“US Navy”60+ pages
- p. 48 …This navy of the air is to be
expanded until no part of Germany is safe…
- p. 53 …the Navy, and civilian agencies-
the terms “independent,” “separate,” and “united air force” were used
interchangeably…
- p. 60 …n 5 September he
used the recent disaster to the Navy’s dirigible Sheizandoah as an…
- p. 62 …appointed in each of several departments-War, Navy, Commerce-
to supervise aviation.
The Lampert report, published…
- p. 71 …delaying them, so that bombardment had been
used to cut communications and to interfere with the…
- p. 86 …One might suppose that
Douhet, who “really struck the first blow,” was most useful; his work…
- p. 88 …the desired support of the War and Navy
departments. Only two months after the major submitted…
- p. 96 …issues between the Army and
the Navy over the use of aircraft in coastal defense.
Neither…
- p. 105 …The Navy would provide aircraPt for
don, scouting, and patrolling over the sea and for the…
- p. 107 …both the Army and the
Navy for aviation to be used in support of “the Infantry…
- p. 113 …Japanese Air Power
The Japanese air forces, divided into separate army and navy air
arms, had…
- p. 116 …T h e navy, on the other hand, gave
closer attention to the training of all…
- p. 117 …0 single-engine fighter used by both the Japanese army
and navy-was widely known to…
- p. 118 …In comparison with the I 1,000
pilots trained by the US. Army and Navy during…
- p. 120 …In the war against Ethiopia, 1935-36, Italian
bombers gained experience in the use of various…
- p. 125 …Under this arrangement the Luftwaffe, along with the
army and navy, had direct access to the…
- p. 126 …Goering had successfully
opposed the navy's desire for its own separate air arm, and the…
- p. 131 …The
German navy was unable to provide such a guarantee, and, moreover,
it lacked necessary equipment…
- p. 144 …This subject had been under study by the Army arid
Navy for more than a decade…
- p. 146 …even at the expense of speed
and useful load. A few months later Air Corps observers…
- p. 154 …a t best deny us the moral support of the
Royal Navy with its shipyards, and…
- p. 155 …use of a mobile striking
force to intercept an enemy approaching by sea. The Navy had…
- p. 156 …in support of or in lieu of US. Navy
forces against hostile fleet^.'^
In each case…
- p. 162 …announced the arrival on the
island of US. Navy At the suggestion of Iceland, the United…
- p. 170 …AAF and the British, 800 for
the US.Navy.’’’ This would total 60,000 aircraft a…
- p. 175 …T h e planners were concerned only with the mission of the
US. Army and Navy…
- p. 179 …In harmony with the general strategy advocated,
US. air forces in the Pacific and Far East…
- p. 180 …For each command, the mission of
the Army (including air forces) and the Navy was described…
- p. 200 …An alert system was in use twenty-four hours
a day, and air operations were carried…
- p. 206 …Scattered
throughout Panama were seven auxiliary airfields, two of which were
ready for immediate use, and…
- p. 218 …Since the
required number of planes represented more heavy bombers than
were then in use in…
- p. 224 …regarding the possibility of using fields
under construction by the Navy a t Palmyra and Samoa…
- p. 225 …I 942.* It devel-
oped that the Navy could not offer assistance in construction until
after…
- p. 228 …MacArthur had requested permission for emer-
gency use of airfields; and negotiations were furthered by conferences…
- p. 243 …This action lasted about an hour.‘ At its end the
Navy had suffered a crushing blow…
- p. 282 …But the US. Navy had been hard hit at Pearl Harbor, the bal-
ance of naval…
- p. 297 …the Secretary of the Navy as to allocation between
the using services. No relative priorities were…
- p. 305 …Army, Navy, and AAF, and similar representatives of the British
services. T h e American members…
- p. 306 …Joint Intelligence Committee, consisted of the directors of intelligence
from the Army, Navy, and AAF, and…
- p. 316 …So far as the Navy is concerned, Admiral King, as you
know, is not only Chief…
- p. 317 …AAF officers were schooled to avoid
use of the term “independent air force,” but in most…
- p. 326 …after 7 December 1941.T h e Navy was responsible for the general
strategic defense of…
- p. 328 …In the absence of adequate preparations, sirens on police cars
were used to warn the people…
- p. 335 …views between the W a r and Navy departments,
and the unsatisfying conjectures advanced by the…
- p. 410 …ready for use; and it had to
be divided between the Army and Navy.
On the…
- p. 424 …Agreements had
been reached for the use of Australian bases in the ferrying of heavy
366
- p. 464 …For inter-island air trans-
port, principal reliance was placed on two Navy PBY’s and…
- p. 489 …In their prior planning, Army and Navy commanders had devoted
scant attention to the problems of…
- p. 495 …Under the joint
Army-Navy plan, approximately 15,000 men of the 37th Division
were to…
- p. 497 …R I 1
precipitated the war, the US. Navy had taken a stand against im-
mediate…
- p. 501 …the end he refused to permit the use of the field at Chu-
chow. But the…
- p. 505 …into thickly settled districts, and
these were used by the Japanese to justify the subsequent execution…
- p. 508 …the S010mons.~~
As early as February, the US. Navy had definite indications of an
enemy offensive…
- p. 509 …The Navy’s lack of knowledge
of these sightings is unexplained.
4-48
- p. 514 …T o be sure, it would be impossible to use
Carrier Division Five, for the Shokaku…
- p. 527 …s and B-24's for naval use in long-range search
and tracking."' Furthermore, he…
- p. 529 …D W A R I 1
planes, useful in covering the northern approaches across the Pacific…
- p. 534 …For the US. forces on Unalaska Island, it represented a loss
of 2 2 , 0 0…
- p. 536 …T h e Japanese navy had
sustained its initial defeats, but the army as yet had…
- p. 588 …Army aircraft might, however, temporarily execute Navy functions
in support of or in lieu of Navy…
N O T E S T O P A G E S 4 9 7 - 5 0 4
38. CM-OUT-32, Arnold to Brere-
ton, #AF 3/53, 4 Mar. 1942.
39. Minutes of meeting held in De-
fense Dept. Comm. Room, 2 1 Mar. 1942,
in Ninth AF, Papers Relating to the
USAAF in India, 1942; minutes of second
meeting of the Administrative Planning
Comm. held at Air Hq. (Delhi), Z L Mar.
1942, %id.; CM-IN-0578, Brereton to
AGWAR, #Aquila 696, 3 May 1942.
40. Ltr., Brig. Gen. C.V. Haynes to
Lt. Col. Samuel T. Moore, historian,
Tenth AF, 20 Apr. 1943, in History,
India-China Ferry Command, 1942. Col-
onel Haynes had been told by General
Arnold that he would command a bom-
bardment group in India, and he was
somewhat disappointed at his first assign-
ment. (Ltr., Gen. Arnold to Col. Haynes,
2 1 Feb. 1942.)
41. History, India-China Ferry Com-
mand; CM-IN-7009, Brereton to AG-
WAR, #Aquila 549, 26 Apr. 1942.
42. History, India-China Ferry Com-
mand.
43. CM-l'N-270 I , Brereton to AG-
WAR, #Aquila 1700, 9 June 1943.
44. In addition to regular duty, some
of the men served as guards to prevent
sabotage of the aircraft. (History, India-
China Ferry Command; ltr., Capt. A.I.
Boyer to Col. Robert F. Tate, 6 May
1942.)
45. A-2 Summary File, 7 Apr. 1942.
46. CM-0UT-0947, Marshall to Bre-
47. A-2 Summary File, 7 Apr. 1942.
48. Zbid., 18 Apr. and 2 May 1942;
CM-IN-4583, Brereton to Arnold,
#Aquila 356, 17 Apr. 1942.
49. A-2 Summary File, 5 , 6, and 9
May 1942; CM-IN-1663, Brereton to
AGWAR, #Aquila 754, 6 May 1942;
CM-IN-1708, Brereton to AGWAR,
#Aquila 814, 7 May 1942.
50. A-2 Summary File, 12, 14,.17, and
27 May 1942; CM-IN-6078, Naiden to
AGWAR, #Aquila 3134 L, 18 July 1942.
5 1 . The civilian airline pilots were
accustomed to carrying a load of 2,500
pounds. Army pilots were flying 6,000
pounds into Dinjan and 5,000 pounds into
reton, #113, 6 Apr. 1942.
726
China. A compromise of 4,000 pounds
was reached for the flight to China, but
Colonel Haynes flew 7,200 pounds east-
ward and a CNAC pilot brought 6,920
pounds from Kunming to Dinjan.
Haynes states that one plane hauled sev-
enty-five passengers out of Burma. (His-
tory, India-China Ferry Command;
interview with Albert E. Nelson, Bendix
rep., 24 June 1943; CM-IN, Aquila to
AGWAR, #1135, 19 May 1942.)
5 2 . History, India-China Ferry Com-
mand.
WAR, #3, IO May 1942; CM-IN-3536,
Aquila to AGWAR, 13 May 1942; CM-
IN-7262, Stilwell to AGWAR, #AM-
MISCA 62, 26 May 1942.
54. CM-IN-6689, Brereton to Arnold,
#Aquila 2172, 2 1 June 1942; History,
India-China Ferry Command.
5 5 . CM-OUT-0947, Marshall to Bre-
reton, f113, 6 Apr. 1942.
56. CM-IN-7661, Stilwell to AG-
WAR, #AMMISCA 610, 29 Apr. 1942.
57. Stilwell and others in Chungking
continued to warn the War Department
of the suspicion and distrust that the
Chinese felt toward the British. (CM-
IN-4540, Stilwell to AGWAR, #AM-
MISCA 62, 17 Apr. 1942; CM-IN-4903,
Stilwell to AGWAR, #AMMISCA 540,
18 Apr. 1942.)
58. CM-OUT-3919, M a r s h a l l to
Aquila, #192, 2 1 Apr. 1942; CM-IN-6405,
Brereton to AGWAR, #Aquila 496, 24
Apr. 1942; CM-IN-6746, Brereton to
AGWAR, #Aquila 541, 2 5 Apr. 1942. As
early as the breakup of the ABDA Com-
mand in Java, AAF officers had them-
selves been apprehensive of RAF control
in India. (CM-IN, Java to AGWAR, # 2 ,
2 0 Feb. 1942; CM-IN-72, ABDACOM to
A G W A R , # 4 p , 21 Feb. 1942; CM-OUT,
Arnold to Brereton, #AF 2/473, 26 Feb.
1942; minutes of second meeting of the
Administrative Planning Comm., as cited
in n. 39; memo for C/S by AAF Hq.,
20 Feb. 1942; ltr., Arnold to Haynes, 21
Feb. 1942; ltr., Brereton to Arnold, 6
Mar. 1942.)
59. CM-l'N-7661, Stilwell to AG-
WAR, #AMMISCA 610, 29 Apr. 1942;
53. CM-IN-2821, AMMISCA to AG-