“US Navy”60+ pages
- p. 48 …This navy of the air is to be
expanded until no part of Germany is safe…
- p. 53 …the Navy, and civilian agencies-
the terms “independent,” “separate,” and “united air force” were used
interchangeably…
- p. 60 …n 5 September he
used the recent disaster to the Navy’s dirigible Sheizandoah as an…
- p. 62 …appointed in each of several departments-War, Navy, Commerce-
to supervise aviation.
The Lampert report, published…
- p. 71 …delaying them, so that bombardment had been
used to cut communications and to interfere with the…
- p. 86 …One might suppose that
Douhet, who “really struck the first blow,” was most useful; his work…
- p. 88 …the desired support of the War and Navy
departments. Only two months after the major submitted…
- p. 96 …issues between the Army and
the Navy over the use of aircraft in coastal defense.
Neither…
- p. 105 …The Navy would provide aircraPt for
don, scouting, and patrolling over the sea and for the…
- p. 107 …both the Army and the
Navy for aviation to be used in support of “the Infantry…
- p. 113 …Japanese Air Power
The Japanese air forces, divided into separate army and navy air
arms, had…
- p. 116 …T h e navy, on the other hand, gave
closer attention to the training of all…
- p. 117 …0 single-engine fighter used by both the Japanese army
and navy-was widely known to…
- p. 118 …In comparison with the I 1,000
pilots trained by the US. Army and Navy during…
- p. 120 …In the war against Ethiopia, 1935-36, Italian
bombers gained experience in the use of various…
- p. 125 …Under this arrangement the Luftwaffe, along with the
army and navy, had direct access to the…
- p. 126 …Goering had successfully
opposed the navy's desire for its own separate air arm, and the…
- p. 131 …The
German navy was unable to provide such a guarantee, and, moreover,
it lacked necessary equipment…
- p. 144 …This subject had been under study by the Army arid
Navy for more than a decade…
- p. 146 …even at the expense of speed
and useful load. A few months later Air Corps observers…
- p. 154 …a t best deny us the moral support of the
Royal Navy with its shipyards, and…
- p. 155 …use of a mobile striking
force to intercept an enemy approaching by sea. The Navy had…
- p. 156 …in support of or in lieu of US. Navy
forces against hostile fleet^.'^
In each case…
- p. 162 …announced the arrival on the
island of US. Navy At the suggestion of Iceland, the United…
- p. 170 …AAF and the British, 800 for
the US.Navy.’’’ This would total 60,000 aircraft a…
- p. 175 …T h e planners were concerned only with the mission of the
US. Army and Navy…
- p. 179 …In harmony with the general strategy advocated,
US. air forces in the Pacific and Far East…
- p. 180 …For each command, the mission of
the Army (including air forces) and the Navy was described…
- p. 200 …An alert system was in use twenty-four hours
a day, and air operations were carried…
- p. 206 …Scattered
throughout Panama were seven auxiliary airfields, two of which were
ready for immediate use, and…
- p. 218 …Since the
required number of planes represented more heavy bombers than
were then in use in…
- p. 224 …regarding the possibility of using fields
under construction by the Navy a t Palmyra and Samoa…
- p. 225 …I 942.* It devel-
oped that the Navy could not offer assistance in construction until
after…
- p. 228 …MacArthur had requested permission for emer-
gency use of airfields; and negotiations were furthered by conferences…
- p. 243 …This action lasted about an hour.‘ At its end the
Navy had suffered a crushing blow…
- p. 282 …But the US. Navy had been hard hit at Pearl Harbor, the bal-
ance of naval…
- p. 297 …the Secretary of the Navy as to allocation between
the using services. No relative priorities were…
- p. 305 …Army, Navy, and AAF, and similar representatives of the British
services. T h e American members…
- p. 306 …Joint Intelligence Committee, consisted of the directors of intelligence
from the Army, Navy, and AAF, and…
- p. 316 …So far as the Navy is concerned, Admiral King, as you
know, is not only Chief…
- p. 317 …AAF officers were schooled to avoid
use of the term “independent air force,” but in most…
- p. 326 …after 7 December 1941.T h e Navy was responsible for the general
strategic defense of…
- p. 328 …In the absence of adequate preparations, sirens on police cars
were used to warn the people…
- p. 335 …views between the W a r and Navy departments,
and the unsatisfying conjectures advanced by the…
- p. 410 …ready for use; and it had to
be divided between the Army and Navy.
On the…
- p. 424 …Agreements had
been reached for the use of Australian bases in the ferrying of heavy
366
- p. 464 …For inter-island air trans-
port, principal reliance was placed on two Navy PBY’s and…
- p. 489 …In their prior planning, Army and Navy commanders had devoted
scant attention to the problems of…
- p. 495 …Under the joint
Army-Navy plan, approximately 15,000 men of the 37th Division
were to…
- p. 497 …R I 1
precipitated the war, the US. Navy had taken a stand against im-
mediate…
- p. 501 …the end he refused to permit the use of the field at Chu-
chow. But the…
- p. 505 …into thickly settled districts, and
these were used by the Japanese to justify the subsequent execution…
- p. 508 …the S010mons.~~
As early as February, the US. Navy had definite indications of an
enemy offensive…
- p. 509 …The Navy’s lack of knowledge
of these sightings is unexplained.
4-48
- p. 514 …T o be sure, it would be impossible to use
Carrier Division Five, for the Shokaku…
- p. 527 …s and B-24's for naval use in long-range search
and tracking."' Furthermore, he…
- p. 529 …D W A R I 1
planes, useful in covering the northern approaches across the Pacific…
- p. 534 …For the US. forces on Unalaska Island, it represented a loss
of 2 2 , 0 0…
- p. 536 …T h e Japanese navy had
sustained its initial defeats, but the army as yet had…
- p. 588 …Army aircraft might, however, temporarily execute Navy functions
in support of or in lieu of Navy…
N O T E S T O P A G E S 5 0 4 - 7
WAR, $442, 3 Apr. 1942; minutes of
Administrative Planning Conference held
at Air Hq. (Delhi), 1 5 Mar. 1942, in
Ninth AF, Papers Relating to the USA-
AF in India, 1942; CM-IN-5611, AM-
MISCA to AGWAR, $831, 8 June 1942;
CM-IN-7824, Stilwell to AGWAR,
#AMMISCA 73, 28 May 1942.
68. Ltr., Brereton to Arnold, 24 June
1942; CM-IN-$194, Bissell to AGWAR,
sgd. Stilwell, #AMMISCA 707, 19 May
1942; interview with Lt. Col. John Al-
lison, 3 July 1943; interview with Noel
R. Bacon, 2 2 Apr. 1942; interview with
Maj. A.J. Baumler, 24 Mar. 1943; talk by
Col. M.C. Cooper in Gen. Johnson's Staff
Meeting, 2 3 Dec. 1942, sgd. by Maj. H.C.
Lint; interview with Maj. Marvin Mor-
ton, 16 Nov. 1943; talk by Col. E.C.
MacMorland, Ord. Dept., 1 2 Feb. 1943;
interview with Col. Homer L. Sanders,
June 1943; New York Times, 27 and 2 8
June 1942.
69. History, 341st Bomb. Gp., 1942-
43; History, 11th Bomb. Sq., 4 May
1942-31 May 1943; History, India-China
Ferry Command.
70. Histories, China Air Task Force,
341st Bomb. Gp., and 11th Bomb. Sq.
71. SO 64, Hq. American Army
Forces, China, Burma, and India, in His-
tory, USAAF India-Burma Sector,
China-Burma-India Theater; unrecorded
interviews by author with Col. C.A.
Snow, 12 May 1944, and Maj. Gen. Clay-
ton L. Bissell, 19 May 1944; Sanders
interview; notes taken during conference
between Cols. Robinson, Wyman,
Pope, 14 July 1942, at Chungking, in
History, USAAF hdia-Burma Sector;
interview with George L. Paxton, 2 8
Aug. 1942; interview with Albert E.
Nelson, Bendix rep., 24 June 1943; ltr.,
Arnold to Chennault, 6 Nov. 1942; CM-
IN-1758, Chungking to AGWAR, # 2 5 1 ,
72. Interview with Maj. George Ma:-
Millan, 5 Nov. 1942; interview with Col.
Robert L. Scott, 30 Apr. 1943; New York
Times, 3 Oct. 1942; ON1 Weekly, No.
24, 7 and 8 July 1942; CM-IN-1758,
Mayer to AGWAR, 6 July 1942.
73. R&R, Gen. George, A T C to
ACJAS, OC&R, 14 June 1942.
anq
6 July 1942.
7 2 7
CM-IN-0535, Gruber to AGWAR,
#AMMISCA 630, 3 May 1942; CM-IN-
2209, Brereton to AGWAR, #Aquila 736,
8 May 1942; CM-IN-1295, Stilwell to
AGWAR, #Aquila ZMR NR, 5 May
1942.
60. CM-OUT-~OZZ,Marshall to Stil-
well, #713, 24 May 1942; CM-IN-7037,
Stilwell to Marshall, #AMMISCA N R 61,
25 May 1942.
61. CM-IN, Brereton to Arnold,
#Aquila 89, 17 Mar. 1942; CM-OUT-57,
Ulio to Brereton, #AAF RC 165, 20
Mar. 1942; CM-OUT-1676, Marshall to
Brereton, #3z3, 4 May 1942.
62. CM-IN, Brereton to AGWAR,
#Aquila 131, 2 8 Mar. 1 % ~ .
63. President Roosevelt had approved
the induction as early as 18 December
1941, contingent upon approval of the
Generalissimo. (Memo for AS/W John
J. McCloy from Brig. Gen. Gordon P.
Saville, Dir. of Air Defense; CM-IN,
Magruder to AGWAR, #AMMISCA
161, 4 Jan. 1942; CM-IN-0629, Chung-
king to AGWAR, # # z , 3 Apr. 1942;
memo for Gen. Arnold from Lt. Col.
H.A. Halverson, 3 Feb. 1942; memo for
AC/S, W P D from AFDMR, 18 Mar.
1942; memo for AFRIT from WPD, 20
Mar. 1942; memo for Maj. Sigourney
from Lt. Col. R.J. Handy, Asst. Chief,
AFPMP, 23 Mar. 1942.)
64. CM-IN-2209, Brereton to AG-
WAR, #Aquila 736, 8 May 1942; CM-
OUT-2037, Marshall to Aquila, #332, 10
May 1942.
65. CM-IN-5592, Brereton to AG-
WAR, #438, 2 1 Apr. 1942; CM-OUT,
Marshall to Aquila, # n o , 23 Apr. 1942.
66. CM-IN-7824, Sfdwell to AG-
WAR, #AMMBCA 73, 28 May 1942.
Brereton was later told by Marshall that
HALPRO would be assigned to the
Tenth Air Force, but the Chief of Staff
gave no indication as to when the as-
signment would be made. (CM-OUT-
4614, Marshall to Stilwell and Brereton,
67. CM-IN, Magruder to AGWAR,
#AMMISCA 161,4 Jan. rgqz; CM-OUT-
0046, Marshall to Brereton, #93, I Apr.
#584, 19 June 1942.)
1942; CM-IN-0629, AMMISCA to AG-