OPD, 20 May 1942.
69. See sources cited in n. 64.
70. Memo for King from McNarney,
26 May 1942.
7 1 . Ltr., King to Marshall, 10 June
1942; ltr., King to Comdrs. ESF and
GSF, 10 June 1942.
7 2 . Memo for King from Marshall, 19
June 1942, Tab XIIA, in Bowles report.
73. Memo for Marshall from King,
2 1 June 1942. Cf. ltr., King to Marshall,
10 June 1942.
74. Memo for Marshall from King,
2 1 June 1942.
75. Memo for Knox from Stimson. 7
July 1942.
76. Memo for Stimson from Knox, 10
July 1942.
77. Memo for Knox from Stimson, 2 3
J ~ Y1942.
78. Memo for CG AAF from Brig.
Gen. T.T. Handy, 27 June 1942; memo
for S/W from Dr. Bowles, 7 Aug. 1942.
79. History, 1st Sea Search Attack
Gp., especially Apps. 3 and 4. Cf. draft
chapter, SADU, in AAFAC file.
80. History, 1st Sea Search Attack Gp.
81. Zbid. Care should be taken in
accepting operational information re-
ported in history of the 1st SSA Group
73‘