“The Advance”60+ pages
- p. 14 …But the final choice remained with the commanding general,
who in some instances moved in advance…
- p. 36 …sufficiently advanced to support limited offensives in both the
European and the Pacific theaters.
The history…
- p. 40 …Advanced training was for the most part scheduled for overseas
schools, where combat experience of the…
- p. 43 …Of 2 , 9 2 5 planes reaching the AEF’s Zone of
Advance during the war…
- p. 45 …Trenchard, then com-
mander of the Royal Flying Corps, and was profoundly impressed by
his advanced…
- p. 46 …the Zone of Advance,
the I Corps, the First Army, and the First Army Group, advancing…
- p. 47 …The rest of his offensive forces Mitchell concentrated along the axis
of the American advance. Since…
- p. 51 …among
the several armies.’ Aviation officers had to accept this concept, but
the most advanced thought…
- p. 63 …Its report in October 1933 did not accept the more advanced
ideas of the Army’s…
- p. 68 …on the details of aerial combat, they
seldom represent the most advanced thought within the Army…
- p. 70 …to have been geared
closely to the advance of the ground armies. His boldest plan, a…
- p. 71 …the field of battle of either armies or navies.“
But this unpleasant thought was advanced as…
- p. 76 …who might provide
advanced bases. H e had come to consider that “the basis of air…
- p. 87 …the doctrine of air war taught in the Air
Corps’ most advanced school a t the…
- p. 88 …One was the acquisition of more advanced bases. That
was a political matter, wholly foreign to…
- p. 91 …the years immediately follow-
ing the war, when as yet commercial aviation had not advanced to…
- p. 93 …the quest for cleaner lines the retractable landing
gear had been introduced.lG8If the advances made…
- p. 96 …mission of
coastal defense and that the proposal was advanced under circum-
stances decidedly favorable to…
- p. 112 …Numerous forecasts of such a development had been
voiced since the end of the earlier conflict…
- p. 117 …In contrast to the 2 0 0 hours in primary, basic, and advanced training
then being…
- p. 119 …in the organization of their air
forces the Italians were much further advanced than the Japanese…
- p. 122 …Force, the aviation department sought to promote the
growth of “civilian” airlines, the advancement of aeronautical…
- p. 125 …Though the Luftwaff e hardly proved
to be so overwhelming a force as its advance notices…
- p. 126 …The Lufnvaffe was used both to eliminate the air opposition and as
an advance striking force…
- p. 127 …Leading the rapidly advancing Panzer divisions through the Low
Countries, the Stukas bombed troop concentrations and…
- p. 129 …supply resulting from the
speed of the German advance, the success of the RAF at Dunkirk…
- p. 131 …By the summer of 1940 the breath-taking advance of German
forces had destroyed all effective…
- p. 134 …After seizing key airdromes, the advance German forces
were supplied and reinforced by Junkers 5 2…
- p. 135 …In addition, the rapid German advance dis-
rupted the air supply and maintenance system and a…
- p. 149 …the best
flying weather and each including a number, steadily growing, of
basic and advanced Responsibility…
- p. 161 …miles to the
That attack argued too for the next eastward advance of the Ameri-
can…
- p. 164 …islands, proved inadequate against the
Japanese surprise attacks, but the advanced island airstrips were to be…
- p. 165 …the United States and Alaska. And, as elsewhere,
protection of Alaska called for more advanced outposts…
- p. 170 …New estimates, submitted in &/lay by the W a r Plans Division
of the General Staff…
- p. 183 …T h e
British chiefs of staff did not envisage the use of the vast numbers…
- p. 198 …so far advanced as
those in Newfoundland. Surveys which were made during the spring
and summer…
- p. 201 …32
The organization of the Caribbean Air Force represented a marked
structural advance over the force…
- p. 204 …Of the several outlying sites in the eastern Caribbean, Puerto Rico
presented the most advanced stage…
- p. 211 …advanced bases, a series of inter-
mediate airfields, a chain of fields between Anchorage and the…
- p. 213 …the requirements for accommodating a pursuit group in the same
area.51These moves had not advanced…
- p. 217 …of the Navy to maintain
the long-range reconnaissance that would be required for advance
notice…
- p. 226 …The Interceptor Command was composed of the 24th Pursuit Group,
whose pilots had received advanced training…
- p. 246 …But as the day advanced
the sea had roughened, and approximately fifty planes were smashed
in…
- p. 251 …execution of the plan for an early morning attack, and gave the
Americans advance notice of…
- p. 253 …mission without advance reconnaissance. T h e interview did
not indicate whether the question of an…
- p. 274 …the steady advance of the enemy from the north and addi-
tional landings along the Luzon…
- p. 278 …in advance of the scheduled
date of 15 January. Both the Army and the Navy were…
- p. 281 …and the disposition of Air Corps troops
in advance thereof in order to accomplish your assigned…
- p. 282 …Shanghai to acquire
advanced bases; (b) by exerting slow pressure through the Nether-
lands East Indies…
- p. 291 …These problems were intimately related, and any ready solu-
tion was complicated by the whirlwind advance…
- p. 327 …than “a cadre sent to the territory in
advance of the main body.” 32 T o…
- p. 334 …the War Department version of the incident, and he advanced two
theories to account for the…
- p. 335 …between the W a r and Navy departments,
and the unsatisfying conjectures advanced by the Army…
- p. 337 …It would be necessary to know in advance of the approach of
enemy craft. Next, there…
- p. 338 …time proved less
effective,lo4 for advance warning of the enemy's approach did little
good…
- p. 350 …the Pacific coast defense
zone, arrangements had been completed with the Canadians to provide
advance warning…
- p. 358 …Prospects for completing the
work in advance of an anticipated spring attack on Dutch Harbor
were…
- p. 397 …his staff to work out in advance details for the staging
+ See below, p. 493.
34'
- p. 399 …an advance task force of engineer, coast artillery, and general
service troops arrived in the waters…
- p. 403 …T e n
enlisted weather specialists accompanied the American advance task
force into southern Greenland in…
N O T E S T O P A G E S 4 7 4 - 8 2
Ghormley recommended that the initia-
tion of the offensive be deferred” because
of insufficient resources. (USSBS, Em-
ployment of Forces under the Southwest
Pacific Command [Feb. 19471, p. 10.)
9. Enemy statistics from Allied Air
Forces and RAAF Intelligence Sum-
maries; Allied statistics from cable status
reports. See also Histories, 49th and 35th
Fighter Gps.
10. CM-IN-2 I 14 (4-8-42), Australia
to T A G , 8 Apr. 1942; interview with
Capt. Charles L. Marburg, 3 Nov. 1942;
interview with Capt. Carey L. OBrien, 5
Dec. 1942; Lt. Gen. George Brett report,
Air Operations in Australia, Sum. J ; un-
recorded interview with Maj. M.J.
Keane, Mar. 1944; Eric Feldt, T h e Coast-
watchers (New York, 1946).
11. RAAF Intel. Sums.; History, 49th
Fighter Gp.
12. History, 49th Fighter Gp.; His-
tory, V Fighter Command.
13. Memo for C/S from Maj. Gen.
Robert C. Richardson, Jr., Report $5, 9
July 1942; Brett report; CM-IN-7277
$811, 26 May 1942. It will be recalled
that two squadrons of the 8th Fighter
Group equipped with P-39’s had reached
Port Moresby by I May. (See chap. 11.)
14. RAAF and Allied AF Intel. Sums.;
cable status reports; Histories, 39th and
40th Sqs. and V Fighter Command. The
heaviest raid of this period damaged
water mains, burned fuel dumps, and
destroyed two P-39’s and one P-400 on
the ground.
15. See sources in n. 14 and CM-IN-
AAF, #A119, 19 July 1942. A t least
twenty P-39’s and P-400’s were destroyed
during June and eight more in July by
enemy action.
16. Osmar White, Green Amour
(New York, 1945), p. 148; msg., Brett to
NE Area, Townsville, I I May 1 9 4 2 ; msg.,
Hq. USA Townsville to Hq. USAFIA,
12 May 1942; msg., NE Area, Towns-
ville to Hq. Allied AF, 14 May 1942;
Histories, 374th Troop Carrier Gp., 3d
Bomb. Gp., 13th and 90th Bomb. as.;
(5-26-42), GHQ SWPA to AGWAR,
6849 (7-20-42), GHQ SWPA to C G
CM-IN4701 (7-2-42), GHQ SWPA to
C/S, #27, 3 July 1942; CM-IN-925,
GHQ SWPA to C/S, #CIS, 3 July 1942.
17. Histories, 3d and 27th Bomb.
Gps.; cable status reports.
18. Histories, 27th Bomb. Gp. and
13th Bomb. Sq.; Consolidated Statistical
Report, Materiel Command, Sec. Vl’, 30
June 1942; cable status reports.
19. R A M and Allied AF Intel. Sums.,
specifically #14, 3 July 1942, p. 6; Keane
interview; Histories, 13th and 90th Sqs.
20. Ibid.; RAAF and Allied AF Intel.
Sums. During this same period and in
these same bomber missions, Allied crews
claimed twenty enemy fighters shot
down.
2 1 . Histories, 8th Photo Sq., 435th
Bomb. Sq., and 3d Gp.; interview with
Maj. Frank P. Bostrom, 5 Dec. 1942;
cable status reports.
2 2 . Interview with Lt. Col. W.F.
Coleman by author, 2 1 June 1946.
23. RAAF and Allied AF Intel. Sums.
24. Cable status reports; Bostrom
interview; Sec. of War’s Conference,
18 May 1942; AFDAS to AFAEP, 14
May 1942.
2 5 . See, for example, General Arnold‘s
undated memo to General Marshall in
regard to JCS 48, and AAJ? Reference
History No. I, The AAF in the South
Pacific to October 1942.
26. Enemy Order of Battle, from
RAAF and Allied AF Intel. Sums.; other
statistics from cable status reports. It
should also be pointed out that the Jap-
anese had no four-engine bombers for
offensive missions.
27. Thus the flow of aircraft was
hardly providing the supposedly estab-
lished wastage of 20 per cent a month.
(Cable status reports; c M - o u T - 7 5 ~ ~
[629-42], Arnold to CinC/SWPA, $308,
2 9 June 1942.)
28. Lt. Col. William J. Kennard, Re-
port on Philippine and Australian Activi-
ties, 14 Nov. 1942.
29. Coleman interview; interview with
members of 19th Bomb. Gp., 5 Dec. 1942;
statement of Col. William Hipps to
author; Kennard report; Richardson and
7 2 3