“RAF”60+ pages
- p. 12 …T h e term “first narrative,” bor-
rowed from the RAF, was frequently used to describe…
- p. 16 …history would constitute a lifetime assignment-the RAF’s history of
World W a r I…
- p. 47 …being made
up of aircraft from the RAF’s Independent Force, the whole of the
French…
- p. 48 …early 1917.O n 6 June 1918the RAF’s Independent Force had been
established with its…
- p. 53 …Most radical was the independent air force,
usually drawing heavily upon the RAF and its Air…
- p. 114 …I when a
British mission of retired RAF officers and others arrived in Japan to
assist…
- p. 127 …At Dunkirk the Luftwaff e momentarily yielded supremacy to the
RAF, which was able to gain…
- p. 128 …After French surrender on 2 2 June, only the RAF remained
for the Luftwaffe to conquer…
- p. 129 …T h e RAF and the Battle of Britain
The German bombing of Britain in World…
- p. 130 …The RAF retained its autonomy; but, even so, sentiment for
many years, like that in the…
- p. 131 …it was
hoped that the badly ournumbered RAF would be able to hold off
any German…
- p. 132 …By the end of September the RAF had asserred its control of the air
over rhe…
- p. 133 …It will take no credit from the RAF’s outnumbered “few” to sug-
gest that the…
- p. 136 …Operations of the RAF after the fall of 1940 were as widely dis-
persed as were…
- p. 137 …on strategic bombardment, would find in the RAF a stout and under-
standing ally. It is…
- p. 171 …British requirements amounted to
49,385 planes, including first-line strength and wastage for the RAF…
- p. 186 …with fresh data and a familiarity with RAF
experience. Actual authorship of a military document is…
- p. 290 …to
prewar plans, was to join the RAF in the attack on Germany. This
project was…
- p. 338 …Fortunately, the RAF,
magnificently served by such advisers as Robert Watson-Watt,
rapidly went beyond the…
- p. 341 …enjoyed
through the co-operation of the RAF unusual opportunities to com-
pare results with those…
- p. 343 …United States military mission in London, the
RAF offered the services of Robert Watson-Watt, Scientific…
- p. 369 …The majority
of the Hudsons were delivered a t Montreal to the RAF Ferry Com-
mand…
- p. 391 …of its production was required by the
RAF to meet current operational commitments. The gasoline had…
- p. 398 …an
initial mission to participate with the RAF in the bombardment of
Germany. Questions remained regarding…
- p. 404 …air force personnel were
concentrated at the RAF base a t Reykjavik, occupying facilities on
the…
- p. 553 …of models considered obsolescent for AAF and RAF needs,
and cadres of American pilots and ground…
- p. 555 …were considered obsolescent by the AAF and
RAF) previously allocated to Sweden were released for the…
- p. 556 …in addition to collaboration with a small RAF contingent in
defense of Rangoon, he provided patrol…
- p. 557 …Even when the
enemy after his first experience sought to wipe out the RAF and
A…
- p. 565 …General Naiden’s survey indicated that the normal
run should be between the RAF base a…
- p. 566 …Unable to
challenge seriously the enemy’s supremacy in the air, meager RAF
and A V…
- p. 568 …May, the bombers struck at
Mingaladon, former RAF airdrome near Rangoon which the Japanese
were using…
- p. 570 …fensive efforts between the Tenth and the RAF, and on 1 5 April the
War Department…
- p. 571 …Accordingly, on
24 May the order committing the Tenth Air Force to operations
under RAF supervision…
- p. 609 …It also reflected the profound influence exerted by the RAF
Coastal Command on AAF thinking. That…
- p. 610 …Fleet
Air Arm by creating a special RAF command, equipped and trained
for sea search and…
- p. 614 …control in terms comparable to those governing RAF
Coastal Command. Almost from the beginning, the question…
- p. 615 …it had
been the experience of the RAF “that a purely defensive policy only
leads to…
- p. 619 …On the tactical side,
valuable assistance was obtained from an experienced RAF crew
which flew two…
- p. 626 …bomber crews
flying borrowed Bostons in an RAF routine sweep against enemy
airfields." During the seven…
- p. 628 …current allocation of heavy bombers to the RAF.6 N o immediate cut
was contemplated; and…
- p. 630 …was suggested that for the present the RAF
would assume sole responsibility for the air offensive…
- p. 633 …the conduct in co-operation with the
RAF of an offensive against western Europe in 1942…
- p. 634 …T o
the Air Staff, as to RAF Bomber Command, the bomber offensive
had figured as…
- p. 635 …Now that the SLEDGEHAMMERJROUNDUP strategy had
been accepted, the RAF wanted the United States to increase…
- p. 636 …the British desire for reinforcement of the
Middle East; the RAF Coastal Command’s request for…
- p. 637 …I ) allocate to
Great Britain for the RAF and Dominion air forces aircraft according
to an…
- p. 647 …TRIGGER,
a plan to set up in America, with RAF aid, a model air defense sector…
- p. 648 …important fea-
tures were borrowed from the RAF. H e proposed to effect a sharp
cleavage…
- p. 649 …Because AAF bombers would have the special mission, in co-operation
with the RAF, of attacking…
- p. 653 …Chaney must provide for their operational control with-
out recourse to the RAF. Chaney’s immediate…
- p. 656 …forces and the RAF, provision must be
made for two chains of command-that of the…
- p. 657 …i.e., Eighth Air
Force = RAF; VIII Bomber Command = RAF Bomber Command) ;
and while it provided…
- p. 659 …Under these conditions, relations with
RAF Bomber Command were more important for the Eighth Air
Force…
- p. 660 …ning for the bomber offensive with the RAF.
Daylight or Dark?
As an argument in favor…
- p. 661 …weapons are the Russian army and the RAF.” 1 5 5
It is significant that this…
- p. 662 …Critics complained of the RAF’s failure to provide adequate close
support for ground operations in…
- p. 663 …Messages from that office cast doubts upon the results of the RAF
bomber offensive and criticized…
- p. 664 …When in 1941 the two air staffs began planning their combined
attack on Germany, the RAF…
- p. 665 …Even before the war, RAF preference had run to night tactics for
strategic bombardment, an attitude…
N O T E S T O P A G E S 4 9 7 - 5 0 4
38. CM-OUT-32, Arnold to Brere-
ton, #AF 3/53, 4 Mar. 1942.
39. Minutes of meeting held in De-
fense Dept. Comm. Room, 2 1 Mar. 1942,
in Ninth AF, Papers Relating to the
USAAF in India, 1942; minutes of second
meeting of the Administrative Planning
Comm. held at Air Hq. (Delhi), Z L Mar.
1942, %id.; CM-IN-0578, Brereton to
AGWAR, #Aquila 696, 3 May 1942.
40. Ltr., Brig. Gen. C.V. Haynes to
Lt. Col. Samuel T. Moore, historian,
Tenth AF, 20 Apr. 1943, in History,
India-China Ferry Command, 1942. Col-
onel Haynes had been told by General
Arnold that he would command a bom-
bardment group in India, and he was
somewhat disappointed at his first assign-
ment. (Ltr., Gen. Arnold to Col. Haynes,
2 1 Feb. 1942.)
41. History, India-China Ferry Com-
mand; CM-IN-7009, Brereton to AG-
WAR, #Aquila 549, 26 Apr. 1942.
42. History, India-China Ferry Com-
mand.
43. CM-l'N-270 I , Brereton to AG-
WAR, #Aquila 1700, 9 June 1943.
44. In addition to regular duty, some
of the men served as guards to prevent
sabotage of the aircraft. (History, India-
China Ferry Command; ltr., Capt. A.I.
Boyer to Col. Robert F. Tate, 6 May
1942.)
45. A-2 Summary File, 7 Apr. 1942.
46. CM-0UT-0947, Marshall to Bre-
47. A-2 Summary File, 7 Apr. 1942.
48. Zbid., 18 Apr. and 2 May 1942;
CM-IN-4583, Brereton to Arnold,
#Aquila 356, 17 Apr. 1942.
49. A-2 Summary File, 5 , 6, and 9
May 1942; CM-IN-1663, Brereton to
AGWAR, #Aquila 754, 6 May 1942;
CM-IN-1708, Brereton to AGWAR,
#Aquila 814, 7 May 1942.
50. A-2 Summary File, 12, 14,.17, and
27 May 1942; CM-IN-6078, Naiden to
AGWAR, #Aquila 3134 L, 18 July 1942.
5 1 . The civilian airline pilots were
accustomed to carrying a load of 2,500
pounds. Army pilots were flying 6,000
pounds into Dinjan and 5,000 pounds into
reton, #113, 6 Apr. 1942.
726
China. A compromise of 4,000 pounds
was reached for the flight to China, but
Colonel Haynes flew 7,200 pounds east-
ward and a CNAC pilot brought 6,920
pounds from Kunming to Dinjan.
Haynes states that one plane hauled sev-
enty-five passengers out of Burma. (His-
tory, India-China Ferry Command;
interview with Albert E. Nelson, Bendix
rep., 24 June 1943; CM-IN, Aquila to
AGWAR, #1135, 19 May 1942.)
5 2 . History, India-China Ferry Com-
mand.
WAR, #3, IO May 1942; CM-IN-3536,
Aquila to AGWAR, 13 May 1942; CM-
IN-7262, Stilwell to AGWAR, #AM-
MISCA 62, 26 May 1942.
54. CM-IN-6689, Brereton to Arnold,
#Aquila 2172, 2 1 June 1942; History,
India-China Ferry Command.
5 5 . CM-OUT-0947, Marshall to Bre-
reton, f113, 6 Apr. 1942.
56. CM-IN-7661, Stilwell to AG-
WAR, #AMMISCA 610, 29 Apr. 1942.
57. Stilwell and others in Chungking
continued to warn the War Department
of the suspicion and distrust that the
Chinese felt toward the British. (CM-
IN-4540, Stilwell to AGWAR, #AM-
MISCA 62, 17 Apr. 1942; CM-IN-4903,
Stilwell to AGWAR, #AMMISCA 540,
18 Apr. 1942.)
58. CM-OUT-3919, M a r s h a l l to
Aquila, #192, 2 1 Apr. 1942; CM-IN-6405,
Brereton to AGWAR, #Aquila 496, 24
Apr. 1942; CM-IN-6746, Brereton to
AGWAR, #Aquila 541, 2 5 Apr. 1942. As
early as the breakup of the ABDA Com-
mand in Java, AAF officers had them-
selves been apprehensive of RAF control
in India. (CM-IN, Java to AGWAR, # 2 ,
2 0 Feb. 1942; CM-IN-72, ABDACOM to
A G W A R , # 4 p , 21 Feb. 1942; CM-OUT,
Arnold to Brereton, #AF 2/473, 26 Feb.
1942; minutes of second meeting of the
Administrative Planning Comm., as cited
in n. 39; memo for C/S by AAF Hq.,
20 Feb. 1942; ltr., Arnold to Haynes, 21
Feb. 1942; ltr., Brereton to Arnold, 6
Mar. 1942.)
59. CM-l'N-7661, Stilwell to AG-
WAR, #AMMISCA 610, 29 Apr. 1942;
53. CM-IN-2821, AMMISCA to AG-