“US Navy”60+ pages
- p. 48 …This navy of the air is to be
expanded until no part of Germany is safe…
- p. 53 …the Navy, and civilian agencies-
the terms “independent,” “separate,” and “united air force” were used
interchangeably…
- p. 60 …n 5 September he
used the recent disaster to the Navy’s dirigible Sheizandoah as an…
- p. 62 …appointed in each of several departments-War, Navy, Commerce-
to supervise aviation.
The Lampert report, published…
- p. 71 …delaying them, so that bombardment had been
used to cut communications and to interfere with the…
- p. 86 …One might suppose that
Douhet, who “really struck the first blow,” was most useful; his work…
- p. 88 …the desired support of the War and Navy
departments. Only two months after the major submitted…
- p. 96 …issues between the Army and
the Navy over the use of aircraft in coastal defense.
Neither…
- p. 105 …The Navy would provide aircraPt for
don, scouting, and patrolling over the sea and for the…
- p. 107 …both the Army and the
Navy for aviation to be used in support of “the Infantry…
- p. 113 …Japanese Air Power
The Japanese air forces, divided into separate army and navy air
arms, had…
- p. 116 …T h e navy, on the other hand, gave
closer attention to the training of all…
- p. 117 …0 single-engine fighter used by both the Japanese army
and navy-was widely known to…
- p. 118 …In comparison with the I 1,000
pilots trained by the US. Army and Navy during…
- p. 120 …In the war against Ethiopia, 1935-36, Italian
bombers gained experience in the use of various…
- p. 125 …Under this arrangement the Luftwaffe, along with the
army and navy, had direct access to the…
- p. 126 …Goering had successfully
opposed the navy's desire for its own separate air arm, and the…
- p. 131 …The
German navy was unable to provide such a guarantee, and, moreover,
it lacked necessary equipment…
- p. 144 …This subject had been under study by the Army arid
Navy for more than a decade…
- p. 146 …even at the expense of speed
and useful load. A few months later Air Corps observers…
- p. 154 …a t best deny us the moral support of the
Royal Navy with its shipyards, and…
- p. 155 …use of a mobile striking
force to intercept an enemy approaching by sea. The Navy had…
- p. 156 …in support of or in lieu of US. Navy
forces against hostile fleet^.'^
In each case…
- p. 162 …announced the arrival on the
island of US. Navy At the suggestion of Iceland, the United…
- p. 170 …AAF and the British, 800 for
the US.Navy.’’’ This would total 60,000 aircraft a…
- p. 175 …T h e planners were concerned only with the mission of the
US. Army and Navy…
- p. 179 …In harmony with the general strategy advocated,
US. air forces in the Pacific and Far East…
- p. 180 …For each command, the mission of
the Army (including air forces) and the Navy was described…
- p. 200 …An alert system was in use twenty-four hours
a day, and air operations were carried…
- p. 206 …Scattered
throughout Panama were seven auxiliary airfields, two of which were
ready for immediate use, and…
- p. 218 …Since the
required number of planes represented more heavy bombers than
were then in use in…
- p. 224 …regarding the possibility of using fields
under construction by the Navy a t Palmyra and Samoa…
- p. 225 …I 942.* It devel-
oped that the Navy could not offer assistance in construction until
after…
- p. 228 …MacArthur had requested permission for emer-
gency use of airfields; and negotiations were furthered by conferences…
- p. 243 …This action lasted about an hour.‘ At its end the
Navy had suffered a crushing blow…
- p. 282 …But the US. Navy had been hard hit at Pearl Harbor, the bal-
ance of naval…
- p. 297 …the Secretary of the Navy as to allocation between
the using services. No relative priorities were…
- p. 305 …Army, Navy, and AAF, and similar representatives of the British
services. T h e American members…
- p. 306 …Joint Intelligence Committee, consisted of the directors of intelligence
from the Army, Navy, and AAF, and…
- p. 316 …So far as the Navy is concerned, Admiral King, as you
know, is not only Chief…
- p. 317 …AAF officers were schooled to avoid
use of the term “independent air force,” but in most…
- p. 326 …after 7 December 1941.T h e Navy was responsible for the general
strategic defense of…
- p. 328 …In the absence of adequate preparations, sirens on police cars
were used to warn the people…
- p. 335 …views between the W a r and Navy departments,
and the unsatisfying conjectures advanced by the…
- p. 410 …ready for use; and it had to
be divided between the Army and Navy.
On the…
- p. 424 …Agreements had
been reached for the use of Australian bases in the ferrying of heavy
366
- p. 464 …For inter-island air trans-
port, principal reliance was placed on two Navy PBY’s and…
- p. 489 …In their prior planning, Army and Navy commanders had devoted
scant attention to the problems of…
- p. 495 …Under the joint
Army-Navy plan, approximately 15,000 men of the 37th Division
were to…
- p. 497 …R I 1
precipitated the war, the US. Navy had taken a stand against im-
mediate…
- p. 501 …the end he refused to permit the use of the field at Chu-
chow. But the…
- p. 505 …into thickly settled districts, and
these were used by the Japanese to justify the subsequent execution…
- p. 508 …the S010mons.~~
As early as February, the US. Navy had definite indications of an
enemy offensive…
- p. 509 …The Navy’s lack of knowledge
of these sightings is unexplained.
4-48
- p. 514 …T o be sure, it would be impossible to use
Carrier Division Five, for the Shokaku…
- p. 527 …s and B-24's for naval use in long-range search
and tracking."' Furthermore, he…
- p. 529 …D W A R I 1
planes, useful in covering the northern approaches across the Pacific…
- p. 534 …For the US. forces on Unalaska Island, it represented a loss
of 2 2 , 0 0…
- p. 536 …T h e Japanese navy had
sustained its initial defeats, but the army as yet had…
- p. 588 …Army aircraft might, however, temporarily execute Navy functions
in support of or in lieu of Navy…
N O T E S T O P A G E S 5 2 8 - 4 0
Historical Study No. 19, Civilian Volun-
teer Activities in the AAF.
2s. Joint Action, chap. ii, par. 8 (a)
and (b); msg., COMINCH and C/S to
C G EDC, 2 s Mar. 1942; ltr., C G EDC
to Comdr. ESF, 28 Mar. 1942.
26. Ltr., Brig. Gen. Westside T. Lar-
son to Gen. Bradley, 19 Mar. 1942. Cf.
draft history, I BC.
27. See sources in n. 4.
28. Correspondence in AAFAC file,
Gulf Task Force Organization. See espe-
cially, ltr., Arnold to Maj. Gen. W.H.
Frank, 3 1 May 1942; ltr., Bradley to C G
I BC, 26 May 1942; ltr., T A G to CGS,
Southern Defense Command and Third
AF, 3 July 1942; ltr., Hq. Gulf Task
Force to The Air Inspector, 2 Oct. 1942.
29, See sources in n. 28; also ltr., Hq.
Third AF to C G AAF, 8 June 1942. Cf.
History, Third Air Force, Defense Ac-
tivities, 1941-44, p. 36.
30. Assessment of Attacks, in AAFAC
file 557. See also n. 38 below.
3 1 . Ltr., Hq. Advance Echelon, I BC
to all tactical comdrs., 19 Jan. 1942, in
AAFAC file, I Bomber Command Opera-
tions, Procedure. See also other cor-
respondence in same file.
32. AAFAC file, I Bomber Command
Operations, Procedure.
33. Ibid., passim.
34. Ibid., passim; Information Bulletin
35. Ltr., Comdr. ESF to all task group
36. Three Essays, Tab I N.
37. AAFAC file, I Bomber Command
Operations, Convoy Escort. See espe-
cially, ltr., Hq. Seventh Naval Dist. to
AS/W for Air, 1 3 May 1942; ltr., Hq.
I BC to C G s EDC and First AF, 29
May 1942.
38. Standish report; AAFAC file 557
(the assessments herein contained have
been checked with those printed in US.
Fleet Antisubmarine Bulletin to Dec.
13, Hq. I BC, 3 1 July 1942.
comdrs., 24 Sept. 1942.
. .
~~~~.
1944). Authority for the “kill” of 7 July
comes from C/NO, German, Japanese,
and Italian Submarine Losses, World
W a r 11, which is a final summary of all
I 5 Jan. 1942.
55- lbid.
56. Ltr., Arnold to King, 2 5 Feb. 1942.
certain evidence from all Allied and
enemy sources.
39. Standish report. See also charts in
AAFAC hlonthly Intel. Sum., Nov. 1942,
40. Standish report; Antisubmarine
Warfare Operations Research Group
Mcmo 2 0 , Analysis of US. Aircraft At-
tacks on U/Boats, 7 Dec. 1942, p. 4. In
this connection it should be noted that
several attacks reported by I Bomber
Command are not included here and
that of the total attacks listed, half, or a
significantly larger proportion, of radar
contacts were made by Army planes.
41. Doenitz, The Conduct of the War
at Sea.
42. Estimated at 859,000 tons for No-
vember as compared with 575,886 for
October. Monthly Intel. Sum., Nov. and
Dec. 1942.
pp. 8-9.
43. History, First Air Force.
44. History, Caribbean Air Force, 8
May 1941-6 Mar. 1942, p. 569; memo
for C G Field Forces from Deputy C/S
US. Army, 19 Feb. 1942.
45. History, Sixth Air Force, Mar.
19q-May f943, pp. I 18ff.; History,
Caribbean Air Force, p. 463.
46. US. Fleet Antisubmarine Bulletin,
47. Report, Col. R.H. Wooten to C G
Field Forces, 1 2 Feb. 1943, in History,
Sixth Air Force, March 1942-May 1943;
Statistical Control, Caribbean data file,
Dec. 1941-Dec. 1943.
48. Memo, Office of A-2, Hq. Antilles
Air Command, 3 0 Nov. 1944; US. Fleet
Antisubmarine Bulletin, June 1943.
49. Standish report; History, 1st Sea
Search Attack Gp.
so. Standish report.
51. Memo for Arnold from AC/AS,
AWPD, 1 5 Jan. 1942.
5 2 . Memo for Arnold from Rear
Adm. J.H. Towers, 14 Feb. 1942.
53. lbid.
~ 4 .Memo for Arnold from AC/AS,
June 1943.
7 3 0