“RAF”60+ pages
- p. 12 …T h e term “first narrative,” bor-
rowed from the RAF, was frequently used to describe…
- p. 16 …history would constitute a lifetime assignment-the RAF’s history of
World W a r I…
- p. 47 …being made
up of aircraft from the RAF’s Independent Force, the whole of the
French…
- p. 48 …early 1917.O n 6 June 1918the RAF’s Independent Force had been
established with its…
- p. 53 …Most radical was the independent air force,
usually drawing heavily upon the RAF and its Air…
- p. 114 …I when a
British mission of retired RAF officers and others arrived in Japan to
assist…
- p. 127 …At Dunkirk the Luftwaff e momentarily yielded supremacy to the
RAF, which was able to gain…
- p. 128 …After French surrender on 2 2 June, only the RAF remained
for the Luftwaffe to conquer…
- p. 129 …T h e RAF and the Battle of Britain
The German bombing of Britain in World…
- p. 130 …The RAF retained its autonomy; but, even so, sentiment for
many years, like that in the…
- p. 131 …it was
hoped that the badly ournumbered RAF would be able to hold off
any German…
- p. 132 …By the end of September the RAF had asserred its control of the air
over rhe…
- p. 133 …It will take no credit from the RAF’s outnumbered “few” to sug-
gest that the…
- p. 136 …Operations of the RAF after the fall of 1940 were as widely dis-
persed as were…
- p. 137 …on strategic bombardment, would find in the RAF a stout and under-
standing ally. It is…
- p. 171 …British requirements amounted to
49,385 planes, including first-line strength and wastage for the RAF…
- p. 186 …with fresh data and a familiarity with RAF
experience. Actual authorship of a military document is…
- p. 290 …to
prewar plans, was to join the RAF in the attack on Germany. This
project was…
- p. 338 …Fortunately, the RAF,
magnificently served by such advisers as Robert Watson-Watt,
rapidly went beyond the…
- p. 341 …enjoyed
through the co-operation of the RAF unusual opportunities to com-
pare results with those…
- p. 343 …United States military mission in London, the
RAF offered the services of Robert Watson-Watt, Scientific…
- p. 369 …The majority
of the Hudsons were delivered a t Montreal to the RAF Ferry Com-
mand…
- p. 391 …of its production was required by the
RAF to meet current operational commitments. The gasoline had…
- p. 398 …an
initial mission to participate with the RAF in the bombardment of
Germany. Questions remained regarding…
- p. 404 …air force personnel were
concentrated at the RAF base a t Reykjavik, occupying facilities on
the…
- p. 553 …of models considered obsolescent for AAF and RAF needs,
and cadres of American pilots and ground…
- p. 555 …were considered obsolescent by the AAF and
RAF) previously allocated to Sweden were released for the…
- p. 556 …in addition to collaboration with a small RAF contingent in
defense of Rangoon, he provided patrol…
- p. 557 …Even when the
enemy after his first experience sought to wipe out the RAF and
A…
- p. 565 …General Naiden’s survey indicated that the normal
run should be between the RAF base a…
- p. 566 …Unable to
challenge seriously the enemy’s supremacy in the air, meager RAF
and A V…
- p. 568 …May, the bombers struck at
Mingaladon, former RAF airdrome near Rangoon which the Japanese
were using…
- p. 570 …fensive efforts between the Tenth and the RAF, and on 1 5 April the
War Department…
- p. 571 …Accordingly, on
24 May the order committing the Tenth Air Force to operations
under RAF supervision…
- p. 609 …It also reflected the profound influence exerted by the RAF
Coastal Command on AAF thinking. That…
- p. 610 …Fleet
Air Arm by creating a special RAF command, equipped and trained
for sea search and…
- p. 614 …control in terms comparable to those governing RAF
Coastal Command. Almost from the beginning, the question…
- p. 615 …it had
been the experience of the RAF “that a purely defensive policy only
leads to…
- p. 619 …On the tactical side,
valuable assistance was obtained from an experienced RAF crew
which flew two…
- p. 626 …bomber crews
flying borrowed Bostons in an RAF routine sweep against enemy
airfields." During the seven…
- p. 628 …current allocation of heavy bombers to the RAF.6 N o immediate cut
was contemplated; and…
- p. 630 …was suggested that for the present the RAF
would assume sole responsibility for the air offensive…
- p. 633 …the conduct in co-operation with the
RAF of an offensive against western Europe in 1942…
- p. 634 …T o
the Air Staff, as to RAF Bomber Command, the bomber offensive
had figured as…
- p. 635 …Now that the SLEDGEHAMMERJROUNDUP strategy had
been accepted, the RAF wanted the United States to increase…
- p. 636 …the British desire for reinforcement of the
Middle East; the RAF Coastal Command’s request for…
- p. 637 …I ) allocate to
Great Britain for the RAF and Dominion air forces aircraft according
to an…
- p. 647 …TRIGGER,
a plan to set up in America, with RAF aid, a model air defense sector…
- p. 648 …important fea-
tures were borrowed from the RAF. H e proposed to effect a sharp
cleavage…
- p. 649 …Because AAF bombers would have the special mission, in co-operation
with the RAF, of attacking…
- p. 653 …Chaney must provide for their operational control with-
out recourse to the RAF. Chaney’s immediate…
- p. 656 …forces and the RAF, provision must be
made for two chains of command-that of the…
- p. 657 …i.e., Eighth Air
Force = RAF; VIII Bomber Command = RAF Bomber Command) ;
and while it provided…
- p. 659 …Under these conditions, relations with
RAF Bomber Command were more important for the Eighth Air
Force…
- p. 660 …ning for the bomber offensive with the RAF.
Daylight or Dark?
As an argument in favor…
- p. 661 …weapons are the Russian army and the RAF.” 1 5 5
It is significant that this…
- p. 662 …Critics complained of the RAF’s failure to provide adequate close
support for ground operations in…
- p. 663 …Messages from that office cast doubts upon the results of the RAF
bomber offensive and criticized…
- p. 664 …When in 1941 the two air staffs began planning their combined
attack on Germany, the RAF…
- p. 665 …Even before the war, RAF preference had run to night tactics for
strategic bombardment, an attitude…
N O T E S T O P A G E S 5 2 8 - 4 0
Historical Study No. 19, Civilian Volun-
teer Activities in the AAF.
2s. Joint Action, chap. ii, par. 8 (a)
and (b); msg., COMINCH and C/S to
C G EDC, 2 s Mar. 1942; ltr., C G EDC
to Comdr. ESF, 28 Mar. 1942.
26. Ltr., Brig. Gen. Westside T. Lar-
son to Gen. Bradley, 19 Mar. 1942. Cf.
draft history, I BC.
27. See sources in n. 4.
28. Correspondence in AAFAC file,
Gulf Task Force Organization. See espe-
cially, ltr., Arnold to Maj. Gen. W.H.
Frank, 3 1 May 1942; ltr., Bradley to C G
I BC, 26 May 1942; ltr., T A G to CGS,
Southern Defense Command and Third
AF, 3 July 1942; ltr., Hq. Gulf Task
Force to The Air Inspector, 2 Oct. 1942.
29, See sources in n. 28; also ltr., Hq.
Third AF to C G AAF, 8 June 1942. Cf.
History, Third Air Force, Defense Ac-
tivities, 1941-44, p. 36.
30. Assessment of Attacks, in AAFAC
file 557. See also n. 38 below.
3 1 . Ltr., Hq. Advance Echelon, I BC
to all tactical comdrs., 19 Jan. 1942, in
AAFAC file, I Bomber Command Opera-
tions, Procedure. See also other cor-
respondence in same file.
32. AAFAC file, I Bomber Command
Operations, Procedure.
33. Ibid., passim.
34. Ibid., passim; Information Bulletin
35. Ltr., Comdr. ESF to all task group
36. Three Essays, Tab I N.
37. AAFAC file, I Bomber Command
Operations, Convoy Escort. See espe-
cially, ltr., Hq. Seventh Naval Dist. to
AS/W for Air, 1 3 May 1942; ltr., Hq.
I BC to C G s EDC and First AF, 29
May 1942.
38. Standish report; AAFAC file 557
(the assessments herein contained have
been checked with those printed in US.
Fleet Antisubmarine Bulletin to Dec.
13, Hq. I BC, 3 1 July 1942.
comdrs., 24 Sept. 1942.
. .
~~~~.
1944). Authority for the “kill” of 7 July
comes from C/NO, German, Japanese,
and Italian Submarine Losses, World
W a r 11, which is a final summary of all
I 5 Jan. 1942.
55- lbid.
56. Ltr., Arnold to King, 2 5 Feb. 1942.
certain evidence from all Allied and
enemy sources.
39. Standish report. See also charts in
AAFAC hlonthly Intel. Sum., Nov. 1942,
40. Standish report; Antisubmarine
Warfare Operations Research Group
Mcmo 2 0 , Analysis of US. Aircraft At-
tacks on U/Boats, 7 Dec. 1942, p. 4. In
this connection it should be noted that
several attacks reported by I Bomber
Command are not included here and
that of the total attacks listed, half, or a
significantly larger proportion, of radar
contacts were made by Army planes.
41. Doenitz, The Conduct of the War
at Sea.
42. Estimated at 859,000 tons for No-
vember as compared with 575,886 for
October. Monthly Intel. Sum., Nov. and
Dec. 1942.
pp. 8-9.
43. History, First Air Force.
44. History, Caribbean Air Force, 8
May 1941-6 Mar. 1942, p. 569; memo
for C G Field Forces from Deputy C/S
US. Army, 19 Feb. 1942.
45. History, Sixth Air Force, Mar.
19q-May f943, pp. I 18ff.; History,
Caribbean Air Force, p. 463.
46. US. Fleet Antisubmarine Bulletin,
47. Report, Col. R.H. Wooten to C G
Field Forces, 1 2 Feb. 1943, in History,
Sixth Air Force, March 1942-May 1943;
Statistical Control, Caribbean data file,
Dec. 1941-Dec. 1943.
48. Memo, Office of A-2, Hq. Antilles
Air Command, 3 0 Nov. 1944; US. Fleet
Antisubmarine Bulletin, June 1943.
49. Standish report; History, 1st Sea
Search Attack Gp.
so. Standish report.
51. Memo for Arnold from AC/AS,
AWPD, 1 5 Jan. 1942.
5 2 . Memo for Arnold from Rear
Adm. J.H. Towers, 14 Feb. 1942.
53. lbid.
~ 4 .Memo for Arnold from AC/AS,
June 1943.
7 3 0