“US Navy”60+ pages
- p. 48 …This navy of the air is to be
expanded until no part of Germany is safe…
- p. 53 …the Navy, and civilian agencies-
the terms “independent,” “separate,” and “united air force” were used
interchangeably…
- p. 60 …n 5 September he
used the recent disaster to the Navy’s dirigible Sheizandoah as an…
- p. 62 …appointed in each of several departments-War, Navy, Commerce-
to supervise aviation.
The Lampert report, published…
- p. 71 …delaying them, so that bombardment had been
used to cut communications and to interfere with the…
- p. 86 …One might suppose that
Douhet, who “really struck the first blow,” was most useful; his work…
- p. 88 …the desired support of the War and Navy
departments. Only two months after the major submitted…
- p. 96 …issues between the Army and
the Navy over the use of aircraft in coastal defense.
Neither…
- p. 105 …The Navy would provide aircraPt for
don, scouting, and patrolling over the sea and for the…
- p. 107 …both the Army and the
Navy for aviation to be used in support of “the Infantry…
- p. 113 …Japanese Air Power
The Japanese air forces, divided into separate army and navy air
arms, had…
- p. 116 …T h e navy, on the other hand, gave
closer attention to the training of all…
- p. 117 …0 single-engine fighter used by both the Japanese army
and navy-was widely known to…
- p. 118 …In comparison with the I 1,000
pilots trained by the US. Army and Navy during…
- p. 120 …In the war against Ethiopia, 1935-36, Italian
bombers gained experience in the use of various…
- p. 125 …Under this arrangement the Luftwaffe, along with the
army and navy, had direct access to the…
- p. 126 …Goering had successfully
opposed the navy's desire for its own separate air arm, and the…
- p. 131 …The
German navy was unable to provide such a guarantee, and, moreover,
it lacked necessary equipment…
- p. 144 …This subject had been under study by the Army arid
Navy for more than a decade…
- p. 146 …even at the expense of speed
and useful load. A few months later Air Corps observers…
- p. 154 …a t best deny us the moral support of the
Royal Navy with its shipyards, and…
- p. 155 …use of a mobile striking
force to intercept an enemy approaching by sea. The Navy had…
- p. 156 …in support of or in lieu of US. Navy
forces against hostile fleet^.'^
In each case…
- p. 162 …announced the arrival on the
island of US. Navy At the suggestion of Iceland, the United…
- p. 170 …AAF and the British, 800 for
the US.Navy.’’’ This would total 60,000 aircraft a…
- p. 175 …T h e planners were concerned only with the mission of the
US. Army and Navy…
- p. 179 …In harmony with the general strategy advocated,
US. air forces in the Pacific and Far East…
- p. 180 …For each command, the mission of
the Army (including air forces) and the Navy was described…
- p. 200 …An alert system was in use twenty-four hours
a day, and air operations were carried…
- p. 206 …Scattered
throughout Panama were seven auxiliary airfields, two of which were
ready for immediate use, and…
- p. 218 …Since the
required number of planes represented more heavy bombers than
were then in use in…
- p. 224 …regarding the possibility of using fields
under construction by the Navy a t Palmyra and Samoa…
- p. 225 …I 942.* It devel-
oped that the Navy could not offer assistance in construction until
after…
- p. 228 …MacArthur had requested permission for emer-
gency use of airfields; and negotiations were furthered by conferences…
- p. 243 …This action lasted about an hour.‘ At its end the
Navy had suffered a crushing blow…
- p. 282 …But the US. Navy had been hard hit at Pearl Harbor, the bal-
ance of naval…
- p. 297 …the Secretary of the Navy as to allocation between
the using services. No relative priorities were…
- p. 305 …Army, Navy, and AAF, and similar representatives of the British
services. T h e American members…
- p. 306 …Joint Intelligence Committee, consisted of the directors of intelligence
from the Army, Navy, and AAF, and…
- p. 316 …So far as the Navy is concerned, Admiral King, as you
know, is not only Chief…
- p. 317 …AAF officers were schooled to avoid
use of the term “independent air force,” but in most…
- p. 326 …after 7 December 1941.T h e Navy was responsible for the general
strategic defense of…
- p. 328 …In the absence of adequate preparations, sirens on police cars
were used to warn the people…
- p. 335 …views between the W a r and Navy departments,
and the unsatisfying conjectures advanced by the…
- p. 410 …ready for use; and it had to
be divided between the Army and Navy.
On the…
- p. 424 …Agreements had
been reached for the use of Australian bases in the ferrying of heavy
366
- p. 464 …For inter-island air trans-
port, principal reliance was placed on two Navy PBY’s and…
- p. 489 …In their prior planning, Army and Navy commanders had devoted
scant attention to the problems of…
- p. 495 …Under the joint
Army-Navy plan, approximately 15,000 men of the 37th Division
were to…
- p. 497 …R I 1
precipitated the war, the US. Navy had taken a stand against im-
mediate…
- p. 501 …the end he refused to permit the use of the field at Chu-
chow. But the…
- p. 505 …into thickly settled districts, and
these were used by the Japanese to justify the subsequent execution…
- p. 508 …the S010mons.~~
As early as February, the US. Navy had definite indications of an
enemy offensive…
- p. 509 …The Navy’s lack of knowledge
of these sightings is unexplained.
4-48
- p. 514 …T o be sure, it would be impossible to use
Carrier Division Five, for the Shokaku…
- p. 527 …s and B-24's for naval use in long-range search
and tracking."' Furthermore, he…
- p. 529 …D W A R I 1
planes, useful in covering the northern approaches across the Pacific…
- p. 534 …For the US. forces on Unalaska Island, it represented a loss
of 2 2 , 0 0…
- p. 536 …T h e Japanese navy had
sustained its initial defeats, but the army as yet had…
- p. 588 …Army aircraft might, however, temporarily execute Navy functions
in support of or in lieu of Navy…
N O T E S T O P A G E S 5 1 5 - 2 8
NOTES TO CHAPTER 15
I . AAFAC A4onthly Bulletin, passim.
2 . History, First Air Force, 111, Pt. 10,
7-10; ltr., Maj. Gen. G.C. Brant to Gen.
Arnold, 30 Oct. 1941; ltr., Arnold to
Brant, 27 Nov. 1941; ltr., Adm. Harold
R. Stark to C/S US. Army, 8 Nov. 1941.
3. Office of Naval Intelligence, The
Conduct of the War at Sea, 1 5 Jan. 1946.
This is a translation of an essay by Adm.
Karl Doenitz.
4. Excerpts from Eastern Sea Frontier
W a r Diary, Dec. 1941, Tab I H, in Three
Historical Essays Relating to Army Anti-
submarine Activities (hereinafter cited as
Three Essays), 26 Apr. 1944; Report by
blaj. A. Standish to Secretary of War
for Air, I Dec. 1943, p. 3 . Figures are
taken from US. Fleet Antisubmarine
Bulletin, June 1943, but cf. Standish re-
port, p. 5 . See also memo for CG
AAFAC from Maj. W. Jackson, Asst.
A-2, AAFAC, 7 Mar. 1943, Tab 11, in
Three Essays.
5 . See especially plan attached to
memo for C G AAF from Col. Lyon and
Col. Williamson, 2 7 Feb. 1943; AAFAC
Liaison Office, Proposed Reorganization
of ASW Forces, 2 1 Jan. 1943; Edward L.
Bowles, The Acute Problem of Ocean-
borne Transport and Supply, special re-
port for S/W, I Mar. 1943. The subject
will be discussed in Volume I1 of this
history.
6. Reference data attached to memo
for Marshall from Arnold, 2 1 Feb. 1942,
in Plans file 111-B, Bk. I . Reference is
here made to Act of 5 June 1920 (41
Stat. 954) as amended by Sec. I , Act of
z July 1923 (44 Stat. 780).
7. Joint Action of the Army and
Navy, I I Sept. 1935.
8. See correspondence in Plans file
111-R,Bk. I under dates November and
December 1941 for discussion of pro-
posed revision of Joint Action and
RAINBOW No. 5.
9. History, I Bomber Command; file
of corresDondence and orders concern-
Dec. 1941, Tab I A, in Three Essays. Cf.
Standish report, p. 3.
I I . Standish report, p. 6. The convoy
system was inaugurated formally on 15
May 1942. (Digest of ESF War Diary,
Tab I N , in Three Essays.)
1 2 . ESF War Diary, Dec. 1941 and
Jan. 1942, quoted in Tab IB, D, and E,
Three Essays; ltr., Comdr. NANCF to
COMINCH, 14 Jan. 1942, Tab I C , in
Three Essays.
1 3 . Col. D.R. Lyon, History and
Organization of the Army Air Forces
Anti-Submarine Command, n.d.; AAFAC
A4onthly Antisubmarine Summary, Jan.
1943, p. 3 2 . According to this account,
the squadrons principally involved were
the zoth, 43d, and 96th Bombardment
squadrons.
14. When activated on 5 September
1941, the I Bomber Command consisted
of a headquarters squadron, three heavy
and one medium bombardment groups, a
similar number of reconnaissance squa-
drons, and a single pursuit group. (Lyon
history.)
15. Ltr., Comdr. NANCF to COM-
INCH, 14 Jan. 1942, Tab I C ; ESF War
Diary, Tabs I F and I G , in Three Essays.
16. Lyon history; Standish report,
p. 2 .
1 7 . Ltr., Hq. I BC to CG First Air
Force, 14 Jan. 1942; Col. C.A. McHenry,
The Antisubmarine Command of the
Army Air Forces, 1 3 Oct. 1943, prepared
for release in the Army and Navy
Journal.
18. Draft history, I BC. Cf. AAFAC
file I I I .o and list prepared by historian,
I BC.
19. AAFAC Historical Report on
Training.
to. Draft history, I BC.
2 1 . Jbid.; report by W / C O.F. Can-
ning, RAF to Capt. J.T.G. Stapler, USN,
Col. H.D. Smith, First AF, and Lt. Col.
R.B. Williamson, I BC, 17 Feb. 1942. See
also file 115.51.
ing Ioo-Aile limit, in special file of Brig.
Gen. Frederic H. Smith, Jr.
Naval Coastal Frontier to C/NO, 2 2 24. See sources in n. 23; also AAF
2 2 . Standish report.
10. Ltr., Corn&. North Atlantic 2 3 * draft history* I BC’
7 2 9