“US Navy”60+ pages
- p. 48 …This navy of the air is to be
expanded until no part of Germany is safe…
- p. 53 …the Navy, and civilian agencies-
the terms “independent,” “separate,” and “united air force” were used
interchangeably…
- p. 60 …n 5 September he
used the recent disaster to the Navy’s dirigible Sheizandoah as an…
- p. 62 …appointed in each of several departments-War, Navy, Commerce-
to supervise aviation.
The Lampert report, published…
- p. 71 …delaying them, so that bombardment had been
used to cut communications and to interfere with the…
- p. 86 …One might suppose that
Douhet, who “really struck the first blow,” was most useful; his work…
- p. 88 …the desired support of the War and Navy
departments. Only two months after the major submitted…
- p. 96 …issues between the Army and
the Navy over the use of aircraft in coastal defense.
Neither…
- p. 105 …The Navy would provide aircraPt for
don, scouting, and patrolling over the sea and for the…
- p. 107 …both the Army and the
Navy for aviation to be used in support of “the Infantry…
- p. 113 …Japanese Air Power
The Japanese air forces, divided into separate army and navy air
arms, had…
- p. 116 …T h e navy, on the other hand, gave
closer attention to the training of all…
- p. 117 …0 single-engine fighter used by both the Japanese army
and navy-was widely known to…
- p. 118 …In comparison with the I 1,000
pilots trained by the US. Army and Navy during…
- p. 120 …In the war against Ethiopia, 1935-36, Italian
bombers gained experience in the use of various…
- p. 125 …Under this arrangement the Luftwaffe, along with the
army and navy, had direct access to the…
- p. 126 …Goering had successfully
opposed the navy's desire for its own separate air arm, and the…
- p. 131 …The
German navy was unable to provide such a guarantee, and, moreover,
it lacked necessary equipment…
- p. 144 …This subject had been under study by the Army arid
Navy for more than a decade…
- p. 146 …even at the expense of speed
and useful load. A few months later Air Corps observers…
- p. 154 …a t best deny us the moral support of the
Royal Navy with its shipyards, and…
- p. 155 …use of a mobile striking
force to intercept an enemy approaching by sea. The Navy had…
- p. 156 …in support of or in lieu of US. Navy
forces against hostile fleet^.'^
In each case…
- p. 162 …announced the arrival on the
island of US. Navy At the suggestion of Iceland, the United…
- p. 170 …AAF and the British, 800 for
the US.Navy.’’’ This would total 60,000 aircraft a…
- p. 175 …T h e planners were concerned only with the mission of the
US. Army and Navy…
- p. 179 …In harmony with the general strategy advocated,
US. air forces in the Pacific and Far East…
- p. 180 …For each command, the mission of
the Army (including air forces) and the Navy was described…
- p. 200 …An alert system was in use twenty-four hours
a day, and air operations were carried…
- p. 206 …Scattered
throughout Panama were seven auxiliary airfields, two of which were
ready for immediate use, and…
- p. 218 …Since the
required number of planes represented more heavy bombers than
were then in use in…
- p. 224 …regarding the possibility of using fields
under construction by the Navy a t Palmyra and Samoa…
- p. 225 …I 942.* It devel-
oped that the Navy could not offer assistance in construction until
after…
- p. 228 …MacArthur had requested permission for emer-
gency use of airfields; and negotiations were furthered by conferences…
- p. 243 …This action lasted about an hour.‘ At its end the
Navy had suffered a crushing blow…
- p. 282 …But the US. Navy had been hard hit at Pearl Harbor, the bal-
ance of naval…
- p. 297 …the Secretary of the Navy as to allocation between
the using services. No relative priorities were…
- p. 305 …Army, Navy, and AAF, and similar representatives of the British
services. T h e American members…
- p. 306 …Joint Intelligence Committee, consisted of the directors of intelligence
from the Army, Navy, and AAF, and…
- p. 316 …So far as the Navy is concerned, Admiral King, as you
know, is not only Chief…
- p. 317 …AAF officers were schooled to avoid
use of the term “independent air force,” but in most…
- p. 326 …after 7 December 1941.T h e Navy was responsible for the general
strategic defense of…
- p. 328 …In the absence of adequate preparations, sirens on police cars
were used to warn the people…
- p. 335 …views between the W a r and Navy departments,
and the unsatisfying conjectures advanced by the…
- p. 410 …ready for use; and it had to
be divided between the Army and Navy.
On the…
- p. 424 …Agreements had
been reached for the use of Australian bases in the ferrying of heavy
366
- p. 464 …For inter-island air trans-
port, principal reliance was placed on two Navy PBY’s and…
- p. 489 …In their prior planning, Army and Navy commanders had devoted
scant attention to the problems of…
- p. 495 …Under the joint
Army-Navy plan, approximately 15,000 men of the 37th Division
were to…
- p. 497 …R I 1
precipitated the war, the US. Navy had taken a stand against im-
mediate…
- p. 501 …the end he refused to permit the use of the field at Chu-
chow. But the…
- p. 505 …into thickly settled districts, and
these were used by the Japanese to justify the subsequent execution…
- p. 508 …the S010mons.~~
As early as February, the US. Navy had definite indications of an
enemy offensive…
- p. 509 …The Navy’s lack of knowledge
of these sightings is unexplained.
4-48
- p. 514 …T o be sure, it would be impossible to use
Carrier Division Five, for the Shokaku…
- p. 527 …s and B-24's for naval use in long-range search
and tracking."' Furthermore, he…
- p. 529 …D W A R I 1
planes, useful in covering the northern approaches across the Pacific…
- p. 534 …For the US. forces on Unalaska Island, it represented a loss
of 2 2 , 0 0…
- p. 536 …T h e Japanese navy had
sustained its initial defeats, but the army as yet had…
- p. 588 …Army aircraft might, however, temporarily execute Navy functions
in support of or in lieu of Navy…
N O T E S T O P A G E S 4 9 2 - 9 7
29. CM-OUT, AGO to Wheeler, 3
Mar. 1942.
30. Histories, Hq. Tenth Air Force,
51st Service Gp., 51st Fighter Gp., 7th
Bomb. Gp., 436th Bomb. Sq.; Russell
interview.
31. CM-IN, Brereton to Arnold, 6
Mar. 1942; Supplies and Services to be
Rendered to USA Forces in India, rec-
ord of meeting held 22 Mar. 1942, in
Ninth AF, Papers Relating to USAAF
in India, 1942.
3 2 . T h e mission was composed of
Henry F. Grady, H.E. Beyster, Dirk
Deltker, A.W. Herrington, and Frank A.
Waring. They arrived a t New Delhi on
17 April and departed from Karachi 2 2
May. ( A Survey of India's Industrial
Production for W a r Purposes, Report of
the American Technical Mission to India
[hereinafter cited as Grady report], sub-
mitted to the governments of India and
the United States, August 1942.)
WAR, #4 ST, 19 Feb. 1942; CM-IN,
Brereton to Arnold, #Aquila 83, 1 5 Mar.
1942; CM-IN, Brereton to AGWAR,
#Aquila 5, 30 Mar. 1942.
34. CM-IN, Brereton to Arnold:
#Aquila 83, 15 Mar.; #Aquila 19, 2 6 Mar.;
and #Aquila 24, 18 Mar. 1942; CM-I",
Brereton to AGWAR, #Aquila 5, 30
Mar. 1942; interview with Col. Homer
L. Sanders (Air Room), June 1943;CM-
IN, ABDACOM to AGWAR, 37 DX,
17 Feb., and #17, 19 Feb. 1942.
35. CM-IN-I.B. 70, Brereton to AG-
WAR, #Aquila 63, 4 Mar. 1942; CM-IN,
Brereton to Arnold, #Aquila I, 26 Mar.
1942; CM-IN, Brereton to AGWAR,
$Aquila 1 3 1 , 2 8 Mar. 1942; memo for
C/AS from O.L. Ferson, AFROM, 2 3
Apr. 1942.
36. CM-IN, Brereton to AGWAR,
#Aquila 64, 4 Mar. 1942; CM-IN, Karachi
to Arnold, #618, 29 Apr. 1942.
37. CM-IN, Brereton to Arnold,
#AMSEG 516, 2 Mar. 1942; CM-OUT-
35, Arnold to Brereton, #AF 3/89, 5 Mar.
1942; memo for Chief, WPD, W D G S
from Arnold, 24 Mar. 1942; History, X
Air Force Service Command, 1942.
33. CM-IN, ABDACOM to AG-
725
Staff, Washington, 2 5 Mar. 1942. Also,
see popular accounts of AVG.
18. CM-IN, Magruder to AGWAR,
#AMMISCA 161,4 Jan. 1942;CM-OUT-
0046, Marshall to Brereton, $93, I Apr.
1942; memo for AS/W John J. McCloy
from Brig. Gen. Gordon P. Saville, Dir.
of Air Defense; memo for Gen. Arnold
from Lt. Col. H.A. Halverson, 3 Feb.
1942; memo for AC/S, W P D from
AFDMR.
19, Col. John Y. York, Jr., Report on
Planes for A V G and Chinese, 6 Mar.
1942; Maj. Paul G. Pennoyer, Report on
Planes for China and AVG, I Apr. 1942;
CM-OUT-3 268, Arnold to Marshall,
#362, 17 Apr. 1942.
20. CM-IN, GHQ Java to T A G , sgd.
Brett, #ABDA 448 A, 18 Feb. 1942; CM-
IN, Brett to AGWAR, 10 Feb. 1942.
21. ABC-4/9, 10 Jan. 1942.
22. Memo for AC/S, W P D from
AFDMR, 18 Mar. 1942; memo for AAG
from Col. H.L. George, AC/AS, AWPD,
2 3 Feb. 1942; R&R, Maj. Gen. M.F. Har-
mon, C/AS to Col. Shumacker, 17 Mar.
'942.
2 3 . CM-IN, Brereton to Arnold, #89,
18 Mar. 1942; History, Hq. and Hq. Sq.,
Tenth Air Force.
24. Histories, 51st Service Gp., Hq.
Tenth Air Force, 5Ist Fighter Gp., 7th
Bomb. Gp., 436th Bomb. Sq.; CM-I",
Brereton to AGWAR, # I I Z , 2 8 Mar.
1942; CM-IN, Brereton to Arnold, #89,
19 Mar. 1942.
25. Memo for C/AS from Col. H.A.
Craig, 4 Mar. 1942; CM-OUT-99,
Arnold to Brereton, #AAF PC 42, z Apr.
1942; History, 59th Service Sq., 1941-42.
26. CM-OUT-57, Ulio to Brereton,
#AAF RC 165, 20 Mar. 1942; CM-IN-
2400, Brereton to AGWAR, #Aquila
1724, 8 June 1942; Lt. Col. John E. Barr,
Report on P-40 Mission, Special Project
157, 19 June 1942. in History, Hq. Tenth
Air Force, 1942.
27. Barr report.
28. Interview with Brig. Gen. Clinton
W. Russell, 4. June 1942; CM-IN, Brere-
ton to Arnold, #AMSEG 516, 2 Mar.
1942.