The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

T H E A R M Y A I R A R M B E T W E E N T W O W A R S
with something of a time lag, the several organizational changes in
the air arm which have been noted above. T h e influence of the
General Staff over air doctrine is clearly shown in Training Regula-
tion 440- I 5, Fundamental Principles of Employment of the Air Serv-
ice (26 January 1926).
This manual states that the organization and training of air units is
to be “based on the fundamental doctrine that their mission is to aid
the ground forces to gain decisive success.”115 This principle is to
guide all operations, but the nature of the aid will vary with the type
of aviation units involved. Some units must operate as an organic part
of the ground command, and their aid will be direct; others may “CO-
operate by indirect support in the area of the ground battlefield or at
a distance therefrom.” Such indirect support is peculiarly the function
of the GHQ air force, which “is self-contained and is capable of
rapidly shifting its activities from one theater of operations to another,
transporting the equipment and personnel necessary for its efficient
operation and upkeep.” At outbreak of war it first gains control of
the air, then attempts to disrupt enemy communications and move-
ments. Thereafter it assists the army directly in battle or “indirectly,
wheq conditions are favorable, by carrying out special missions at
great distance from the ground forces” against critical areas of the
enemy country. And the GHQ air force is of special value in coast
defense, both in reconnaissance and in attacks on approaching fleets.l”
Compared with Mitchell’s bold claims this was pale stuff, and it was
a fitting coincidence that his resignation from the Army came on the
day after T R 440-15 was published. But its authors, following in all
respectability the recommendations of the Lassiter Board, had at least
ascribed to GHQ aviation something of the functions of a striking
force; further the Air Service was not then prepared to go. Even at
the Air Service Tactical School a t Langley Field the teaching was f a r
from radical. Textbooks published there in I 926 constitute perhaps
the most detailed analysis of employment of military aviation yet to
come from a W a r Department agency. That on Bombardment specifies
that the course is to deal primarily with “operations in support of, or
in conjunction with, large forces of ground troops” rather than with
bombardment “in what may be termed ‘independent air force opera-
tions.’ ” Hence the approach is always “from the standpoint of various
ground situations,” both in open warfare and on a stabilized front;
even strategic bombardment is so treated.”‘ T h e authors, unlike
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