“US Navy”60+ pages
- p. 48 …This navy of the air is to be
expanded until no part of Germany is safe…
- p. 53 …the Navy, and civilian agencies-
the terms “independent,” “separate,” and “united air force” were used
interchangeably…
- p. 60 …n 5 September he
used the recent disaster to the Navy’s dirigible Sheizandoah as an…
- p. 62 …appointed in each of several departments-War, Navy, Commerce-
to supervise aviation.
The Lampert report, published…
- p. 71 …delaying them, so that bombardment had been
used to cut communications and to interfere with the…
- p. 86 …One might suppose that
Douhet, who “really struck the first blow,” was most useful; his work…
- p. 88 …the desired support of the War and Navy
departments. Only two months after the major submitted…
- p. 96 …issues between the Army and
the Navy over the use of aircraft in coastal defense.
Neither…
- p. 105 …The Navy would provide aircraPt for
don, scouting, and patrolling over the sea and for the…
- p. 107 …both the Army and the
Navy for aviation to be used in support of “the Infantry…
- p. 113 …Japanese Air Power
The Japanese air forces, divided into separate army and navy air
arms, had…
- p. 116 …T h e navy, on the other hand, gave
closer attention to the training of all…
- p. 117 …0 single-engine fighter used by both the Japanese army
and navy-was widely known to…
- p. 118 …In comparison with the I 1,000
pilots trained by the US. Army and Navy during…
- p. 120 …In the war against Ethiopia, 1935-36, Italian
bombers gained experience in the use of various…
- p. 125 …Under this arrangement the Luftwaffe, along with the
army and navy, had direct access to the…
- p. 126 …Goering had successfully
opposed the navy's desire for its own separate air arm, and the…
- p. 131 …The
German navy was unable to provide such a guarantee, and, moreover,
it lacked necessary equipment…
- p. 144 …This subject had been under study by the Army arid
Navy for more than a decade…
- p. 146 …even at the expense of speed
and useful load. A few months later Air Corps observers…
- p. 154 …a t best deny us the moral support of the
Royal Navy with its shipyards, and…
- p. 155 …use of a mobile striking
force to intercept an enemy approaching by sea. The Navy had…
- p. 156 …in support of or in lieu of US. Navy
forces against hostile fleet^.'^
In each case…
- p. 162 …announced the arrival on the
island of US. Navy At the suggestion of Iceland, the United…
- p. 170 …AAF and the British, 800 for
the US.Navy.’’’ This would total 60,000 aircraft a…
- p. 175 …T h e planners were concerned only with the mission of the
US. Army and Navy…
- p. 179 …In harmony with the general strategy advocated,
US. air forces in the Pacific and Far East…
- p. 180 …For each command, the mission of
the Army (including air forces) and the Navy was described…
- p. 200 …An alert system was in use twenty-four hours
a day, and air operations were carried…
- p. 206 …Scattered
throughout Panama were seven auxiliary airfields, two of which were
ready for immediate use, and…
- p. 218 …Since the
required number of planes represented more heavy bombers than
were then in use in…
- p. 224 …regarding the possibility of using fields
under construction by the Navy a t Palmyra and Samoa…
- p. 225 …I 942.* It devel-
oped that the Navy could not offer assistance in construction until
after…
- p. 228 …MacArthur had requested permission for emer-
gency use of airfields; and negotiations were furthered by conferences…
- p. 243 …This action lasted about an hour.‘ At its end the
Navy had suffered a crushing blow…
- p. 282 …But the US. Navy had been hard hit at Pearl Harbor, the bal-
ance of naval…
- p. 297 …the Secretary of the Navy as to allocation between
the using services. No relative priorities were…
- p. 305 …Army, Navy, and AAF, and similar representatives of the British
services. T h e American members…
- p. 306 …Joint Intelligence Committee, consisted of the directors of intelligence
from the Army, Navy, and AAF, and…
- p. 316 …So far as the Navy is concerned, Admiral King, as you
know, is not only Chief…
- p. 317 …AAF officers were schooled to avoid
use of the term “independent air force,” but in most…
- p. 326 …after 7 December 1941.T h e Navy was responsible for the general
strategic defense of…
- p. 328 …In the absence of adequate preparations, sirens on police cars
were used to warn the people…
- p. 335 …views between the W a r and Navy departments,
and the unsatisfying conjectures advanced by the…
- p. 410 …ready for use; and it had to
be divided between the Army and Navy.
On the…
- p. 424 …Agreements had
been reached for the use of Australian bases in the ferrying of heavy
366
- p. 464 …For inter-island air trans-
port, principal reliance was placed on two Navy PBY’s and…
- p. 489 …In their prior planning, Army and Navy commanders had devoted
scant attention to the problems of…
- p. 495 …Under the joint
Army-Navy plan, approximately 15,000 men of the 37th Division
were to…
- p. 497 …R I 1
precipitated the war, the US. Navy had taken a stand against im-
mediate…
- p. 501 …the end he refused to permit the use of the field at Chu-
chow. But the…
- p. 505 …into thickly settled districts, and
these were used by the Japanese to justify the subsequent execution…
- p. 508 …the S010mons.~~
As early as February, the US. Navy had definite indications of an
enemy offensive…
- p. 509 …The Navy’s lack of knowledge
of these sightings is unexplained.
4-48
- p. 514 …T o be sure, it would be impossible to use
Carrier Division Five, for the Shokaku…
- p. 527 …s and B-24's for naval use in long-range search
and tracking."' Furthermore, he…
- p. 529 …D W A R I 1
planes, useful in covering the northern approaches across the Pacific…
- p. 534 …For the US. forces on Unalaska Island, it represented a loss
of 2 2 , 0 0…
- p. 536 …T h e Japanese navy had
sustained its initial defeats, but the army as yet had…
- p. 588 …Army aircraft might, however, temporarily execute Navy functions
in support of or in lieu of Navy…
N O T E S T O P A G E S 4 7 4 - 8 2
Ghormley recommended that the initia-
tion of the offensive be deferred” because
of insufficient resources. (USSBS, Em-
ployment of Forces under the Southwest
Pacific Command [Feb. 19471, p. 10.)
9. Enemy statistics from Allied Air
Forces and RAAF Intelligence Sum-
maries; Allied statistics from cable status
reports. See also Histories, 49th and 35th
Fighter Gps.
10. CM-IN-2 I 14 (4-8-42), Australia
to T A G , 8 Apr. 1942; interview with
Capt. Charles L. Marburg, 3 Nov. 1942;
interview with Capt. Carey L. OBrien, 5
Dec. 1942; Lt. Gen. George Brett report,
Air Operations in Australia, Sum. J ; un-
recorded interview with Maj. M.J.
Keane, Mar. 1944; Eric Feldt, T h e Coast-
watchers (New York, 1946).
11. RAAF Intel. Sums.; History, 49th
Fighter Gp.
12. History, 49th Fighter Gp.; His-
tory, V Fighter Command.
13. Memo for C/S from Maj. Gen.
Robert C. Richardson, Jr., Report $5, 9
July 1942; Brett report; CM-IN-7277
$811, 26 May 1942. It will be recalled
that two squadrons of the 8th Fighter
Group equipped with P-39’s had reached
Port Moresby by I May. (See chap. 11.)
14. RAAF and Allied AF Intel. Sums.;
cable status reports; Histories, 39th and
40th Sqs. and V Fighter Command. The
heaviest raid of this period damaged
water mains, burned fuel dumps, and
destroyed two P-39’s and one P-400 on
the ground.
15. See sources in n. 14 and CM-IN-
AAF, #A119, 19 July 1942. A t least
twenty P-39’s and P-400’s were destroyed
during June and eight more in July by
enemy action.
16. Osmar White, Green Amour
(New York, 1945), p. 148; msg., Brett to
NE Area, Townsville, I I May 1 9 4 2 ; msg.,
Hq. USA Townsville to Hq. USAFIA,
12 May 1942; msg., NE Area, Towns-
ville to Hq. Allied AF, 14 May 1942;
Histories, 374th Troop Carrier Gp., 3d
Bomb. Gp., 13th and 90th Bomb. as.;
(5-26-42), GHQ SWPA to AGWAR,
6849 (7-20-42), GHQ SWPA to C G
CM-IN4701 (7-2-42), GHQ SWPA to
C/S, #27, 3 July 1942; CM-IN-925,
GHQ SWPA to C/S, #CIS, 3 July 1942.
17. Histories, 3d and 27th Bomb.
Gps.; cable status reports.
18. Histories, 27th Bomb. Gp. and
13th Bomb. Sq.; Consolidated Statistical
Report, Materiel Command, Sec. Vl’, 30
June 1942; cable status reports.
19. R A M and Allied AF Intel. Sums.,
specifically #14, 3 July 1942, p. 6; Keane
interview; Histories, 13th and 90th Sqs.
20. Ibid.; RAAF and Allied AF Intel.
Sums. During this same period and in
these same bomber missions, Allied crews
claimed twenty enemy fighters shot
down.
2 1 . Histories, 8th Photo Sq., 435th
Bomb. Sq., and 3d Gp.; interview with
Maj. Frank P. Bostrom, 5 Dec. 1942;
cable status reports.
2 2 . Interview with Lt. Col. W.F.
Coleman by author, 2 1 June 1946.
23. RAAF and Allied AF Intel. Sums.
24. Cable status reports; Bostrom
interview; Sec. of War’s Conference,
18 May 1942; AFDAS to AFAEP, 14
May 1942.
2 5 . See, for example, General Arnold‘s
undated memo to General Marshall in
regard to JCS 48, and AAJ? Reference
History No. I, The AAF in the South
Pacific to October 1942.
26. Enemy Order of Battle, from
RAAF and Allied AF Intel. Sums.; other
statistics from cable status reports. It
should also be pointed out that the Jap-
anese had no four-engine bombers for
offensive missions.
27. Thus the flow of aircraft was
hardly providing the supposedly estab-
lished wastage of 20 per cent a month.
(Cable status reports; c M - o u T - 7 5 ~ ~
[629-42], Arnold to CinC/SWPA, $308,
2 9 June 1942.)
28. Lt. Col. William J. Kennard, Re-
port on Philippine and Australian Activi-
ties, 14 Nov. 1942.
29. Coleman interview; interview with
members of 19th Bomb. Gp., 5 Dec. 1942;
statement of Col. William Hipps to
author; Kennard report; Richardson and
7 2 3